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INTRODUCTION
This article is the second in a series discussing the evolution and application
of Pub. Act No. 80-1099' (Act), Illinois' determinate sentencing law.2 The
earlier article showed that the Act, also known as the Class X Bill,3 adopted
two broad approaches to rationalizing the process by which sentences were
bargained for, imposed, and served.4 The first approach was to place mean-
ingful structural limitations on the exercise of discretion by prosecutorial,
judicial, and correctional officials. 5 The second was to devise direct substan-
tive limitations on the exercise of sentencing discretion by the judiciary. 6
The first article also reviewed the effectiveness of the structural controls
just referred to, concluding that in the main those controls had been circum-
vented or invalidated.7 As a result, the Act's goal of fair and proportionate
criminal sentences has been imperiled. Numerous remedies for that situation
were proposed.' Nevertheless, unless and until those remedies are imple-
mented, the rationality of criminal sentences is dependent almost entirely on
how the judiciary uses its authority as granted and limited by the Act's
substantive sentencing provisions. This article examines that subject.
A detailed historical treatment of the evolution of the Act's substantive
sentencing provisions9 will show that they were deliberately kept vague,
subtle, and indirect,' 0 principally because of a fundamental political com-
promise that paved the way for the Act's passage. This compromise consisted
of an agreement by the proponents of Governor Thompson's legislative
package to accept a detailed set of rigorous structural controls on sentencing
discretion. In return, the Governor's opponents agreed to accept substantive
sentencing limitations that, at least facially, were hardly confining."
Thus, the Act's substantive limitations on sentencing discretion, when
viewed in isolation, were poorly suited to the task of providing the necessary
1. An act in relation to the criminal justice system in Illinois, Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub.
Act No. 80-1099, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264-3318 (codified throughout Unified Code of Corrections,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1001-1008 (1983)) [hereinafter cited as Pub. Act No. 80-1099].
2. The first article is Schuwerk, Illinois' Experience With Determinate Sentencing: A Critical
Reappraisal Part 1: Efforts to Structure the Exercise of Discretion in Bargaining For, Imposing,
and Serving Criminal Sentences, 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 631 (1985).
3. Class "X" was a new felony crime category created by the bill for non-capital crimes
that were to be punished most severely. Previously, Illinois had had four felony classes (along
with murder, which was a separate class), ranging from class I (most serious) through class 4
(least serious). Most class X felonies had been class I felonies under prior laws. See infra notes
36-38 and accompanying text.
4. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 632-35.
5. Id. at 634, 640-43, 668-73, 696-707, 715-19.
6. Id. at 634-35.
7. Id. at 651-57, 673-707, 719-33.
8. Id. at 657-68, 708-14, 734-39.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 22-124.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 25-34, 52-113.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 47-113.
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guidance to sentencing judges. Partly for that reason, the new law's efforts
to limit or standardize the exercise of judicial sentencing discretion have not
enjoyed a very great measure of success. Moreover, the Act's lack of clarity
and specificity was compounded by irrational features of the law itself' 2 and
by a number of judicial decisions vitiating most of its few explicit substantive
limitations on sentencing discretion. 3
The above assertions will be buttressed by an extensive analysis of judicial
interpretations and applications of the Act's provisions relating to natural
life sentences,' 4 consecutive sentences, 5 and sentences for extended 6 and
12. See infra text accompanying notes 77-119, 130-63, 364-89, 519-49.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 226-45, 302-29, 425-93, 578-638.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 125-216.
This article will not attempt to treat the imposition of the death penalty in Illinois, even
though the topic is integrally related to the subject of sentencing disparity and richly deserves
a detailed review. The reasons for not doing so are entirely pragmatic: An analysis of the vast,
complex subject of capital sentencing would appreciably expand an already lengthy article.
Nonetheless, a few observations are in order. Illinois is currently laboring under a death
penalty statute that, at varying times and in varying cases, a majority of the Justices of the
Illinois Supreme Court has concluded is unconstitutional because it delegates undue discretion
to prosecutors. See People v. Lewis, 88 I11. 2d 129, 179-210, 430 N.E.2d 1346, 1370-85 (Simon,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982); People ex. rel. Carey v. Cousins, 77 II1.
2d 531, 544-61, 397 N.E.2d 809, 816-24 (1979) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (Justice Ryan was joined
in his dissent by Chief Justice Goldenhersh and Justice Clark). In a number of cases, arbitrary
exercises of that discretion have had to be corrected by the supreme court. See, e.g., People
v. Walker, 84 Ill. 2d 512, 520-26, 419 N.E.2d 1167, 1173-76 (1981) (unconstitutional for state
to seek death penalty after defendant withdrew from plea bargain for 60-year sentence), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1297 (1984); id. at 527-33, 419 N.E.2d at 1176-79 (Ryan, J., concurring).
The prosecutorial actions reported in Walker highlight that the decision to pursue a death
sentence is fraught with potential for whim and caprice. It is a decision made in secret, and
requires neither explanation nor justification. In all but the rarest instances, the decision is not
subject to review. While the offenders selected for the death penalty must meet certain criteria,
see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (1983), prosecutors frequently decide not to pursue a death
sentence in cases that do qualify. No additional criteria have ever been formulated to govern
the choice between pursuing or not pursuing that option.
Finally, the sentencing process in death penalty cases is also troublesome. To begin with,
Illinois permits "death qualified" juries to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused, despite
mounting evidence that such juries are conviction-prone. See People v. Szabo, 94 I11. 2d 327,
353-57, 447 N.E.2d 193, 205-07 (1983); Lewis, 88 111. 2d at 146-47, 430 N.E.2d at 1354. Moreover,
the supreme court has refused to give relief from what appears to be a pervasive practice of
excluding racial minorities from juries in both capital and noncapital cases. See People v.
Payne, 99 I11. 2d 135, 136-39, 457 N.E.2d 1202, 1203-04 (1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 447
(1984); People v. Gaines, 88 I11. 2d 342, 358-59, 430 N.E.2d 1046, 1054, cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1001 (1982); see also Williams v. Illinois, 104 S. Ct. 2364 (1984) (denial of certiorari in three
Illinois cases raising systematic exclusion issue; Justice Marshall dissented); People v. Moore,
Ill. 2d, 463 N.E.2d 728 (1984) (denial of defendant's petition for leave to appeal raising same
issue; Justice Simon dissented).
Beyond these problems, the sentencer in death penalty cases is not given any significant
guidance concerning what factors should be deemed sufficient to override a finding that a
defendant could be sentenced to death. See Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d at 143-46, 430 N.E.2d at 1352-54
(court will consider all relevant factors although statute lacks individualized focus); People v.
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regular terms." Limitations on the availability of time, resources, and data
precluded an exhaustive empirical analysis of those subjects. s A review of
approximately one thousand cases that have arisen since the Act's effective
date, however, presents the overall picture that trial judges frequently exercise
their sentencing powers in an arbitrary and inconsistent fashion. 9 Moreover,
appellate review under the prevailing "abuse of discretion" standard 20 has
been completely ineffective in curbing such abuses.
Brownell, 79 III. 2d 508, 537-38, 404 N.E.2d 181, 196 (1979) (presence of mitigating factors
does not preclude imposition of death penalty), cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 811 (1980). Indeed,
the jury-the true sentencer in capital cases where the defendant does not request sentencing
by the court-can render its decision without reviewing any sort of evaluation of the defendant:
A pre-sentence report is not required in capital cases. See Gaines, 88 II1. 2d at 372-73, 430
N.E.2d at 1061 (judge not required to have pre-sentence report prepared before imposing
sentence in capital case; jury's finding that there were no mitigating factors that would preclude
imposition of the death penalty obliged him to impose death sentence).
Although the supreme court conscientiously reviews all death penalty cases, considering not
only errors of law but also those of proportionality, see People v. Glecker, 82 Ill. 2d 145, 411
N.E.2d 849 (1980), the court is probably not equipped institutionally to bring order to such a
system, if indeed that can be done at all. See Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose
Death, 68 GEo. L.J. 97 (1979).
15. See infra notes 217-351 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 352-566 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 568-896 and accompanying text.
This article makes no systematic effort to discuss the judiciary's use of probation. Reasons
for this include the relative dearth of reported cases in which probation was imposed and the
even fewer number in which a defendant claimed that he or she was erroneously denied
probation. Based on the limited information available, however, probation is not being withheld
inappropriately with any great degree of frequency. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 698-99;
infra notes 60, 75.
18. A thorough empirical study of sentencing practices in Illinois would be most welcome,
as would a number of changes in the manner in which aggregate sentencing decisions are
reported. The latter subject was treated briefly in Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 669, 695-701.
The author also realizes that a number of risks inhere in the methodology this article adopts-
criticizing particular sentencing decisions (or classes of such decisions) based on appellate
opinions-that would be largely obviated by an empirical approach. For one, a danger of bias
exists in selecting the cases to be discussed, such as representing an exceptional case as typical.
For another, there is the possibility that a decision which seems unsupportable based on the
factors the appellate court chose to discuss, might be entirely defensible based on matters of
record that were not mentioned in the reviewing court's opinion.
The author has attempted to avoid these dangers to the extent possible by routinely acknowl-
edging the existence of sound decisions respecting particular issues and by selecting cases that
give every indication of providing a complete treatment of the principal factors the trial court
thought pertinent to sentencing. If errors have occurred despite these precautions, the author
extends his apology to the judges and courts involved.
19. See infra notes 130-245, 271-329, 369-493, 519-49, 578-637, 692-710, 713-53, 783-96 and
accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., People v. La Pointe, 88 111. 2d 482, 492, 431 N.E.2d 344, 348 (1982) (the
defendant in this case is referred to as LaPointe by the Illinois appellate court; this article
adopts the Illinois Supreme Court's spelling of his name); People v. Perruquet, 68 111. 2d 149,
153, 368 N.E.2d 882, 883 (1977).
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The net effect of this approach to appellate review has been to treat
sentences that are not literally prohibited by the Act as being virtually
unassailable, even where they fly in the face of.the Act's overall concern
for fairness, proportionality, and consistency in sentencing. 2 This persistent
transformation of questions of propriety into questions of judicial power or
prerogative is both revealing and profoundly disturbing because, if this
judicial attitude is immutable, the possibility of meaningful reform of sentenc-
ing practices is very much in doubt. At the very least, the only reforms with
any chance of success would be stricter and more explicit limitations upon
judicial sentencing discretion.
I. THE EVOLUTION AND CONTENT OF THE ACT'S SUBSTANTIVE
CONTROLS ON JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION
A. The Early Reform Legislation
The most fundamental reforms proposed by the Act's early legislative
predecessors were the institution of a system of determinate sentences and
the abolition of parole. 22 These measures were undertaken in an effort to
lessen what was viewed as the arbitrary and undue exercise of discretion by
prosecutors, judges, and correctional officials in the bargaining for, impos-
ing, and serving of criminal sentences. 23 Determinate sentences were seen as
desirable primarily because they reduced the amount of discretion vested in
correctional officials through the parole release process. 24 Determinate sen-
tences, however, increased the significance of the original sentencing decision,
because the term imposed would be fully served less good-time credit earned.
Recognizing this, proponents of the early legislation realized that it would
be necessary to confine judicial sentencing discretion to some extent. Not
wishing to prevent the imposition of just sentences through unduly restrictive
guidelines, proponents of the early bills generally adopted an approach of
structuring rather than limiting the exercise of discretion. 25
21. See infra notes 144-245, 271-329, 369-493, 519-49, 578-637, 692-710, 713-53, 783-96 and
accompanying text,
22. See House Amendment No. I to H.B. 1500, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess.; S.B.
1885, 79th 111. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess. Before the Act was adopted, Illinois had an
indeterminate sentencing system, which allowed a judge to impose a minimum term and a
maximum term on an offender with the release date within that period determined by the
former Parole and Pardon Board. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-1 to 1003-3-13 (1975).
Determinate sentences call on judges to impose fixed terms of years on those offenders sentenced
to prison, who then must serve their entire sentences, less any earned good-conduct credits.
Under the determinate sentencing system, parole as a release mechanism is abolished. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-3(b) (1983).
23. For a discussion of the main purposes of the legislation, see Schuwerk, supra note 2,
at 635-38, 640-42, 668-73, 695-702, 715-19.
24. Id. at 637-38.
25. The Act attempted to insure that sentencing decisions were made in a reasoned, informed
1985]
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Nonetheless, it was believed that some substantive limits on judicial sen-
tencing discretion were needed as well. This discretion was limited in three
ways. First, this early legislation adopted a "least restrictive alternative"
approach to sentencing,2 6 in which probation became the preferred disposition
of all offenses for which it was authorized.27 Relatively narrow ranges of
prison sentences were authorized, with more severe sanctions reserved for
those offenders who clearly were not suitable candidates for some lesser
penalty.2 Second, in an effort to bolster the "least restrictive alternative"
sentencing principle and in order to provide general guidance to judges in
sentencing matters, this early legislation also specified the more important
mitigating and aggravating factors2 9 that sentencing judges should consider
manner. Beyond expanding use of pre-sentence investigations, the Act required that judges
provide reasons for the sentences they impose. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264,
3302 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1(c) (1983)); see also Schuwerk, supra note
2, at 668-706 (discussing the Act's structural controls on judicial discretion, including the reasons
requirement).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 52-68.
27. See Pub. Act. No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3303 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-6-1(a) (1983)). This reversed prior law, under which probation was to be denied
unless certain conditions were satisfied. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1(a) (1977).
28. Regular term prison sentences were intended to be the preferred incarcerative sanction
under these bills, with extended term or consecutive sentences reserved for narrowly drawn
classes of especially aggravated offenders. See Schuwerk, Commentary on Determinate Sen-
tencing Bill 33-35, 51-54 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Proposal Commentary]; Schuwerk, Technical
Paper-Comments on Proposed Determinate Sentencing Bill of the Subcommittee on Adult
Corrections of the Illinois House Judiciary 11 Committee 32-34 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Technical Paper]. For example, House Amendment No. I to H.B. 1500, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly,
1977 Sess., authorized extended term sentences for certain offenders found to "present a
continuing risk of physical harm to the public." Id. I 5-5-3.2(a)(2) at 40. It also mandated such
sentences for certain "repeat offender[s] whose imprisonment for an extended term is necessary
to protect the public." Id. I 5-5-3.2(a)(3) at 40-43.
That bill took the same sort of approach to imposing consecutive sentences. It adopted a
general rule flatly prohibiting sentences for offenses "which were committed as part of a single
course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal
objective." Id. I 5-8-4(a) at 56-57. It then went 6n, however, to require consecutive sentences
where "one of the offenses . . . was a class I felony and extreme violence or severe bodily
harm occurred." Id. Thus, these early proposals approached extended term and consecutive
sentences as sanctions reserved for the most violent or incorrigible offenders. While such
sentences were to be relatively rare, it was expected that they would be imposed quite consistently
when the requisite qualifying circumstances were present. See Schuwerk, Prepared Statement
delivered to the Adult Corrections Subcommittee 3-7 (Dec. 1, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Schuwerk Statement].
29. See House Amendment No. I to H.B. 1500, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 11 5-5-
3.1, 5-5-3.2 at 39-43; S.B. 1885, 79th Il. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 11 5-5-3.1, 5-5-3.2 at
27-30. While the array of bills proposed variations in the weight to be accorded the factors in
mitigation, the factors themselves essentially remained the same throughout the legislative pro-
cess. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3.1(a)(l)-(12) (1979)); S.B. 1885, 79th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., I
5-5-3.1(a)(1)-(12). The proposed factors in aggravation, however, changed significantly from
bill to bill. See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
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in imposing sentences.30 Finally, the early bills limited judicial sentencing
discretion by significantly narrowing the ranges of available regular term,
extended term, and consecutive prison sentences for given offenses.3'
Proponents of the early bills did not view these substantive limitations as
the most important aspects of the controls on judicial sentencing discretion,
nor were those limitations well designed to serve that end.32 Instead, it was
anticipated that various structural controls on the imposition and review of
sentences would prove to be the major source of such restraints.3 Structural
controls, coupled with increased information on sentencing practices, were
expected to result in either a common law of sentencing or, better still, a
detailed set of sentencing guidelines that would flesh out the bill's skeletal
sentencing scheme.34
B. The Original "Class X" Legislation
About the time that an early bill, House Bill (H.B.) 1500, was securing
passage in the Illinois House of Representatives, Governor Thompson caused
an eight-bill package of criminal justice legislation to be introduced in the
Illinois Senate. 5 The Governor's package had a very different approach to
the use of determinate sentences and the need for sentencing reform. The
Governor's principal bill, Senate Bill (S.B.) 1272,36 proposed that only those
convicted of murder or seven other felony offenses receive determinate
sentences.3 7 Those seven felonies were to be reclassified into a new felony
class -"class X"-for which a mandatory six-year minimum prison term
was created.3 8 The Senate bill also abolished parole for persons convicted of
murder and class X offenses, with release possible only after they had served
their full sentences less time off for good behavior.39
30. The guidelines were not particularly restrictive. By and large they did not suggest what
effect the presence or absence of particular factors should have on the length and the type of
sentence imposed; they did not discuss the relative weight and importance between factors; and
they did not make the presence or absence of any of them decisive in selecting a particular
sentence. Without those kinds of additional limitations, the use of such factors was criticized
by one authority as likely to be ineffectual. See McAnany, Merritt & Tromanhauser, Illinois
Reconsiders "Flat Time": An Analysis of the Impact of the Justice Model, 52 CHI.[-]KENT L.
REV. 621, 627-33 (1976). As it has turned out, those criticisms were well taken.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 93-101.
32. See supra note 30 and infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
33. For a detailed description of these controls, see Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 668-73, 695-
702.
34. See House Amendment No. I to H.B. 1500, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess.,
5-5-4.3 at 43-44; see also Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 672-73, 696-97 (judiciary retained its preemi-
nent role in sentencing under the Act, but its discretion was to be influenced by data on actual
sentencing practices as well as by any sentencing guidelines that might be adopted).
35. These bills were S.B. 1272-1279, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess.
36. S.B. 1272, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess.
37. Id. 5-8-1.1 at 16.
38. Id. §§ 1, 4 at 1-4, 18-21 and 5-8-1.1(c)(2) at 17.
39. Id. 3-3-3(c) at 6.
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S.B. 1272 did very little to address the concerns of the proponents of
H.B. 1500 and its predecessors regarding the fairness of the sentences imposed
upon and served by criminals in Illinois."' Significantly, the Senate bill
omitted all of the structural and substantive limitations on the exercise of
sentencing discretion by prosecutors, judges, and correctional officials con-
tained in the House bill." Proponents of S.B. 1272 were interested in deter-
minate sentences only to the extent that such sentences would offer possibly
greater deterrents to certain classes of potential offenders."
Fueled by philosophical differences and political considerations, the debate
between the proponents of the House and Senate bills became exceptionally
heated, even by the General Assembly's normally boisterous standards. No
useful purpose would be served in recounting the byzantine, bizarre, and
frequently dubious parliamentary maneuvers indulged in by all sides 3.4 The
upshot of the whole affair was that H.B. 1500 was interred in the Senate
Judiciary II Committee, 44 while components of the Governor's Senate bill
package either suffered a similar fate in the House Judiciary II Committee 5
or were defeated on procedural grounds on the House floor.4' Thus, the
1977 regular legislative session ended in tumult with no sentence reform
legislation passed.
C. The Compromise Leading to the Act
Shortly after the close of the 1977 regular legislative session, calls were
issued for a special session to deal with criminal justice issues. Both Governor
40. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 640-42, 668-73, 695-702, 715-19.
41. See id.
42. Statements issued by Governor Thompson's office contemporaneously with the intro-
duction of this legislative package made this point. Apparently, however, there was no concern
at that juncture over how to select a fair sentence for these types of offenders. One example
of the bill's cavalier attitude in this respect was its failure to provide any maximum sentence
for murder or class X felonies, coupled with its failure to provide guidelines or restraints on
the selection of an appropriate sentence. S.B. 1272, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess.,
5-8-1.1(c)(1), (2) at 17.
43. The author yields to temptation in mentioning one such instance that occurred when
the Governor's crime package was introduced in the Senate and referred to the Senate Judiciary
I! Committee. That body passed all eight bills without any prior hearing. Instead, proponents
and opponents were heard by the committee only after the bills were voted out. See ILL. S.
J., Ist Sess., 52 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Rock); id. at 52-53 (remarks of Sen. Netsch).
44. The actual history of the bill is a bit more complicated. Upon referral to the Senate
Judiciary 11 Committee, H.B. 1500, as amended, was further amended by Senate Amendment
No. I into a form identical to the Governor's proposal. See ILL. S. J., 1st Sess., 3246-3252
(1977). It was voted out of committee, as amended, but eventually was returned to the committee.
See Legislative Synopsis and Digest, 80th I11. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., at 1975.
45. This was the fate of Senate Amendment No. I to S.B. 165, 80th I11. Gen. Assembly,
1977 Sess., a Republican sponsored revision of S.B. 1272 which included the class X proposal
largely as set out in the latter bill, along with a modified habitual-offender provision and a
number of other recommendations from the Governor's package. The amended bill passed the
Senate, was sent to the House, and was referred to the House Judiciary 11 Committee where
a "do pass" motion failed.
46. After S.B. 165 failed to be reported out of the House committee, one final effort was
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Thompson and proponents of H.B. 1500 presented legislative proposals in
the special session. The principal bill in the Governor's package, S.B. 11, 47
was accompanied by a detailed message from him to the members of the
General Assembly explaining why his legislation was preferable to H.B.
1500.48 The proponents of H.B. 1500 countered with new H.B. 15, 49 a bill
that was hardly different from their earlier proposali 0 Once the House and
Senate bills had been introduced, a small group of key supporters of each
bill began intense efforts to reach a compromise." Although not without
their difficult moments, these efforts began bearing fruit almost immediately.
All three proposed areas of substantive control of judicial sentencing dis-
cretion-the principle of "least restrictive alternative" sentencing, the sta-
tutory specification of factors in mitigation and aggravation, and the narrowing
of overall sentencing ranges-were in sharp dispute between the proponents
of H.B. 15 and S.B. 11. Resolution of'these differences was no easy matter.
Like most hard-bargained legislative compromises, the Act approached and
resolved the three issues in a somewhat ambiguous and inconsistent fashion.
The most plausible reading of the Act, however, indicates that it embodied
a legislative compromise in which the proponents of S.B. 11 agreed to accept
"least restrictive alternative" sentencing, some additional limitations on a
number of proposed factors in aggravation, a substantial narrowing of the
available sentencing ranges for more serious felonies, and a plethora of
structural controls designed to make the sentencing process more rational
and accountable. In return, the supporters of H.B. 15 agreed to accept a
bill that, on its face, left extremely broad substantive sentencing discretion
in judicial hands, especially regarding extended term sentences and consec-
utive sentences for more serious felonies. By and large, only the Act's
structural controls and substantive principles of general applicability stood
made to get the Governor's program enacted by amending H.B. I (another habitual-offender
bill that had passed the House and was pending in the Senate) to include a revised version of
the class X package. See Senate Amendment No. 2 to H.B. 1, 80th 111. Gen. Assembly, 1977
Sess. The amended bill passed the Senate by a vote of 47-1, with 10 abstentions. See Memo-
randum from James Bagley to Representative Daniel Houlihan entitled Class X Legislative
History [hereinafter cited as Bagley Legislative History].
When the amended bill reached the House, however, a motion to accept the Senate amendment
was met by a point of order, the basis of which was that the amendment was non-germane to
H.B. 1. The speaker ruled that the point of order was well taken. A motion to overrule the
chair was made, but failed, and the bill died. Id.
47. S.B. 11, 80th I11. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess.
48. Address by Governor Thompson, The Class X Criminal Justice Program: An Analysis
and Comparison, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess. [hereinafter cited as Class X Analysis].
49. H.B. 15, 80th I1. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess.
50. The only change related to substantive sentencing discretion was the creation of a
"heinous crimes" category, which permitted a sentence of up to 50 years for certain crimes
accompanied by "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, indicative of wanton cruelty." See
H.B. 15, 80th 111. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-8-1(a)(2) at 52.
51. The members of this group were Senators Bowers, Egan, Netsch, Roe, and Sangmeister;
Representatives Getty and Katz; James Bagley of the House Democratic staff; and James Zagel
and Gary Starkman representing Governor Thompson. Numerous other persons made informal
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as potential checks on judicial discretion. The materials that follow trace
out those developments in detail.
1. The Principle of "Least Restrictive Alternative" Sentencing
A principal aim of the proponents of H.B. 15 and its predecessors was to
have penal sanctions selected on a "least restrictive alternative" basis. One
motivation for this position was a belief that such an approach would
promote consistency, proportionality, and fairness in sentencing.12 A second
motivation was a belief that more severe penal sanctions normally serve no
rehabilitative purpose and, thus, should be reserved for situations in which
punishment was properly the overriding sentencing goal.53 The proponents
of S.B. 11, however, were of a different view. They saw incarceration-even
lengthy incarceration-as the preferred sentencing alternative, with probation
to be grudgingly doled out only to the particularly deserving.5 4
Determining how these conflicting views were resolved requires a review
of the Act's provisions relating to probation as a sentencing alternative and
the application of various factors in aggravation in the sentencing process.
An examination of those provisions shows that the Act rejected S.B. 11 's
proposals in favor of the "least restrictive alternative" approach called for
by H.B. 15.
a. The Availability of Probation
H.B. 15 and S.B. 11 took polar-opposite positions as to the availability
of probation. H.B. 15 proposed that probation be granted unless it was
either flatly prohibited by the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections (Code)
or found inappropriate by the court for certain reasons. Thus, probation
would be the presumptively appropriate sentence when available.5 S.B. 11,
on the other hand, required that probation be refused unless certain precon-
ditions were met.5 6 Moreover, the particular preconditions of S.B. 11 included
not only two of the three criteria then called for by Illinois law,57 but also
contributions to this effort.
52. Proposal Commentary, supra note 28, at 32-34; Schuwerk Statement, supra note 28,
at 5-7.
53. Proposal Commentary, supra note 28, at 32-33; Schuwerk Statement, supra note 28, at
3-5.
54. See S.B. I1, 80th 111. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess., I 5-6-1(a) at 48-49 (probation
to be denied unless certain very stringent conditions were met); id. 5-5-3.2(a) at 46 (regular
term factors in aggravation to serve as reasons to impose lengthy sentences); id. 5-5-3.2(b)(4)
at 46-47 (extended term sentences to be imposed on general deterrence rationale); see also Class
X Analysis, supra note 48, at 32, 34-35, 37 (urging that extended term provisions of H.B. 1500
were too restrictive).
55. H.B. 15, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-6-1(a) at 43.
56. S.B. 11, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-6-1(a) at 48-49.
57. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1(a)(1), (3) (1975) (imprisonment to be utilized
as sentencing option where necessary for the protection of the public or where probation or
conditional discharge would deprecate the seriousness of the offender's conduct and be incon-
sistent with the ends of justice); S.B. 11, 80th 111. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess.,
5-6-1(a)(1), (2) at 48-49.
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the requirements that "the character and attitude of the defendant indicate
that he is unlikely to commit another crime" and that "the defendant is
particularly likely to comply with the terms of a period of probation.""8
The Act resolved this conflict by making probation available on precisely
the terms proposed in H.B. 15 .59 This elevation of probation to a preferred
disposition for all probationable offenses reversed prior Illinois law in that
regard,6° but its significance extends far beyond that fact. When that reversal
is read in conjunction with the Act's preference for shorter regular terms
sentences 6' and its failure to mandate either extended term or consecutive
sentences for any offenders other than three-time class X felons, 62 the
conclusion is inescapable that in adopting the Act the General Assembly
embraced the principles of "least restrictive alternative" sentencing.
b. The Use of Factors in Aggravation of Regular Term Sentences
One major difference between S.B. 11 and H.B. 15 lay in the uses each
would make of factors in aggravation of regular term prison sentences. The
manner in which those differences were resolved provides additional support
for the proposition that the Act adopted a "least restrictive alternative"
sentencing principle. Under H.B. 15, the presence of factors in aggravation
of regular term sentences weighed in favor of imposing a term of impris-
onment rather than probation, but did not mandate a prison term unless
otherwise specified. 63 Under S.B. 11, however, the presence of even a single
factor in aggravation would preclude probation and, further, would mandate
a more severe regular term prison sentence.6 The clear thrust of the Senate
58. S.B. 11, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, Ist 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-6-1(a)(3), (4) at 49,
59. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3303 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-6-1(a) (1983)); H.B. 15, 80th 111. Gen. Assembly, lst 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-6-1(a)
at 43 (both providing that probation or conditional discharge be imposed on offender unless
certain circumstances exist).
60. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1(a) (1977) (mandating imprisonment for
offenders unless certain conditions were met) with Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws
3264, 3303 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1(a) (1983)) (making probation or
conditional discharge the preferred disposition).
This reversal of prior law has been recognized by the supreme court. See People v. Cox, 82
Ill. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980) (probation not to be denied unless statutory basis for doing
so is apparent from record). Denying probation on a general deterrence rationale also appears
widely recognized as inconsistent with probation's new favored status. Thus, probation may
not be denied solely because it would deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's offense.
Instead, it also must be inconsistent with the ends of justice in the case at bar. See, e.g., People
v. Huffman, 78 I1. App. 3d 525, 527-29, 397 N.E.2d 526, 528-30 (4th Dist. 1979); People v.
Thomas, 76 Il1. App. 3d 969, 973-76, 395 N.E.2d 601, 603-06 (5th Dist. 1979); cf. People v.
Knowles, 70 Ill. App. 3d 30, 32-35, 388 N.E.2d 261, 263-65 (4th Dist. 1979) (reaching result
comparable to that in Huffman and Thomas, but applying pre-Act law).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65.
62. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
63. H.B. 15, 80th I1. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-5-3.2(a)(1), (4) at 39, 41
(factors to be weighed in favor of imprisonment); id. 5-5-3.2(a)(2), (3) at 39-41 (aggravating
factors would require imprisonment).
64. S.B. 11, 80th Il1. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-5-3.2(a) at 46.
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provisions was to shift the center of gravity away from probation or other
nonincarcerative dispositions to terms of imprisonment.
The compromise struck on this issue tilted rather markedly toward the
position advocated by the proponents of H.B. 15, by mandating that aggra-
vating factors be given weight in favor of a regular term prison sentence,
while only permitting the consideration of aggravating factors to extend
sentences of that type. 65 This clear legislative preference for shorter rather
than longer sentences when probation was inappropriate is consistent with
the principle of "least restrictive alternative" sentencing. When considered
in conjunction with the preeminent position given to probation in the Act's
overall sentencing scheme, this provision manifests a legislative intent that
sentencing judges move upwards from the least restrictive (nonincarcerative)
sanctions available to more and more restrictive penalties, and select the
least restrictive alternative commensurate with the circumstances at hand.
c. The Use of Factors Qualifying Offenders for Extended Term or
Consecutive Sentences
The ways in which factors could be used to qualify offenders for extended
term or consecutive sentences also underwent a metamorphosis during the
compromise process. The resulting changes provide further support for the
notion that the Act embodies a "least restrictive alternative" sentencing
principle. H.B. 15 presented a narrowly drawn catalogue of offenders who
merited, and were required to receive, extended term or consecutive sen-
tences. 66 The compromise rejected this approach in favor of one similar to
that of S.B. 11, which balanced more broadly phrased aggravating factors
with permissive, rather than mandatory, extended term or consecutive sen-
tences when those aggravating factors were present. 67 The only exception to
this rule was to require natural life sentences for certain three-time class X
felons, 6 a group clearly comprising a small number of dangerous, hard-core
offenders.
This change, too, is consistent with a "least restrictive alternative" ap-
proach to sentencing in that it permits the factors that could trigger a lengthy
sentence to be overridden by mitigating circumstances. In adopting this
65. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(l)-(7) (1983)).
66. H.B. 15, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, Ist 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-5-3.2(a)(2), (3) at 39-41.
67. S.B. II, 80th I1. Gen. Assembly, Ist 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-5-3.2(b), 5-8-4(a) at 46-47,
61-62.
68. The compromise fashioned mandated natural life sentences for three-time class X felons
whose crimes were committed after the effective date of the Act, with the second crime
committed after conviction for the first and the third crime committed after conviction for the
second. Pub. Act. No. 80-1099, § I, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3269 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 33B-l(a) (1979)) This provision has since been amended (codified as amended at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 33B (1983)).
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approach, however, the General Assembly necessarily committed itself to a
sentencing system in which considerations of rationality, consistency, and
fairness would arise, if at all, primarily through judge-made limitations
rather than statutory ones. Because of the broad latitude given to sentencing
judges by the Act, the need for judicial controls was acute.
2. The Specification of Factors in Mitigation and Aggravation
The Act's utilization of factors in mitigation and aggravation as a guide
to judicial sentencing decisions, while well intentioned, has proven to be
ineffective and confusing. The factors in mitigation are clear and substan-
tively unobjectionable but they have failed, in all likelihood, to have any
significant impact on sentencing decisions. 69 The various factors in aggra-
vation, on the other hand, have had a significant impact. Due to various
defects in drafting and errors in interpretation and application, however,
that impact unfortunately has been more harmful than beneficial. 70
a. Factors in Mitigation
The Act listed a series of factors in mitigation 71 to "be accorded a weight
in favor of withholding or minimizing a sentence of imprisonment. ' 72 For
a variety of reasons, however, that admonition probably has had no real
effect on sentencing decisions. For one thing, although the factors apply to
all dispositions whether by trial or by plea,73 the overriding determinant of
the sentence imposed after a plea involving a bargain as to sentence is likely
to be the agreed-upon sentence itself.74 For the relatively few cases that
remain, the noncontroversial and common sense nature of the factors them-
selves virtually assures that they would have been considered by a sentencing
judge even in the absence of a statute. Arguably, the mere listing of these
factors, especially when coupled with the requirement that they be given
some weight, may have both increased and standardized their use to some
degree.7 Any benefit along those lines, however, was minimized by the fact
69. See infra text accompanying notes 71-76.
70. See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
71. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I1. Laws 3264, 3300-01 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.1(a)(1)-(12) (1983)).
72. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 11. Laws 3264, 3300 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3.1(a) (1983)).
73. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Il. Laws 3264, 3295, 3309 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-4-1(a)(3), 1005-8-1(b) (1983)).
74. The Act itself makes the plea bargain struck a factor that the court must take into
consideration. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Il1. Laws 3264, 3295 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1(b) (1983)). As to why that factor is likely to be decisive, see Schuwerk,
supra note 2, at 643 n.62.
75. There is no hard evidence either way on this question. Although the use of probation
had modestly increased since the Act became effective, see Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 698-99,
that upturn could just as readily be due to other factors-such as the new status of probation
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that the Act failed to rank or quantify the importance of the mitigating
factors either among themselves or in relation to any aggravating circum-
stances that might be present in a given case.76 This failure, of course,
permitted the proclivities of particular judges to weigh heavily in the balance,
even in apparently similar cases.
b. Factors in Aggravation
The Act took an even looser approach to factors in aggravation. It specified
seven considerations required to be weighed in favor of imposing a regular
term prison sentence instead of a non-prison alternative. In addition, these
seven factors could be utilized to impose a regular term sentence that was
longer than the minimum. 77 On a fair reading, the Act also permitted judicial
accretions to the specified list. 7s Next, the Act made the presence of either
of two additional factors a precondition to the discretionary imposition of
an extended term prison sentence. 79 Finally, the Act specified the aggravating
factors that had to be present before consecutive sentences could be imposed
for offenses growing out of a single course of conduct. But, as with extended
term sentences, the imposition of a consecutive sentence was made optional
rather than mandatory. 80
as a preferred sentencing alternative or changes in plea bargaining practices-rather than to the
specification of mitigating factors. On the other hand, as the legal principles underlying
probation's new favored status have been interpreted correctly, see supra note 60, it certainly
is possible that this increase is due to a faithful implementation of the Act.
76. See supra note 30 and infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
77. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 II1. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(l)-(7) (1983)), amended by Act of Sept. 17, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-432, §
1, 1983 II1. Laws 3365, 3366 (making the commission of crimes against victims 60 years of age
and older an additional aggravating factor), further amended by Act of Sept. 23, 1983, Pub.
Act No. 83-704, § 1, 1983 I11. Laws 4472, 4473 (making the commission of a crime in a place
of worship or on its grounds prior to, during, or immediately following worship service an
additional aggravating factor), further amended by Act of Sept. 17, 1984, Pub. Act. No. 83-1449,
§ I, 1984 IlI. Legis. Serv. 33 (West) (making commission of a crime while released on bail
or on probation an additional aggravating factor) (codified respectively at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(8), (9), (10) (1984 Supp.)).
78. See infra notes 578-85 and accompanying text.
79. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(l)-(2) (1983)), amended by Act of Sept. 17, 1981, Pub. Act No. 82-564,
§ 3, 1981 III. Laws 2835, 2847 (defendants committing crimes against victims under 12 or over
60 years old, or physically handicapped, to be subjected to extended term sentences), further
amended by Act of July 28, 1982, Pub. Act No. 82-884, § 1, 1982 III. Laws 1982, 1983 (codified
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-5-3(c)(2)(c) (1983) (subjecting certain persons participating in
gang rapes to extended term sentences), further amended by Act of Jan. 5, 1984, Pub. Act.
No. 83-1067, § 4, 1983 11. Laws 7251, 7269 (amending the gang rape provision to conform to
new criminal sexual assault law, but not otherwise changing substance of factor) (codified
respectively at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(3), (4) (1984 Supp.)).
80. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983)).
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It was extremely unlikely that this system of statutory factors in aggra-
vation would have any rationalizing effect on sentencing practices without
the judiciary's thoughtful and enthusiastic implementation of additional
limitations. Putting aside purely interpretive questions for the time being,"'
the difficulties involved fell within three broad areas. First, the Act encour-
aged unrestrained judicial discretion. Second, it failed to devise a method
for deciding upon an extended term or consecutive sentence. Third, it gave
insufficient guidelines for choosing a particular sentence from within the
statutory range.
Concerning the first of these flaws, the Act's system unnecessarily en-
couraged the exercise of unrestrained judicial sentencing discretion in several
ways. It authorized judicial additions to existing regular term factors in
aggravation, subject only to the general limitation that the factors be "con-
sistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing set out in [the Act]."8 2
The Act then expanded judicial sentencing discretion still further by including
factors in aggravation that specifically allow a judge's own system of values
to come into play in a manner related tangentially, at best, to the nature of
the offender or the offense. For example, a judge's subjective belief that a
prison sentence is "necessary to deter others from committing the same
crime" may aggravate the defendant's sentence. 3 Finally, the Act left its
factors in aggravation unranked and unweighted in relative importance either
among themselves or in opposition to any mitigating factors in a given case.14
81. Many of the Act's factors in aggravation have proven very difficult to interpret. For
discussions of a number of the major problems that have arisen, see infra notes 226-37, 302-
29, 414-93, 641-753 and accompanying text .
82. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3309 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-1(b) (1983)).
83. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(7) (1983)). There are two important limitations on this statement. First,
the Act specifically makes general deterrence alone an insufficient basis to deny probation. See
supra note 60.
In addition, general deterrence is not an available basis for imposing an extended term
sentence, although it is frequently utilized in that manner. See, e.g., People v. Lobdell, 121 Ill.
App. 3d 248, 459 N.E.2d 260 (3d Dist. 1983); People v. Longoria, 117 111. App. 3d 241, 452
N.E.2d 1350 (2d Dist. 1983). This precedent is clearly in error for two reasons. First, the Act's
list of factors justifying an extended term sentence is all-inclusive. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099,
§ 3, 1977 Il1. Laws 3264, 3301, 3310 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.2(b),
1005-8-2(a) (1983)). Second, the General Assembly specifically considered and rejected legisla-
tion that would have allowed a general deterrence rationale to support such sanctions. See
S.B. I1, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-5-3.2(b)(4) at 46-47. Presumably,
the General Assembly concluded that such lengthy sanctions should be imposed only when
appropriate in light of the defendant's personal circumstances. Unfortunately, this principle
has not always been recognized. See infra text accompanying notes 317-29, 425-93.
84. See supra note 30. A number of these factors, such as "caus[ing] . . . serious harm"
or having "a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity," see Pub. Act. No. 80-1099, §
3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(1), (3) (1983)),
obviously embraced a wide range of conduct. The Act, however, did not attempt to grade the
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Thus, absent a thoughtful and diligent implementation by the judiciary, the
Act's system of aggravating factors threatened to become little more than a
license to place a judicial thumb on the sentencing scales in an essentially
unreviewable manner.
A second and closely related problem was the Act's failure to devise a
satisfactory method for deciding when to resort to its more draconian
extended term and consecutive sentences. The Act specified the necessary
preconditions for such a sentence but not the sufficient ones. 5 This approach
was flawed in three respects. First, the ostensibly distinct forms of behavior
triggering those harsher sentences were really not distinct at all.8 6 Second,
the Act permitted a judge to reject extended term and consecutive sentences
in favor of a regular term sentence, despite the presence of the qualifying
behavior required by the more severe alternatives. 7 Thus, even if a classifica-
tion of behavior into distinct, relatively discrete categories were possible, such
an effort would have been largely nullified because the Act allowed judges
to either ignore or consider the qualifying behavior without providing any
explicit guidance as to how that decision should be made."
conduct those factors included or, perhaps more importantly, to require explicitly that a
sentencing judge do so in selecting an appropriate sanction.
85. See supra notes 77-80. The Act sets forth seven factors in aggravation which must be
accorded weight in favor of imposing a term of imprisonment or may be considered by the
court as reasons for imposing a more severe sentence. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Il.
Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(I)-(7) (1983)). It also
provides other factors, such as prior felony convictions in Illinois of the same or greater class
as that involved in the current offense or the existence of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
accompanying the offense, that may be considered by the court as reasons to impose an ex-
tended term sentence upon any offender who was at least 17 years old on the date the crime
was committed. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b) (1983). Finally, the Act also pro-
vides that the court may impose consecutive sentences for certain felonies where the defendant
afflicted severe bodily injury. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983). In no case, however,
does the presence of a particular type of aggravating factor mandate that a sentence of that
type be imposed.
86. For example, a defendant who tortured his victim in the course of raping her could be
found simultaneously to have "caused . . . serious harm, " for purposes of receiving a regular
term sentence, to have engaged in "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of
wanton cruelty," for purposes of receiving an extended term sentence, and also to have
committed "a class X . . . felony [in the course of which] the defendant inflicted severe bodily
injury," for purposes of receiving a consecutive sentence. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977
111. Laws 3264, 3301, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.2(a)(1), 1005-5-3.2(b)(2),
1005-8-4(a) (1983)). Those provisions of the Act that allowed both extended term sentences
or natural life sentences to be imposed on murderers upon the identical showing that they
had engaged in "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty," Pub.
Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3301, 3308 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 1005-5-3.2(b)(2), 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1983)), threatened to be even more unfathomable. See infra
notes 165-216 and accompanying text.
87. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 II1. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b) (1983)) (extended term factors in aggravation "may be considered . . .
as reasons to impose" such a sentence (emphasis added)); Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977
111. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983) (court "may"
impose consecutive sentence when certain circumstances are present).
88. The Act's only clues as to which of the sentencing alternatives to choose were a
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Third, and perhaps most distressingly, many of the Act's aggravating
factors were clearly inappropriate in many cases in which they were literally
applicable. For example, one provision of the Act permitted an extended
term sentence to be imposed on certain offenders who had prior convictions
of the same or a greater class of felony.8 9 The routine application of this
provision would have resulted in extended term sentences being imposed
most often on those recidivist felons committing the least serious class of
felony and least often on those committing the most heinous crimes. 9° Basing
resort to lengthy sentences on this factor, without specifying what additional
aggravating circumstances might make resort to such sanctions appropriate,
greatly increased the likelihood of substantia and unjustified sentencing
disparities. 9'
Finally, assuming that all of the foregoing problems had been solved and
that a rational decision had been made between a regular term, extended
term, or consecutive prison sentence, one last difficulty remained: the selec-
tion of a particular sentence from within the frequently vast range available.
With the exception of regular term sentences, the Act's various factors in
aggravation are limited to suggesting a particular category of prison sentence
without providing any explicit guidance as to how to select a sentence from
within the available range. This problem could have been alleviated somewhat
if the Act had sought to grade or quantify the broad range of conduct
embraced within a number of its factors in aggravation, but this was not
done. Consequently, only the Act's general principle of least restrictive
sentencing and its overriding concern for consistency and proportionality in
sentencing matters applied to this final aspect of the sentencing decision.92
The effect of such tacit and amorphous limitations, however, was problem-
atic. Unless those precepts were adhered to assiduously by sentencing judges
and policed zealously by courts of review, a very real risk existed that a
sentencing judge would view the entire range of the more severe penalties
as equally available to an offender who merited one of those sanctions.
Because those ranges span a substantial term of years, at least for more
serious offenses, the potential discretion vested in sentencing judges by the
Act is enormous.
preference for the least restrictive alternative, see supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text,
and a desire for consistency and proportionality in sentencing. See Schuwerk, supra note 2,
at 686-89. In the absence of further judicial elaboration of the circumstances in which a court
should choose those more severe sentencing alternatives, these broad principles were not likely
to confine the discretion of a judge. Such elaboration, however, has not been forthcoming.
89. Pub. Act. No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(1) (1983)).
90. Fortunately, courts seem to have recognized and avoided the absurdities of an even-
handed application of this provision. See infra notes 364-68 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 364-89, 425-93, 519-49 and accompanying text.
92. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 686-89.
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3. The Breadth of Sentencing Ranges
As the various bills culminating in the Act wended their way through the
legislative process, one of the principal areas of dispute centered on whether
there was a sufficient range of punishments available for the most serious
offenders. 93 The basic structure of the earliest proposal, S.B. 1885, called
for a total range of punishments for such offenses as shown in Chart 1
below. 94
Chart 1
Felony Regular Extended Consecutive
Class Term Term Term
M 20-30 NL* or Death
1 6-10 12-18 24-30**
* NL = Natural Life
** Based on both felonies being class I felonies
This early legislation limited the imposition of extended term sentences to
a relatively small group of exceptionally aggravated offenses. 95 Its even more
severe consecutive sentences were available only when the sentencing judge
found that a consecutive sentence was "required to protect the public from
further criminal conduct by the defendant" 96 and that the extended terms
of imprisonment authorized by the bill were "not adequate for that pur-
pose.'' 97
These limitations were sharply criticized in a number of quarters on several
grounds. 9 It was argued, for example, that narrow ranges did not provide
sufficient differentiation between the most and least culpable offenders of a
given type. It was also asserted that the upper limits of these ranges were
too low to provide sufficiently severe punishment for more aggravated
versions of the offenses or for defendants with lengthy prior criminal his-
tories. Finally, prosecutors maintained that their ability to obtain plea bar-
gains would be adversely affected because the narrow ranges would impair
the state's ability to offer significant sentencing concessions.
H.B. 1500 accommodated these concerns, but only to a limited extent.
The bill expanded the regular term, extended term, and consecutive sentenc-
93. The term "serious offenders" is used to describe murderers and what were formerly
class I felons, prior to passage of the Act. There appeared to be no serious opposition to
proposed limitations on the sentences available for class 2, class 3, and class 4 felons.
94. S.B. 1885, 79th 111. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess. 5-8-1, 5-8-2, 5-8-4 at 40-43.
95. Extended term sentences would have been available to a narrowly defined group of
brutal or recidivist defendants whose imprisonment for an extended term was found necessary
to protect the public. Id. 5-5-3.2(a)(2), (3) at 29.
96. Id. I 5-8-4(b) at 47.
97. Id.
98. The author recalls these arguments being raised by a number of witnesses who were
either prosecutors or judges.
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ing ranges for murder and class 1 felonies. 99 This expansion, however, was
offset to a considerable degree by a number of provisions that made it
unlikely that judges would resort to extended term or consecutive sentences
with any frequency. °° The net effect of these changes was to make the
maximum extended term and consecutive sentences under H.B. 1500 more
severe than those available under the earlier bill for class M and class 1
felonies, but less severe for other classes of felonies.' 0°
The Act, however, abandoned this approach. Although both regular and
extended term sentencing ranges for serious felonies were expanded once
99. The regular term, extended term, and consecutive sentence ranges proposed in H.B.
1500, as amended, are set out below:
Felony Regular Extended Consecutive
Class Term Term Term
M 20-40 NL* -
1 6-25 25-50 31-50**
* NL = Natural Life
** Based on both felonies being class I felonies.
100. In addition to containing all of S.B. 1885's limitations on the use of those lengthier
sentences, the amended version of H.B. 1500 also proposed to retain the requirements of then-
existing law (which S.B. 1885 had proposed to eliminate) that required that defendants first
have been committed to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for a diagnostic examination
and report. Compare S.B. 1885, 79th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 9 5-5-3.2, 5-8-2 at 28-30,
43-44 (extended term sentences may be imposed without DOC examination and report) with
House Amendment No. I to H.B. 1500, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 9 5-5-3.2, 5-8-2
at 40-43, 55-56 (extended term sentences require DOC evaluation of offender). Because the
DOC continued to lack the facilities and resources to complete such reports, the prospects of
using this greatly enlarged sentencing range to any significant extent was inconsequential.
H.B. 1500, as amended, exhibited similar caution in its proposed use of consecutive sentences.
It rejected the position taken by S.B. 1885 that consecutive sentences be tied to extended terms
and proposed instead to return to then-existing law in selecting the available ranges for such
sentences. Compare S.B. 1885, 79th IIl. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 99 5-8-2, 5-8-4(c)(2) at 43-44,
48 (setting out extended term sentence ranges and linking consecutive sentences to them) with
House Amendment No. I to H.B. 1500, 80th i1. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 99 5-8-1, 5-8-4(c)(2)
at 52-55, 57 (setting out regular term sentence ranges and linking consecutive sentences to them).
101. Differences in the resulting maximum consecutive terms are set out below.
COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES AVAILABLE UNDER




Felony 1 2 3 4
I 30/50 24/32 21/30 19/28
2 24/32 18/14 15/12 13/10
3 21/30 15/12 12/10 10/8
4 19/28 13/10 10/8 8/6
See House Amendment No. I to H.B. 1500, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess., 5-8-1,
5-8-4(c)(2) at 52-55, 57; S.B. 1885, 79th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 1$ 5-8-2, 5-8-4(c)(2)
at 43-44, 48.
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again, as shown in Chart 2 below, those changes were rather modest.'0 2
Chart 2
Felony Regular Extended Consecutive
Class Term Term Term***
M 20-40 or NL** 40-80 40-160
X* 6-30 30-60 12-120
1* 4-15 15-30 8-60
* Class X felonies under the Act were largely former class I felonies.
** NL = Natural Life
* Based on both felonies being of the same class
Of far greater significance were the Act's increase in the availability of
extended term and consecutive sentences and the enormous expansion of the
total ranges of consecutive sentences. The Act dispensed with efforts to limit
imposition of extended term and consecutive sentences to those few offenders
whose particularly egregious prior criminal records or conduct on the oc-
casion in question made any lesser sentence inappropriate.' 3 Moreover, in
some circumstances consecutive sentences could range from the sum of the
shortest two regular term minima to the sum of the longest two extended
term maxima for the various offenses involved.' °4 The Act, however, offered
no explicit guidance on how to utilize the vast discretion provided by such
a broad range. Indeed, no cogent rationale for creating this range was
102. See H.B. 15, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess., 1 5-8-1(a), 5-8-2(a) at
52, 54-55; Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3310 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 1005-8-1(a), 1005-8-2(a) (1983)).
103. Compare H.B. 15, 80th I1. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-5-3.2(b), 5-8-2(b),
5-8-4(c)(2) at 39-41, 55, 56-57 (linking consecutive sentences to regular term sentences and
requiring a DOC examination and report before imposing them) with Pub. Act No. 80-1099,
§ 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3301, 3311-12 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.2(b),
1005-8-2, 1005-8-4(c)(2) (1983)) (linking consecutive sentences to extended term sentences and
eliminating need for DOC examination and report).
104. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3312 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-4(c)(2) (1983)).
There are two qualifications to the rule that consecutive sentences can range up to the sum
of the maximum extended terms for the two most serious felonies involved. First, such sentences
may be limited to the sum of the regular term maxima for the two most serious felonies
involved if for some reason a defendant (such as one under the age of 17) is not subject to
any extended term sentence. Arguably, however, even in such cases the statute would permit
more than two regular term sentences to be strung together to reach the extended term maxima.
Second, the Illinois Supreme Court has recently concluded that when a defendant has
committed felonies of more than one class, only those of the most serious class may be punished
by extended term sentences. People v. Jordan, 103 11. 2d 192, 207, 469 N.E.2d 569, 574-76
(1984). Thus, a defendant convicted of two felonies of different classes cannot be sentenced to
a consecutive term in excess of the sum of the maximum extended term for the more serious
felony and the maximum regular term for the less serious one. This decision appears to be
erroneous. See infra note 405.
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provided. 05 This state of affairs obviously increased the likelihood of ca-
pricious sentencing decisions, with only judicial restraint and vigilance as
any real protection.
4. Unduly Confining Efforts to Limit Sentencing Discretion
The Act's loose and ambiguous treatment of factors in mitigation and
aggravation and its expansive authorization of extended terms and consec-
utive sentences complicated the development of a rational sentencing system.
Ironically enough, these complications were exacerbated by the Act's overly
rigid insistence on mandatory minimum prison sentences in a variety of
circumstances. In addition to perpetuating all prior provisions for mandatory
minimum sentences,"°6 the Act created a variety of new offenses carrying
those terms. 0 7 The Act also added to the circumstances in which a defend-
ant's prior record would render an otherwise probationable offense
105. One conceivable rationale for this broad range is to allow for the common judicial
practice of imposing relatively short sentences on probation or parole violators, which run
consecutively to those imposed for their previous offenses. See cases cited infra notes 226-
32. This possibility, however, is weakened by the Act's requirement that consecutive sentences
not be imposed unless they are necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct
by the defendant. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(b) (1983)). It is difficult to see how such sentences have been
squared with a "protect the public" requirement where the defendant could be incarcerated
for as long a period by concurrent sentences. See infra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
Another possible rationale for this provision is to permit imposition of longer than regular
term sentences on offenders who appear to be particularly dangerous but who are not eligible
for extended term sentences because of their youth. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill.
Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b) (1983)) (defendant must
have been at least 17 when he committed offense to be eligible for extended term sentence).
Several apparent instances of imposing these longer terms on young offenders have been
reported. See People v. Perez, 115 I11. App. 3d 446, 450 N.E.2d 870 (1st Dist. 1983) (16-year-
old defendant given consecutive sentences of 35 and 15 years for brutal execution style murder
and attempted murder); People v. Hicks, 112 I11. App. 3d 303, 446 N.E.2d 516 (3d Dist. 1983)
(defendant given consecutive 20-year sentences for particularly brutal rape and deviate sexual
assault of young child), aff'd, 101 Ill. 2d 366, 462 N.E.2d 473 (1984) (supreme court's opinion
revealed that defendant was 15 at time of crime).
106. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(d)(1), (g) (1977) (probation, imprisonment
and conditional discharge not allowed for certain crimes; prohibiting probation for offender
convicted of class I felony while on probation for committing a previous felony) with Pub.
Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I1. Laws 3264, 3298 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-
3(c)(2), (4) (1983)) (retaining language in the 1977 provision).
107. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 1, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3265 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 10-2 (1983)) (aggravated kidnapping); Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 1, 1977 Ill. Laws
3264, 3266 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-4 (1983)) (heinous battery); Pub. Act No.
89-1099, § 1, 1977 Il1. Laws, 3264, 3267 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 30-1 (1983))
(treason); Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 1, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3268 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 33A-1 (1983)) (an expanded armed violence provision); Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3,
1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3298 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2)(C) (1983))
(making all the foregoing offenses nonprobationable); Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111.
Laws 3264, 3298 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2)(C), (6) (1983)) (making
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nonprobationable'0 s and created a mandatory natural life sentence without
possibility of parole for certain defendants convicted of three or more class
X felonies. 109
As is discussed in more detail elsewhere,'' these provisions have had two
distinct adverse effects on the development of a rational sentencing process.
First, in a number of cases, these provisions have compelled the imposition
of sentences that even the judges and prosecutors involved believed were too
severe."' Second, and far more frequently, the provisions have fostered pleas
and sentences to inappropriate charges in an effort to evade the disposition
called for by law.'' 2 While some of these cases are explainable as efforts to
do justice in the case at hand," 3 that justice is attained only at the substantial
cost of distorting the seriousness of the criminal activity involved and
undermining the overall credibility and fairness of the sentencing process.
5. Subsequent Developments
Unfortunately, many of the disturbing aspects of the Act's provisions
aimed at controlling the judiciary's substantive sentencing discretion have
been exacerbated by developments occurring subsequent to its passage. As
an example, the General Assembly has continued to expand the list of factors
attempted murder nonprobationable).
108. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3298 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2)(G), (6) (1983)).
109. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, §§ 1, 3, 1977 I1. Laws 3264, 3269, 3298, 3308 (codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 33B-l(a), 1005-5-3(c)(5), 1005-8-1(a)(2) (1983)).
110. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 645-51, 660-61.
111. Id. at 648-49 n.79; see also People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 205-09, 464 N.E.2d 1059,
1062-64 (1984) (affirming power of General Assembly to establish mandatory natural life
sentence for murder as applied to defendants to whom trial judge would have given lesser
sentence were it available).
112. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 645-51.
113. Since the passage of the Act, numerous courts have balked at imposing, and occasionally
have simply refused to impose, its more severe penalties. For a representative cross-section of
the various stratagems employed, see People ex rel. Daley v. Schreier, 92 Il. 2d 271, 442
N.E.2d 185 (1982) (disallowing the trial judge's imposition of a class 3 felony penalty provision
upon defendant convicted of a class X felony on the basis that the class X felony classification
was unconstitutional, and therefore, its penalty provision inapplicable); People ex rel. Daley v.
Limperis, 86 I11. 2d 459, 460, 427 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1981) (expressing disapproval of the trial
judge's device to avoid imposing a class X felony sentence by entering a non-appealable acquittal
of the class X offense of delivering over 30 grams of cocaine; trial judge had found defendants
guilty of delivering lesser amounts even though the parties had stipulated that the quantity
involved exceeded 30 grams); People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 i1. 2d 537, 541, 416
N.E.2d 259, 263 (1981) (issuing a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to vacate its order
granting defendant probation for a non-probationable burglary involving less than five dollars
of merchandise); People v. Baes, 94 Il1. App. 3d 741, 745-46, 419 N.E.2d 47, 51 (3d Dist.
1981) (holding that a court cannot order a prosecutor to nolle prosequi a charge merely because
the prosecutor and the court believe that imposing even the minimum available sentence for
that offense on the defendant would be unduly harsh, but indicating that the prosecutor
remained free to take such action).
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that permit imposition of extended term sentences," 4 without attempting to
address the vexing question of what factors should be sufficient to trigger
those penalties in a particular case. While these legislative efforts undoubtedly
were well intended," 5 they have only compounded the problems inherent in
developing a rational sentencing system. Creating additional factors that a
court may or may not weigh in a particular case, without establishing when
or to what extent these factors must be considered, will only multiply the
chances for random or capricious action by a sentencing judge.
The reverse side of this coin-eliminating judicial discretion altogether in
particular cases-has also been employed expansively by the General Assem-
bly since the Act's passage. The legislature has created numerous additional
nonprobationable offenses" 6 and has expanded the circumstances in which
offenders are subject to mandatory natural life sentences." 7 These measures,
apparently a response to what is perceived as unduly lenient sentencing,"'
114. See Act of July 28, 1982, Pub. Act No. 82-884, § I, 1982 Ill. Laws 1982, 1983 (codified
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(4) (1983)) (subjecting certain persons participating
in gang rapes to extended term sentences); Act of Sept. 17, 1981, Pub. Act No. 82-564, § 3,
1981 111. Laws 2835, 2847 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(3) (1983))
(defendants committing crimes against victims under 12 or over 60 years old, or physically
handicapped, to be subjected to extended term sentences); see also Act of Jan. 5, 1984, Pub.
Act No. 83-1067, § 4, 1983 Il1. Laws 7251, 7269 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-
3.2(b)(4) (1984 Supp.)) (amending the section to conform to new criminal sexual assault law,
but not otherwise changing substance as aggravating factor).
115. These factors appear to have been motivated by a number of particularly vicious
assaultive crimes against women, small children, the elderly, and the physically handicapped.
Undoubtedly, many crimes involving these victims warrant particularly harsh punishment but
it seems unlikely that they all do. It is unfortunate that the General Assembly gave such
qualities controlling significance in determining which offenders merited lengthy sentences.
For the author's proposed solution to this issue, see Appendix, § 2a(l), (2), at 397-401.
116. See Act of Aug. 28, 1981, Pub. Act No. 82-238, §§ 1, 2 1981 11. Laws 1275, 1275-76
(codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 19-3, 1005-5-3(c)(2)(G) (1983)) (creating offense of
residential burglary and making it a nonprobational class 1 felony); Act of Aug. 26, 1981,
Pub. Act No. 82-341, § 1, 1981 Il1. Laws 1822, 1823 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-
19.2 (1983)) (creating class X felony of exploitation of a child); Act of Aug. 22, 1978, Pub.
Act No. 80-1392, § 1, 1978 Il1. Laws 1378, 1382 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-11
(1983)) (creating class X offense of home invasion); Act of Nov. 12, 1981, Pub. Act No. 82-
694, § 1, 1981 Il1. Laws 3697, 3697 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-4.1 (1983))
(creating class X felony for aggravated indecent liberties with a child), repealed by Pub. Act
No. 83-1067, § 28, 1983 Il1. Laws 7251, 7306 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-14 (1984
Supp.)) (much of same conduct remaining punishable as aggravated criminal sexual assault in
new sections of criminal code).
117. See Act of July 3, 1980, Pub. Act No. 81-1270, § 1, 1980 Ill. Laws 288, 289 (codified
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33B-1 (1983)) (expanding circumstances in which three-time class
X felons may receive natural life sentences); Act of Nov. 26, 1979, Pub. Act No. 81-1118, §
1, 1979 Il1. Laws 4286, 4286 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(1)(c) (1983))
(mandating natural life sentence for multiple murders).
118. The General Assembly may be right in believing that sentences are not being imposed
in accordance with its expectations, but it seems to have misperceived both the reasons for that
phenomenon and the proper response. Most sentences-and in all likelihood an even greater
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also appear likely to create more problems than they solve because of the
distortions they foster in the plea bargaining and sentencing processes." 9
D. Conclusion
While the Act included a number of broad limitations on substantive
sentencing discretion, those limiting provisions were not intended to serve
as an all-encompassing set of sentencing guidelines. Nor were they well suited
to that purpose. 2 " Rather than mandate the many details of sentencing
guidelines, the General Assembly sought to enlist the judiciary in developing
them. To facilitate that process, as well as to promote sensible sentencing
decisions in particular cases, the General Assembly contented itself with
structural controls on the sentencing process.' 2' Such an approach, it was
hoped, would provide a workable mechanism for a judicially sponsored
fleshing-out of the Act's broad sentencing principles and, over time, a fairer
and more coherent sentencing system. 22
As the earlier article in this series demonstrated, however, the Act's
elaborate system of structural controls-at least as it affects prosecutors and
judges-has been largely nullified through judicial decisions.,23 Those deci-
sions evince remarkable hostility toward those modest and indirect efforts
to control substantive sentencing discretion. Thus, it would be surprising
indeed if the judiciary had fashioned a tightly reasoned and consistent
sentencing system out of the Act's direct efforts to curtail sentencing discre-
tion. 2 4 No such pleasant surprise has occurred, nor is any in the offing.
proportion of those that would be deemed unduly lenient-are imposed pursuant to plea
bargains. In most cases, if judges are imposing sentences that could be considered too light in
some objective sense, it is only because prosecutors ask for them. See Schuwerk, supra note 2,
at 645-5 I.
If that is indeed the nature of the problem, mandatory minimum sentences are not the
solution. These sentences are effective only in those cases in which the parties do not bargain
away the charge to which they apply. Id. at 649-51. Even then, there is no assurance that
sentences greater than the minimum terms are applied in a rational manner. Instead, Illinois
needs to develop more explicit legislative expectations about what sentences are appropriate in
the general run of cases and to devise mechanisms to insure that those expectations are carried
out. The author's earlier article proposed a number of such measures. See Schuwerk, supra
note 2, at 651-68, 708-09. This article will propose a number of others. See infra notes 550-
68, 608-38, 754-55, 798-872, 898-903 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, at 396-407.
119. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 648, 660-61.
120. See supra notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
121. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 668-69, 701-02.
122. Id. at 641-43.
123. Id. at 651-68, 673-85, 691-707, 719-33.
124. The manner in which the judiciary implemented the Act's sentencing election provisions
manifests this attitude. The Act specifically provided that inmates whose crimes had been
committed prior to the effective date of the Act, but who had not been sentenced as of that
date, had a right to elect between sentencing under the new Act or under prior law. Pub. Act
No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3315 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1008-2-4(b)
(1983)). This right raised the issues of what information, if any, a defendant was entitled to
receive before making such an election, and who was responsible for providing it to him.
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II. NATURAL LIFE SENTENCES
The Act provided for natural life sentences in two circumstances. The first
allowed for natural life sentences to be imposed at the court's discretion for
murders that the sentencing judge found to have been "accompanied by
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. " '12
The second called for mandatory natural life sentences for offenders con-
victed of a third class X offense, if all three offenses had been committed
after the effective date of the Act and if each had been committed after
conviction of the immediately preceding one. 26
Two subsequent enactments expanded the circumstances calling for natural
life sentences. The first significantly broadened the applicability of the three-
time class X offender natural life category by specifiying that only the last
of the three class X offenses must have been committed after the Act's
While some early cases stated that the legislature intended that defendants be informed in a
general way of the differences and consequences which would flow from election under either
sentencing law, see People v. Peoples, 71 Ill. App. 3d 842, 846, 390 N.E.2d 554, 557 (3d Dist.
1979), these requirements were always found to be minimal. Thus, courts repeatedly held that
there was no requirement that the defendant be told what sentence he or she would receive
under each alternative. Id. at 845-46, 390 N.E.2d at 557; accord People v. Menke, 74 Ill. App.
3d 220, 390 N.E.2d 441 (5th Dist. 1979); People v. Dozier, 67 Ill. App. 3d 611, 385 N.E.2d
155 (4th Dist. 1979). There was also no requirement that the effect of the new law's good-
conduct credits be explained to the defendant. Menke, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 222, 390 N.E.2d at
443. Indeed, even outright misinformation concerning such matters was not found to be a basis
for vacating guilty pleas based on that misinformation, at least where the defendants acknowl-
edged that they also had been advised by counsel concerning their choice. Id. As one court put
it, "neither statute nor any Supreme Court rule requires that specific admonitions be given or
that the election be knowing and intelligent." People v. Gunner, 73 111. App. 3d 533, 539, 392
N.E.2d 165, 169 (5th Dist. 1979) (emphasis added).
Although not impermissible, this was certainly a grudging construction of legislation concerned
with promoting fairness in sentencing. On the one hand, it could be argued that where the
General Assembly wished to provide persons with the right to specific information about
sentencing, it had done so explicitly; for example, in connection with the Prisoner Review
Board (PRB) setting of mandatory release dates for incarcerated inmates. See Pub. Act. No.
80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3276 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-2.1
(1983)). Consequently, the absence of such provisions concerning judicial sentencing elections
was a strong indication that the court was not required to furnish defendants with such
information.
On the other hand, it would have been more consistent with the Act's underlying rationale
if the judiciary had considered it appropriate to furnish those persons awaiting sentencing with
at least as much information concerning the consequences of their sentencing election as the
PRB was giving to those already incarcerated. The fact that they did not take that view now
seems to have been more than a legalistic matter of statutory construction. Instead, it has
overtones of a rebellion against legislative efforts to curtail judicial sentencing prerogatives.
125. Pub. Act. No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3308 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1983)).
126. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3298, 3308 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 33B-1, 1005-5-3(c)(5), 1005-5-8-1(a)(2) (1983)). One authority contends this provision
is not mandatory, and that imposition of a natural life sentence is permissible only if the
prosecutor proves up the requisite predicate offenses. See Haddad, Commentary: Some Lessons
from the History of Illinois' Sentencing Law, 2 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 19, 26 n.34, 27 n.36 (1981).
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effective date. 27 The second created a third class of offenders for which
natural life sentences were mandated: persons convicted of multiple murders
who were not sentenced to death.'28 Recent case law has addressed the
constitutionality of each of these natural life sentence provisions, as well as
the additional issue of how discretionary natural life sentences have been
utilized.
A. The Constitutionality of Natural Life Sentences
There are three types of natural life sentences under the Act: the two
mandatory versions based on multiple murders or prior class X convictions,
and the discretionary version for exceptionally brutal or heinous murders. 12 9
All three types of sentences have been subject to attack on constitutional
grounds. These attacks have been unsuccessful to date, although valid ar-
guments remain unanswered.
1. Mandatory Natural Life Sentences
In People v. Taylor,'30 the Illinois appellate court was confronted with
defendants who had each been convicted of murdering two victims. The trial
judge had sentenced them to natural life imprisonment under a section of
the Code providing that the court "shall" sentence multiple murderers to
natural life imprisonment.'' The trial judge, however, would have imposed
a lesser sentence had one been permitted by law. 3 2
This interpretation, however, seems contrary to the language of the provision, which states that
every person with the requisite criminal record "shall be adjudged an habitual criminal" and
that all such offenders "shall be sentenced to life imprisonment." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
33B-l(a), (e) (1983). Moreover, the notion that resort to the provision is discretionary with the
prosecutor has been uniformly rejected in judicial opinions. See, e.g., People v. McNeil, 125
I1l. App. 3d 876, 466 N.E.2d 1058 (1st Dist. 1984); People v. Tobias, 125 Ill. App. 3d 234,
465 N.E.2d 608 (1st Dist. 1984); People v. Withers, 115 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 450 N.E.2d 1323
(1st Dist. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1332 (1984). Consequently, this article will treat the
provision as mandatory.
127. See Act of July 3, 1980, Pub. Act No. 81-1270, § 1, 1980 Ill. Laws 288, 289-90 (codified
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33B-(d) (1983)).
128. See Act of Nov. 26, 1979, Pub. Act No. 81-1118, § 1, 1979 111. Laws 4286, 4286
(codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(1)(c) (1983)).
129. See Act of Nov. 26, 1979, Pub. Act No. 81-1118, § 1, 1979 II1. Laws 4286, 4286
(codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(1)(c) (1983)) (mandating natural life sentence
for multiple murder convictions); Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 III. Laws 3264, 3308 (codified
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(2) (1983)) (mandating natural life sentence for person
adjudged a habitual criminal under § 33B-1 of Code); Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11.
Laws 3264, 3308 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1983) (permitting natural
life sentence if the court finds that a murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty).
130. 115 11. App. 3d 621, 450 N.E.2d 1256 (1st Dist. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 102
Ill. 2d 201, 464 N.E.2d 1059 (1984).
131. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(1)(c) (1983).
132. 115 Ill. App. 3d at 624, 450 N.E.2d at 1258.
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The defendants argued on appeal that natural life sentences in these
circumstances violated the Illinois Constitution, which requires that all pen-
alties be determined "both according to the seriousness of the offense and
with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship."' 3 3 The
appellate court agreed that a constitutional violation would occur if the word
"shall" in section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c) was mandatory. But in a remarkable con-
struction proving the eternal verity of the adage that necessity is the mother
of invention, the court said that "shall" really meant "may.' ' 34 This was
true, the court concluded, because under any other reading the statute would
unduly intrude on the sentencing prerogatives of the judiciary by forbidding
individualized consideration of a defendant's circumstances.,
The appellate court's construction of section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c) was clearly
erroneous. Section 5-8-1(a)(1)(b) of the Code refers to circumstances in which
a court may impose natural life sentences for murders. 36 Thus, basic prin-
ciples of statutory construction alone ordinarily would have dictated that the
legislature's use of the word "shall" rather than "may" in section 5-8-
l(a)(l)(c) was intended to render the latter provision mandatory. 3 7 Moreover,
unless section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c) were mandatory, it would have been completely
superfluous because other sections of the Code already gave trial courts the
discretion to impose natural life sentences on multiple murderers. 3 ' Once
again, basic canons of statutory construction should have led the appellate
court to reject an interpretation of the provision that rendered it mere
surplusage. 119
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, con-
cluding for the above reasons that section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c) was mandatory. 140
The supreme court also found that the appellate court had erred in concluding
that section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c), if mandatory, would be unconstitutional. 14 The
supreme court noted that the legislature's powers to define offenses and
prescribe penalties have traditionally been given broad sway.41 2 Observing that
many states impose natural life sentences on multiple murderers, the court
then concluded that the legislature's decision to withdraw all lesser sentencing
133. Id. at 623, 450 N.E.2d at 1258.
134. Id. at 629-30, 450 N.E.2d at 1262-63.
135. Id. at 624-30, 450 N.E.2d at 1258-62.
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(I)(b) (1983).
137. See People ex rel. Morrison v. Sielaff, 58 Ill. 2d 91, 92, 316 N.E.2d 769, 770 (1974)
(entire statute must be considered in ascertaining legislative intent); Estate of Kritsch, 65 111.
App. 3d 404, 409, 382 N.E.2d 50, 54 (Ist Dist. 1978) (statutes that pertain to same subject
should be considered together to ascertain legislative intent).
138. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1, 1005-8-1(a)(1)(b) (1983).
139. See, e.g., People v. Lutz, 73 11. 2d 204, 212, 383 N.E.2d 171, 174 (1978); Skillet Fork
River Outlet Union Drainage Dist. v. Fogle, 382 111. 77, 85, 46 N.E.2d 73, 77 (1943).
140. 102 II1. 2d 201, 464 N.E.2d 1059 (1984).
141. Id. at 205-09, 464 N.E.2d at 1062-64.
142. Id. at 207-08, 464 N.E.2d at 1062-63.
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options neither violated defendant's constitutional rights nor ran afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers.143
The supreme court's constitutional analysis in Taylor seems to be sound
under current precedent, although the constitutionality of mandatory natural
life sentences, particularly as applied to offenses not resulting in death,
presents a close question. Modest extensions of recent capital punishment
cases decided by the Illinois and United States Supreme Courts could pro-
vide a basis for arguing that mandatory natural life sentences are constitu-
tionally suspect. In describing the special heightened review to be given to
death sentences and in seeking to limit such intensive scrutiny to those cases,
traditional analyses have stressed the qualitative difference between imprison-
ment and death as penalties.' 44 Nonetheless, a natural life sentence, like the
death penalty, "utterly rejects the possibility of rehabilitation.""' Article
1, section 11 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, however, requires that
all sentences be imposed only after taking the possibility of rehabilitation
into account.' 6 Requiring imposition of a natural life sentence, then, seems
to violate this provision.
That conclusion is buttressed by the United States Supreme Court's in-
validation of mandatory death penalty statutes and by the more intensive
scrutiny the Court recently applied to natural life sentences in Solem v.
Helm.'" The Solem case held that a state may not constitutionally impose
a natural life sentence without possibility of parole upon a defendant con-
victed of several nonviolent felonies.'48 Taken together, those authorities
could be construed as invalidating mandatory natural life sentences as a
matter of either federal or state law.
This line of analysis, however, has found no favor with courts construing
the constitutionality of mandatory natural life sentences for three-time class
X felons. "49 Efforts to invoke the provisions of article 1, section 11 have
143. Id. at 209, 464 N.E.2d at 1064.
144. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (death
penalty differs in kind, not just in degree, from imprisonment).
145. People v. Merchel, 91 11. App. 3d 285, 294, 414 N.E.2d 804, 811 (5th Dist. 1980).
146. 1970 ILL. CONST. art. 1, § I1. That article provides that "[aIll penalties shall be
determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring
the offender to useful citizenship." Id.
147. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983); see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (invalidating
Louisiana's mandatory death penalty statute); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(invalidating North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute).
148. 103 S. Ct. at 3016.
149. A recent flood of these cases have all concluded that the provision is constitutional.
See, e.g., People v. McNeil, 125 III. App. 3d 876, 466 N.E.2d 1058 (1st Dist. 1984); People v.
Washington, 125 III. App. 3d 109, 465 N.E.2d 666 (1st Dist. 1984); People v. Tobias, 125 111.
App. 3d 234, 465 N.E.2d 608 (Ist Dist. 1984); People v. Pettigrew, 123 II1. App. 3d 649, 462
N.E.2d 1273 (4th Dist. 1984); People v. Mason, 119 Ill. App. 3d 516, 456 N.E.2d 864 (3d Dist.
1983); People v. Withers, 115 111. App. 3d 1077, 450 N.E.2d 1323 (Ist Dist. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1332 (1984).
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been unsuccessful. Beginning with the decision in People v. Withers,' every
court to consider the question has concluded that mandatory natural life
sentences for such "three-time losers" do not violate that constitutional
provision. Rather, the constitutional mandate to consider a defendant's
rehabilitative potential is considered to be satisfied by the defendant having
been given at least two prior opportunities to present mitigating circumstan-
ces. 51
This treatment of article 1, section I l's protections seems flawed, however,
because that provision states that all sentences, not just some, are to be
based in part on the rehabilitative potential of the defendant.'52 Nothing in
the constitution's language suggests that because an earlier sentence was
imposed in conformity with its terms, a subsequent sentence need not be.
Challenges based on federal law have been equally unavailing to three-
time class X convicts. Although the Withers court concluded that mandatory
natural life sentences were constitutional without referring to Solem,'" the
later Illinois case of People v. McNeil"' did consider Solem's impact. The
McNeil case, however, concluded that Solem's prohibition of natural life
sentences for recidivist felons should be limited to offenders whose prior
convictions were for nonviolent offenses.' 5
Assuming that Solem provides the proper framework for analysis in this
area, 5 6 it is not as easily disposed of as the McNeil court supposed. Under
Solem, the constitutionality of a penal sanction is to be judged primarily by
comparing it with (1) the sentences typically imposed on similarly situated
offenders in the same jurisdiction; (2) the sentences imposed for other
offenses in that jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed on similarly
The volume of opinions strongly suggests that the underlying sentencing provisions are at
last beginning to be used quite frequently. If, as is argued below, there is some doubt as to
the soundness of these provisions from both constitutional and penological perspectives, a full
reassessment is particularly timely.
150. 115 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 450 N.E.2d 1323 (1st Dist. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1332
(1984).
151. Id. at 1088-90, 450 N.E.2d at 1331-33.
152. See supra note 146.
153. The Withers court relied solely on the earlier decision of Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263 (1980). Withers, 115 I11. App. 3d at 1088-89, 450 N.E.2d at 1331-32. In Rummel, the
Supreme Court upheld imposition of a mandatory natural life sentence with possibility of parole
imposed on an offender for his third conviction of a nonviolent felony. 445 U.S. at 276-85.
154. 125 I11. App. 3d 876, 466 N.E.2d 1058 (1st Dist. 1984).
155. Id. at 881, 466 N.E.2d at 1061-62.
156. Supreme Court precedents in this area are in disarray. It seems fair to say that the
analytical framework established in Solem is indistinguishable from that considered and rejected
by the Court in two earlier decisions, Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982), and Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Although the majority in Solem sought to distinguish those
precedents, 103 S. Ct. at 3008-10 nn.13-16, 3015-16, a four-justice dissent argued rather
persuasively that Solem had effectively overruled those decisions. 103 S. Ct. at 3017-24 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (Chief Justice Burger was joined in his dissent by Justices White, Rehnquist,
and O'Connor).
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situated offenders in other jurisdictions. 5 7 Although the supreme court in
Taylor focused on the last of these requirements in sustaining mandatory
natural life sentences, it did not address either of the first two; it is those
two that render Illinois' scheme to be of doubtful validity.
The reason those requirements are troublesome is that under Illinois law
many offenders with three or more class X convictions cannot receive natural
life sentences because of the peculiarities of their cycles of crime and con-
viction. For example, a rapist who commits ten rapes before his first arrest
is only one-third of the way to a natural life sentence even if he is convicted
of all ten crimes, because none of the crimes was committed after conviction
of the first."" If after serving his time for those crimes, he should commit
another ten rapes before being apprehended, he is still only two-thirds of
the way to a natural life sentence because none of the second ten rapes were
committed after a second conviction." Such an offender undoubtedly could
receive a lengthy sentence. 16 It is open to serious question, however, whether
that fact should sustain a statute that requires natural life sentences for
offenders committing as few as three class X felonies while forbidding such
sanctions for those committing a substantially greater number of such of-
fenses.
Even if this provision is not constitutionally infirm, however, the existence
of the anomalies just described calls for a rethinking of the whole subject
of mandatory natural life sentences, particularly as applied to three-time
class X convicts.' 6' The proper approach to sentence selection for persons
currently subject to mandatory natural life sentences should not vary from
that used in other cases. The sentencing decision should be based primarily
on the severity of the defendant's prior criminal record, with any aggravating
features of the current crime serving to enhance the sentence further. 62 Such
a system would consistently increase sentences for persons who showed a
propensity for criminal behavior. Moreover, those increases would be grad-
uated so that sentences for crimes posing the greatest threats to public
157. 103 S. Ct. at 3010-11.
158. This requirement is imposed by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33B-I(d)(4) (1983).
159. This requirement is also a prerequisite to imposition of a natural life sentence. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 33B-I(d)(3) (1983).
160. In this instance the offender would be eligibli for an extended term sentence of up to
60 years. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3. 2(b)(1) (1983). If the offender also committed
another felony in the course of this criminal episode and "inflicted severe bodily injury" on
the victim, the offender would be eligible for longer consecutive sentences. Id. § 1005-8.4(a),
(c)(2).
161. Although the temptation to incarcerate all these offenders permanently is understandable,
a different approach appears preferable. In its present form, the Act allows indefensible
sentencing disparities. Moreover, natural life sentences impose substantial costs on the penal
system. From the perspective of public safety, these costs may be largely unjustified because
crimes of violence arc overwhelmingly committed by younger offenders. At the very least, it
seems obvious that the correctional funds needed to incarcerate more elderly inmates until their
death could be better spent on efforts to rehabilitate less incorrigible inmates or to incarcerate
more dangerous offenders for somewhat longer periods.
162. See infra notes 806-49 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 34:241
ILLINOIS' DETERMINATE SENTENCING
safety-those involving brutality and violence-would be enhanced at the
greatest rate. 63
2. Discretionary Natural Life Sentences
The Act allows the discretionary imposition of natural life sentences for
murders found to have been "accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty." 164 This provision has been challenged
unsuccessfully as being void for vagueness and contrary to the provisions of
article 1, section 11 of the Illinois Constitution. 165 Void for vagueness ar-
guments were disposed of in a manner typified by People v. La Pointe.16 6
The La Pointe court observed that the words of the statute had "ordinary
and popularly understood meanings.' 1 67 These meanings, coupled with the
statute's objectives, kept the words from being "so ill defined that their
meaning will ultimately be determined by the opinions and whims of the
trier of fact rather than any objective criteria.' 1 68 Nor were natural life
sentences banned by the Illinois Constitution's requirement that penalties
consider restoring the offender to useful citizenship, because legislative his-
tory strongly indicated that this constitutional requirement was not intended
to bar even the death penalty. 69
The La Pointe court also considered and rejected an equal protection
challenge to natural life sentences, noting that equal protection of the laws
"does not require equality or proportionality of penalties for dissimilar
conduct."' 170 The General Assembly under its broad police powers could
reasonably determine that imposing natural life sentences on "murderers
who have demonstrated ... their capacity for particularly brutal and heinous
crimes indicative of wanton cruelty .. .would remedy the evil" posed by
those murderers. 17 1 The La Pointe court concluded that the Act presented
"a legitimate means by which the legislature might seek to protect society."1 72
The recent case of People v. Cartalino,7 however, has raised one further
163. See infra notes 837-39 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, Chart 3, at 396; Chart
4, at 405.
164. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3308 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1983)).
165. See, e.g., People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 499-500, 431 N.E.2d 344, 352 (1982);
People v. Hudson, 95 Ill. App. 3d 350, 356, 420 N.E.2d 271, 275 (3d Dist. 1981); People v.
Merchel, 91 111. App. 3d 285, 291-93, 414 N.E.2d 804, 811 (5th Dist. 1980).
166. 88 111. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1982).
167. Id. at 499, 431 N.E.2d at 352.
168. Id.
169. This argument was not raised in La Pointe, but other authorities have reached this
conclusion. See, e.g., People v. Nobles, 83 111. App. 3d 711, 716-17, 404 N.E.2d 330, 335 (4th
Dist. 1980).
170. 88 I11. 2d at 500, 431 N.E.2d at 352 (quoting People v. Bradley, 79 I11. 2d 410, 416,
403 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (1980)).
171. 88 Ill. 2d at 501, 431 N.E.2d at 352.
172. Id. at 501, 431 N.E.2d at 353.
173. 111 I11. App. 3d 578, 444 N.E.2d 662 (1st Dist. 1982).
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argument against discretionary natural life sentences. In that case, the de-
fendant noted that both extended term and natural life sentences were
authorized as punishment for murders accompanied by exceptionally brutal
or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. 7 4 He then argued that this
scheme unconstitutionally gave the sentencing court "totally unbridled dis-
cretion to sentence a defendant convicted of murder to a term of natural
life rather than an extended term based on the identical finding that the
murder was exceptionally brutal or heinous.'"7 The appellate court rejected
that argument, stating that a finding of brutality or heinousness, without
more, was not a sufficient basis under the Act for imposing either sentence. 76
Instead, the sentencing judge was required to consider all other constitu-
tionally or statutorily specified factors before determining what sentence to
impose. Thus, it was simply not accurate to state that a sentencing court
had totally unbridled discretion to choose between natural life and extended
term sentences. The Cartalino court concluded that it was therefore consti-
tutional to use the same circumstances to trigger application of either natural
life or extended term prison sentences.' 71
The Cartalino court clearly was correct in concluding that the presence of
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior was a necessary but not a sufficient
basis for imposing a natural life or extended term sentence. 7 8 Nonetheless,
the opinion was unhelpful on the ultimate issue facing a sentencing judge in
such a case: exactly what combinations of circumstances over and above
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior should be present before the Act's
lengthier sanctions are imposed? Before reaching that issue, however, it is
useful to examine the factors that the courts have considered in deciding
whether or not to impose discretionary natural life sentences, and how
rationally and consistently the courts have exercised their sentencing discre-
tion in such cases.
B. The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in
Non-Mandatory Natural Life Sentence Cases
The reported cases reflect a number of judicial efforts to impose rational
limits on the imposition of discretionary natural life sentences. Some of these
efforts, however, are not conceptually sound and, perhaps for that reason,
have been largely ignored. Even limitations that do seem appropriate, how-
ever, have generally not been recognized. Consequently, additional legislation
is necessary to control the undue sentencing disparities that have resulted.
People v. Merchel'" proposed one solution to the fundamental problem
174. Id. at 591, 444 N.E.2d at 673; Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 i11. Laws 3264, 3301,
3308 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.2(b)(2), 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1983)).
175. 111 Il. App. 3d at 591, 444 N.E.2d at 673.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
179. 91 111. App. 3d 283, 414 N.E.2d 804 (5th Dist. 1980).
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of deciding which exceptionally brutal or heinous murders should qualify
offenders for natural life sentences. The Merchel court limited judicial
discretion somewhat by holding that natural life sentences were inappropriate
unless the qualifying reprehensible behavior had been engaged in by the
person to be sentenced.8 0 This judicial limitation, however, does not seem
to be consistent with the literal language of the Act and, perhaps for that
reason, has not been widely followed. In order for a murder to qualify a
defendant for a discretionary natural life sentence, the Act requires only that
the offense be accompanied by the requisite behavior. It does not go on to
require that the defendant being sentenced, rather than a co-felon, must
have engaged in the conduct.'" The General Assembly probably intended to
permit the imposition of a natural life sentence upon all convicts involved
in brutal or heinous crimes regardless of which co-felon performed the
qualifying conduct, as long as the other requirements of this provision of
the Act were satisfied.
Among those other requirements, however, is that the conduct in question
be "indicative of wanton cruelty." That language appears to limit imposition
of discretionary natural life sentences to defendants who have demonstrated
a capacity to engage in the requisite culpable behavior, whether or not they
performed it personally." 2 This test, while somewhat broader than Merchel,
nonetheless retains a requirement of personal responsibility for the behavior
justifying a natural life sentence. Absent such a showing, it seems both
180. Id. at 293, 414 N.E.2d at 810.
181. Compare Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3301, 3308 (codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-3.2(b)(2), 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1983)) (extended term allowed for felony
conviction where the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty; natural life imprisonment allowed for murder accompanied by the
same behavior) with Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983)) (consecutive sentence not to be imposed in specified
circumstances unless the "defendant inflicted severe bodily injury"). It should be noted,
however, that the supreme court held in People v. Sangster, that personal culpability also was
not required under § 1005-8-4(a). Sangster, 91 Ill. 2d 260, 265-66, 437 N.E.2d 625, 628 (1982).
It is argued below that Sangster was erroneously decided. See infra text accompanying notes
323-29.
182. Such a showing could be made out, for example, by establishing that a defendant had
ordered a particularly brutal or heinous murder to be committed. See, e.g., People v. Johnson,
123 III. App. 3d 1008, 463 N.E.2d 877 (4th Dist. 1984) (natural life sentence affirmed where
defendant ordered confederate to kill unresisting victims); People v. White, 122 III. App. 3d
24, 460 N.E.2d 802 (4th Dist. 1984) (natural life sentence affirmed for criminal mastermind
who ordered the slaying of his gangland rivals-the same crime involved in Johnson).
This showing also could be made out by establishing the active assistance or assent of the
nonparticipating defendant to his colleagues "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior." See,
e.g., People v. Rivera, 126 Ill. App. 3d 197, 205, 466 N.E.2d 1144, 1148-49 (1st Dist. 1984)
(extended term sentence for murder affirmed where defendant held victim while confederate
stabbed him repeatedly). It should be noted, however, that whether this sentences would be
appropriate in such cases is an entirely different question, and can be determined only upon a
review of all pertinent factors. See People v. Cartalino, Ill III. App. 3d 578, 591-92, 444
N.E.2d 662, 673 (1st Dist. 1982); supra text accompanying notes 173-78.
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inconsistent with the Act's "wanton cruelty" standard and utterly inappro-
priate from the standpoint of elemental fairness to impose a natural life
sentence on one defendant based on the qualifying conduct of another. 83
Another judicially fashioned limitation on the use of discretionary natural
life sentences is based on the fact that such sentences utterly reject the
possiblity of rehabilitation.184 For that reason a number of cases held that a
natural life sentence could be properly sustained only if the record supported
a specific finding that the defendant was devoid of rehabilitative potential.'85
Other courts, however, rejected this view and instead merely required that
"the trial judge must weigh and give consideration to the rehabilitative
potential of the defendant" as well as to the seriousness of the offense
before imposing sentence. 8 6
These two tests, while not dissimilar in phrasing, led to markedly different
outcomes. Whenever explicit, on-the-record consideration of mitigating cir-
cumstances was required, the natural life sentences were vacated on appeal.
In contrast, cases that permitted a mere tacit balancing by the trial judge
resulted in the natural life sentences being sustained. People v. Goodman"7
is illustrative of cases in the former category. In Goodman, the defendant
received a natural life sentence for a murder in which he had sought to rob
his victim in a tavern. The victim had resisted and in the ensuing struggle,
the defendant had repeatedly and fatally stabbed the victim. Although the
defendant had a prior criminal record, the sentencing judge was presented
with a number of factors in mitigation, including the defendant's own fear
of death or great bodily harm. 88 The trial judge, however, did not allude
to any mitigating circumstances, nor was there any indication in the record
that he had taken them into account before imposing a natural life sentence.
The appellate court vacated the sentence, concluding that, before a natural
life sentence could be sustained, the record had to indicate affirmatively and
clearly that evidence of the defendant's rehabilitative potential had been
considered and given due weight by the trial judge. 8 9
183. See infra notes 459-67 and accompanying text.
184. See People v. Goodman, 98 III. App. 3d 743, 751-52, 424 N.E.2d 663, 670 (2d Dist.
1981); People v. Merchel, 91 11. App. 3d 285, 294, 414 N.E.2d 804, 811 (5th Dist. 1980) People
v. La Pointe, 85 Il1. App. 3d 215, 223, 407 N.E.2d 196, 203 (2d Dist. 1980), rev'd, 88 111. 2d
482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1982).
185. See, e.g., People v. Goodman, 98 Ill. App. 3d 743, 751-52, 424 N.E.2d 663, 668-71
(2d Dist. 1981); People v. La Pointe, 85 111. App. 3d 215, 222-23, 407 N.E.2d 196, 203 (2d
Dist. 1980), rev'd, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1982).
186. People v. Smith, 91 111. App. 3d 438, 450-51, 414 N.E. 2d 1281, 1292-93 (2d Dist.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 93 111. 2d 179, 442 N.E.2d 1325 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
937 (1983); accord People v. Bartik, 94 II1. App. 3d 696, 702-03, 418 N.E.2d 1108, 1114 (2d
Dist. 1981); People v. Merchel, 91 111. App. 3d 285, 294-96, 414 N.E.2d 804, 811-13 (5th Dist.
1980).
187. 98 Ill. App. 3d 743, 424 N.E.2d 663 (2d Dist. 1981).
188. Id. at 749, 424 N.E.2d at 668.
189. Id. at 750-53, 424 N.E.2d at 669-71.
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The approach taken in Goodman is sound. The imposition of such an
extraordinary penalty should be reserved only for those hardened violent
offenders whose backgrounds present no plausible prospect of rehabilita-
tion.19° There are numerous cases, however, in which the Goodman approach
has not been followed. For example, in People v. Bartik,'9' the defendant
was sentenced to natural life for a brutal murder he committed during the
course of an armed robbery and burglary. 192 Although the defendant had
raised a number of mitigating factors, the trial judge had not referred to
them in pronouncing sentence. 93 Nor had the judge found that the defendant
was utterly devoid of rehabilitative potential. 194 Nonetheless, the appellate
court affirmed the sentence even though it found that sentences of terms of
years had been imposed in other cases "where the balance of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances appeared to be more heavily against the de-
fendant than in this case."' 95
The result in Bartik shows a rather cavalier disregard for both the enormity
of a natural life sentence in general and the disparity resulting from its
imposition in that particular case. Under Bartik, the validity of discretionary
natural life sentences becomes a question of power rather than propriety.
Could the judge have imposed such a sentence? If so, it will be affirmed.
This tendency was also manifested in People v. Newsome,'96 in which the
defendant was sentenced to natural life for a murder committed in the course
of an armed robbery. 97 Although the offense was potentially a capital one, 98
the state's evidence revealed that the defendant had shot his victim only
after the latter had threatened the defendant with a pistol and the defendant
had warned the victim against such resistance.' 99 In those circumstances the
defendant's decision to shoot, standing alone, does not seem sufficient to
brand him as the brutal, hardened offender for whom a natural life sentence
is appropriate °. 2 0 Nonetheless, Newsome's natural life sentence was sustained
190. See authorities cited supra note 185 and infra notes 330-51, 494-518 and accompanying
text.
191. 94 111. App. 3d 696, 418 N.E.2d 1108 (2d Dist. 1981).
192. Id. at 697, 418 N.E.2d at 1110.
193. Id. at 701, 418 N.E.2d at 1112. The judge did state, however, that he had noted and
considered them. Id.
194. Id. at 702-03, 418 N.E.2d at 1113-14.
195. Id.
196. 110 111. App. 3d 1043, 443 N.E.2d 634 (1st Dist. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 340 (1983).
197. Id. at 1046, 443 N.E.2d at 635-36.
198. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b)(6) (1983).
199. 110 111. App. 3d at 1046, 443 N.E.2d at 636.
200. Newsome's only apparent prior record was a minor possessory drug offense and a
charge of assault. Id. at 1057, 443 N.E.2d at 643. Newsome's sentence seems more severe than
those imposed in comparable circumstances. For example, in People v. Ramos, 110 II1. App.
3d 225, 441 N.E.2d 1153 (1st Dist. 1982), the defendant received an 80-year sentence for killing
a bystander while fleeing from an armed robbery in which his codefendant had been shot and
killed. Id. at 226-27, 441 N.E.2d at 1154-55. The sentence is unusually severe for this kind of
killing absent a lengthy prior record. See cases cited infra note 215.
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on appeal solely on the basis that the law permitted imposition of such a
sentence in any capital case. 20 1
The additional factors needed to make imposition of a natural life sentence
appropriate seem clear enough: the requisite degree of personal wrongdoing
in the case at bar, and clear evidence-best documented by a lengthy history
of violent behavior-that rehabilitation is utterly improbable. 20 2 Due regard
for concepts of proportionality and fairness dictate that natural life sentences
should be reserved for the most hardened and incorrigible offenders, espe-
cially given the fact that sentences of up to eighty years are available for
those murders that are also punishable by natural life sentences. 213
After the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. La Pointe,'4
however, there is no real hope for the needed judicial self-restraint. In
reversing the appellate court and reinstating the natural life sentence imposed
on a young armed robber-murderer, 205 the supreme court unwisely expanded
the circumstances in which natural life sentences could be imposed. The La
Pointe court first adopted an expansive definition of the murders that could
be classified as involving exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, indicative
of wanton cruelty. 2°6 Referring to dictionary definitions of "brutal" and
201. 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1057, 443 N.E.2d at 644. The Newsome approach seems contrary
to that of People v. Cartalino, I I 1 111. App. 3d 578, 444 N.E.2d 662 (lst Dist. 1982). Cartalino
sustained the constitutionality of discretionary natural life sentences only because it concluded
that the presence of a qualifying factor for such a sentence is not a sufficient basis for imposing
it. Id. at 592, 444 N.E.2d at 673.
The court in People v. Hargis, 118 III. App. 3d 1064, 456 N.E.2d 250 (4th Dist. 1983), also
provides an instructive contrast to the approach taken in Newsome. In Hargis, the court vacated
a sentence of natural life because the trial judge had imposed it in the mistaken belief that the
defendant had been eligible for the death penalty. Id. at 1080-81, 456 N.E.2d at 259-60. The
Hargis court reasoned that the judge's mistaken perception of the sentencing options available
to him might have led him to impose a more severe sentence than was warranted. While the
factual situation in Hargis is unusual, one should not lose sight of its underlying principle: that
imposition of a natural life sentence should be a fully informed and carefully deliberated act.
202. See supra notes 184-201 and accompanying text. A number of natural life sentences
based on the "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior" rationale do not seem to meet this
standard. See, e.g., People v. McKinney, 117 II1. App. 3d 591, 599, 453 N.E.2d 926, 931 (1st
Dist. 1983) (affirming natural life sentence for 21-year old defendant suffering from psycho-
logical problems for which he was being treated, who killed armed robbery victim while on
felony probation); People v. Darnell, 97 III. App. 3d 830, 419 N.E.2d 384 (3d Dist. 1981)
(affirming natural life sentence for 16-year-old defendant, based on testimony of expert witnesses
regarding his incorrigibility). For the manner in which the proposed sentencing guidelines would
handle these types of cases, see Appendix to text, Chart 4, at 405.
203. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-2(a)(1) (1983).
204. 88 I1. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1982).
205. La Pointe involved an 18-year-old defendant who had been convicted of murdering a
cab driver during an armed robbery. As revealed by the appellate court's opinion, the most
damning evidence in aggravation of the offense was that the defendant had ruthlessly executed
his victim in order to avoid identification and, thereafter, had flaunted the deed-by wearing
a t-shirt with the words "Elmhurst Executioner" lettered on it while in jail awaiting trial.
People v. La Pointe, 85 Ill. App. 3d 215, 217, 407 N.E.2d 196, 198-99 (2d Dist. 1980).
206. 88 Ill. 2d at 501, 431 N.E.2d at 353.
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"heinous," the court concluded that any murder that could be viewed as
"grossly bad" or as "cruel and cold-blooded," among other definitions,
would suffice.2 0 7 Clearly, most murders would fit comfortably within this
category. Next, the court found that the defendant's relatively modest crim-
inal record constituted a significant history of criminal activity that justified
imposition of a substantially enhanced sentence. 20 1 In the court's view, the
defendant's premeditated and deliberated killing coupled with his "significant
history" of criminal activity and his "callous attitude and complete lack of
remorse" prevented a natural life sentence from being an abuse of discre-
tion.209
The supreme court acted too quickly in allowing the imposition of a
natural life sentence. Its substantial expansion of both the group of eligible
murders and the group of eligible offenders will almost certainly confound
any effort to make sense of the imposition of discretionary natural life
sentences. Initially, the court can be faulted for failing to realize that
discretionary natural life sentences may be imposed only upon a finding of
"exceptionally" brutal or heinous behavior, not merely brutal or heinous
behavior. 210 The La Pointe opinion gave no operational significance to that
qualifier. Moreover, the court failed to consider that by making extended
term prison sentences available for identically aggravated murders, the leg-
islature must have intended that natural life sentences be imposed only upon
a far clearer showing of a defendant's propensity for violence and incorri-
gibility than was made in La Pointe.2 ' It is not enough to say that a
207. Id.
208. 88 Ill. 2d at 494-99, 431 N.E.2d at 349-52. The defendant had a prior burglary conviction
and admitted to a long-term use of illicit drugs. Id.
209. Id. at 501, 431 N.E.2d at 353. Speaking on his own behalf at sentencing, La Pointe
denied all memory of the offense, claiming to have been under the influence of LSD. He stated,
"If I did [it], I am truly sorry. I am not no killer by instinct. If I did [do it], it was the LSD."
85 II. App. 3d at 217, 407 N.E.2d at 199.
The trial judge, however, found that La Pointe's crime was premeditated and deliberate, and
had not been committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance. Id. The trial judge inexplicably failed to refer to information contained
in a pre-sentence report which had disclosed that the defendant had become very heavily
involved in drugs, and suggested that the crime was probably a product of the defendant's
unhappy home life and drug use. Id. at 217-18, 407 N.E.2d at 199-200. After concluding that
the defendant lacked remorse and that no statutory factors in mitigation were present, the trial
judge imposed a natural life sentence. Id. at 217-18, 407 N.E.2d at 199-200.
210. Id. A number of cases had noted that by making only "exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior" subject to lengthy sentences, the General Assembly had clearly intended to restrict
the application of those provisions to a group of particularly egregious cases. See, e.g., People
v. Schlemm, 82 Ill. App. 3d 639, 650, 402 N.E.2d 810, 818 (4th Dist. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1127 (1981). The La Pointe court, however, made no reference to these authorities.
211. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3301., 3310 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(2), 1005-8-2(a) (1983)).
It was this perception that apparently lay at the heart of the appellate court's decision to
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particular murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous be-
havior and that such a crime may be punished with a natural life sentence.
The real problem, which the court failed to recognize in its institutional zeal
to defend the trial judge,212 is how to distinguish exceptionally brutal or
heinous murders warranting natural life sentences from those sufficiently
punished by lesser sentences.2 1 3
The key to this distinction, as Cartalino held, lies in a careful consideration
of all apects of the offense and of the defendant's character and background,
focusing on the defendant's amenability to rehabilitation. Before a natural
life sentence is imposed, the record should demonstrate a clear basis for
concluding that the defendant is markedly less likely to be rehabilitated than
other defendants who committed equally atrocious murders but who were
sentenced only to terms of years.2 14
The supreme court's decision in La Pointe is also faulty for failing to
recognize the importance of the Act's overriding principles and purposes in
deciding when natural life sentences are appropriate. For example, the Act's
least restrictive alternative sentencing philosophy was ignored by the La
Pointe court. This principle, on its own, would preclude the imposition of
natural life sentences except in those few cases in which no lesser sanction
appears likely to protect the public adequately. Similarly, the La Pointe
court did not even mention the Act's goals of consistency and proportionality
vacate La Pointe's natural life sentence and impose one of 60 years imprisonment. 85 Ill. App.
3d at 224, 407 N.E.2d at 204. Noting that the trial judge had never made reference to the pre-
sentence report, the appellate court stated that the judge below had not given due weight to
defendant's unhappy home situation and drug related mental problems as revealed therein. Id.
at 218, 222-23, 407 N.E.2d at 199, 202-03. Such factors "should have some influence" because
the defendant had no history of violent criminal activity. Id. at 221-22, 407 N.E.2d at 202. The
appellate court concluded that the trial judge had not adequately considered the defendant's
rehabilitative potential and that the sentencing judge should have indicated the factual bases
for his implicit finding that there was no real possibility of the defendant's rehabilitation. Id.
at 223-24, 407 N.E.2d at 203.
212. The appellate court in La Pointe had employed a rebuttable presumption of correctness
standard for reviewing the trial judge's sentencing decision. 88 Il. 2d at 492, 431 N.E.2d at
348. This standard had been developed to implement a mandate in the Act for more stringent
review of trial courts' sentencing decisions and supposedly made it easier for appellate courts
to overturn those decisions. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 686-92. The Illinois Supreme Court
had determined, however, that its traditional "abuse of discretion" test provided the appropriate
standard of review in this area and that the General Assembly's supposed effort to provide a
different standard was void. People v. Cox, 82 II1. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980). The court's
action in La Pointe was motivated at least in part by its finding that the appellate court had
erred by not using the "abuse of discretion" test and by its desire to emphasize the infrequency
with which sentencing decisions of lower courts should be overturned under that standard. 88
Ill. 2d at 492-93, 431 N.E.2d at 348-49.
213. Resort to both extended term and natural life sentences for murders involving excep-
tionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty is entirely discretionary with
the court, which remains free to impose a regular term of imprisonment instead. See supra
notes 85-91, 173-78 and accompanying text.
214. Cartalino, Ill Ill. App. 3d at 591, 444 N.E.2d at 673.
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in sentencing, nor did it attempt to evaluate La Pointe's sentence from those
perspectives. Had the court done so, it would have found the sentence too
harsh. Numerous defendants, sentenced to terms of years no longer than
that recommended by the La Pointe appellate court, committed crimes every
bit as grisly as La Pointe's." 5
A general disregard for the Act's broader principles is not limited to the
area of discretionary natural life sentences. It has a special significance,
however, in this area. The indefensibly inconsistent imposition of natural
life sentences threatens the very constitutionality of the statute. The Act's
discretionary life sentence provision was sustained in Cartalino solely because
trial judges do not have "totally unbridled discretion to sentence a defendant
to natural life or to an extended term. ' 2 6 Unless effective control on judicial
discretion is imposed by the supreme court, however, "unbridled" seems a
very apt description of the imposition of natural life sentences.
III. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
The Act's provisions regarding consecutive sentences are unusual in two
respects. First, consecutive sentences are not mandated in any case. Second,
when such a penalty is allowed, any sentence may be imposed between the
sum of the regular term minima for the two least serious felonies involved
and the sum of the maximum allowable sentences for the two most serious
felonies involved. 217 This sentencing structure obviously vests the judiciary
with an enormous amount of sentencing discretion. Although some statutory
limitations on that discretion exist, they have not had any widespread impact
on sentencing practices. Consequently, the fairness and proportionality of
consecutive sentences would be enhanced by the adoption of certain guide-
lines by the judiciary.
A. Restrictions on the Imposition of Consecutive Sentences
The Act imposed a number of explicit limitations on the availability of
consecutive sentences. The first, applicable in all cases, forbade imposition
of consecutive sentences unless the court found that "such a term is required
215. See, e.g., People v. Green, 125 I1. App. 3d 734, 466 N.E.2d 630 (4th Dist. 1984) (18-
year-old defendant with no prior record shot victim to prevent his identification of defendant;
60-year sentence for murder affirmed); People v. Hanna, 120 Ill. App. 3d 602, 457 N.E.2d
1352 (2d Dist. 1983) (defendant approached victim in parked car and shot him; 40-year sentence
for murder affirmed); People v. Jones, 119 111. App. 3d 615, 456 N.E.2d 926 (lst Dist. 1983)
(defendant, in the course of a burglary, strangled 65-year-old victim with electrical cord; sentence
of 60 years for murder affirmed); People v. Perez, 115 I1. App. 3d 446, 450 N.E.2d 870 (1st
Dist. 1983) (16-year-old defendant with no prior criminal record convicted of execution-style
murder and attempted murder; consecutive sentences totaling 50 years affirmed). While many
of these defendants had no prior criminal records, they also did not appear to have other
mitigating circumstances in their background in contrast to La Pointe.
216. III Ill. App. 3d at 591, 444 N.E.2d at 673.
217. See supra note 104.
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to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant." 21 s
The second limitation, also applicable in all cases, required sentencing judges
to state the basis for their finding in the record. 2 9 Finally, the Act imposed
a broad prohibition against consecutive sentences "for offenses which were
committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no
substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. ' 20 The Act created
an exception to this rule, however, by permitting (but not requiring) con-
secutive sentences to be imposed when at least one of the defendant's crimes
was a class X or class 1 felony and "the defendant inflicted severe bodily
injury." 221 Over and above these explicit limitations, however, were the
implicit constraints imposed by the Act's embodiment of a least restrictive
alternative principle of sentencing and its general concern for fairness and
proportionality. The General Assembly anticipated that these considerations
would eventually narrow the ranges of possible penalties that would be
deemed appropriate in any given case. 222
None of these limitations has had any real effect on the imposition of
consecutive sentences. Judicial decisions have diluted any impact that the
reasoned basis and protection of the public limitations might have had if
they had been rigorously enforced. 2 a Moreover, judicial constructions nar-
rowing the single course of conduct limitation and nullifying the personal
infliction of injury requirement have kept them from limiting the imposition
of consecutive sentences to any significant extent. 224 Finally, there has been
absolutely no sign of any judicial concern over the impact of the Act's
general sentencing principles on the selection of consecutive sentences. 25 For
all of these reasons, consecutive sentences have every appearance of being
little more than aberrant and unpredictable events.
1. The "Required to Protect the Public" Limitation
The requirement that consecutive sentences not be imposed unless they are
required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant
has two possible interpretations. First, it may be viewed as prohibiting
consecutive sentences that are too short-that is, sentences resulting in a
total period of incarceration that instead could have been achieved by longer
concurrent sentences. Such a reading would invalidate numerous cases in
218. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-4(b) (1983)).
219. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I1. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-4(b) (1983)).
220. Pub. Act No. 80-1099 § 3, 1977 Il. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983)).
221. Pub. Act No. 80-1099 § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983)).
222. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 669, 701.
223. See infra notes 226-301 and accompanying text.
224. See infra notes 302-29 and accompanying text.
225. See infra notes 226-329 and accompanying text.
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which relatively short sentences for current crimes were to be served consec-
utively to sentences that a defendant was already serving for past crimes. 226
In addition, the occasional practice of imposing short consecutive sentences
for crimes arising from different courses of conduct also would be inter-
dicted .227
This interpretation seems unassailable as a matter of logic. Nonetheless,
in People v. Snyder, 22 the supreme court disapproved of this construction. 2 9
The Snyder court concluded that consecutive sentences were permissible
as long as the record affirmatively indicated that the resulting lengthier
sentence met statutory criteria. 20 The construction adopted in Snyder is
directly contrary to the language of the statute.2 1' As a matter of policy,
however, the result is unobjectionable. Because the defendant could have
been properly incarcerated for as long a period by a concurrent prison
sentence, the use of consecutive sentences instead would seem to be harmless
error. Consequently, it is proper to uphold such "short" consecutive sen-
tences as long as concurrent sentences resulting in the same total period of
incaceration would not have been disproportionately severe. 23 2
But there is a second and more obvious meaning to the "required to
protect the public" limitation on consecutive sentences: a prohibition of
consecutive sentences that are "too long." Aside from possible rehabilitation,
most convicts would eventually become so enfeebled by age that their
continued imprisonment on a public safety rationale would be indefensible.
Yet, the cases do not reflect this physical reality. Instead, one finds such
226. See, e.g., People v. Testa, 125 II1. App. 3d 1039, 466 N.E.2d 1126 (1st Dist. 1984)
(consecutive sentences imposed for crime committed while out on bond for prior offense);
People v. Pebbles, 125 Ill. App. 3d 213, 465 N.E.2d 539 (1st Dist. 1984) (requiring defendant's
concurrent sentences for 111 counts of theft by deception to run consecutively to unrelated
felony theft); People v. Miller, 115 111. App. 3d 592, 450 N.E.2d 767 (2d Dist. 1983) (allowing
consecutive sentences for two separate convictions-both drug-related-even where defendant
was serving the first of two sentences), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1302 (1984); People v. Green,
83 Ill. App. 3d 982, 404 N.E.2d 930 (3d Dist. 1980) (consecutive sentences for home invasion
and armed robbery where each arose from separate circumstances).
227. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 124 I11. App. 3d 14, 463 N.E.2d 981 (1st Dist. 1984) (four
concurrent terms of 20 years for rape and armed robbery, along with two concurrent terms of
15 years for aggravated battery, may run consecutively to two prior sentences for armed robbery
offenses that occured earlier in the same evening); People v. Soloman, 116 I11. App. 3d 481,
451 N.E.2d 953 (5th Dist. 1983) (consecutive sentences or prior crimes, entered pursuant to
defendant's plea of guilty, may be served consecutively to new sentences).
228. 77 111. 2d 459, 397 N.E.2d 799 (1979).
229. Id. at 462, 397 N.E.2d at 800. Appellate courts had previously held that consecutive
sentences were improper where a concurrent term could be used to achieve at least as severe a
result. See People v. Presley, 67 Ill. App. 3d 894, 385 N.E.2d 181 (4th Dist. 1979); People v.
Kruse, 37 I11. App. 3d 475, 346 N.E.2d 169 (4th Dist. 1976); People v. Dawson, 30 111. App.
3d 147, 332 N.E.2d 58 (4th Dist. 1975).
230. 77 I11. 2d at 462-63, 397 N.E.2d at 800-01.
231. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(b) (1983).
232. See infra notes 271-301 and accompanying text.
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decisions as People v. Smith, 2" in which ninety-six years of consecutive
sentences were imposed on a sixty-two-year-old armed robber; People v.
Bush,"' in which consecutive natural life sentences were imposed; People
v. Guyon, ' in which a forty-five-year sentence was imposed consecutive to a
natural life sentence; and People v. Brownell,36 in which a 100-year sentence
was imposed consecutive to the death penalty. Moreover, there are multiple
cases in which defendants have drawn the 120-year "jackpot" sentence
allowed in certain situations. 21 It is not atypical for Illinois courts to fail to
take these gross physical limitations into account, although the courts are
required by law to do so. Rather, these cases illustrate a general failure to
give some degree of consistency and fairness to the imposition of these
drastic sanctions.
2. The Reasoned Basis Requirement
The Act's drafters felt that the development of adequate guidelines for
the imposition of consecutive sentences was sufficiently important to require
express treatment. Thus, the Act requires that sentencing judges set out the
bases for their conclusions that, "having regard to the nature and circum-
stances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant . ..
a [consecutive] term is required to protect the public from further criminal
conduct by the defendant. ' 238 The rigor with which this requirement was
enforced was probably the most important determinant of the rationality
233. I11 Ill. App. 3d 494, 444 N.E.2d 565 (Ist Dist. 1982). Smith, in addition to wounding
one of his victims in the stomach, also had a "long criminal record which indicates consistent
criminal activity since 1935." Id. at 501, 444 N.E.2d at 570. Thus, while the judge's sentence
might not have complied with the Act, his reaction was certainly understandable.
234. 103 II1. App. 3d 5, 430 N.E.2d 514 (5th Dist. 1981). It appears that imposition of a
natural life sentence consecutive to any other sentence imposed for crimes growing out of the
same transaction or occurrence is not authorized by the Act. In this situation, any consecutive
sentences imposed may not exceed the sum of the extended term maxima for the two most
serious felonies involved. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(c)(2) (1983). However, no extended
term sentencing provision authorizes a natural life sentence, id. § 1005-8-2, only a variety of
regular term provisions do, id. § 1005-8-1(a)(1)(b), (c).
235. 117 II1. App. 3d 522, 453 N.E.2d 849 (1st Dist. 1983).
236. 123 III. App. 3d 600, 462 N.E.2d 963 (2d Dist. 1984).
237. Such a sentence is available when a defendant has committed two or more class X
felonies; each of those felonies is properly punishable by an extended term sentence of up to
60 years; and those sentences are made to run consecutively to one another. See, e.g., People
v. Gholston, 124 Ill. App. 3d 873, 464 N.E.2d 1179 (Ist Dist. 1984); People v. Perruquet, 118
I1l. App. 3d 293, 454 N.E.2d 1055 (5th Dist. 1983); People v. DeSimone, 108 II1. App. 3d
1015, 439 N.E.2d 1311 (2d Dist. 1982).
238. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-4(b) (1983)); see also Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3296, 3309
(codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-4-1(c), 1005-8-1(b) (1983)) (requiring explanations
for all sentences in felony cases).
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and even-handedness of consecutive sentences. Now it appears that the
reasoned basis requirement may not be enforced at all.
a. The Partial Nullification of the Reasoned Basis Requirement
The most direct assault on the reasoned basis requirement stems from the
supreme court's decisions in People v. Davis2 3 and People v. Hicks.2" ' In
Davis, the court concluded that any mandatory legislative requirement that
courts give reasons for imposing sentence would be unconstitutional. Thus,
in order to avoid invalidating language in the Act calling for such statements,
the court construed the mandatory language as merely directory. 24' Of course,
the Act's reasoned basis requirement for consecutive sentences would also
fall under this utterly indefensible interpretation.2 42 In Hicks, the Court
followed Davis and held that the phrase, "the basis for which the court
shall set forth in the record," was also permissive rather than mandatory.2 43
The impact of Davis and Hicks is unclear because each case apparently
takes the position that a defendant can compel a trial judge to supply reasons
for the sentence that is imposed. 244 Consequently, astute counsel should be
able to minimize the adverse impact of these cases to a large extent. But
even if a defendant has not insisted on a statement of reasons, a remand
for an explanation of those sentences should be required if the defendant
can demonstrate the likelihood of prejudice arising from the consecutive
sentences imposed.2 45 The substantial disparities that can result from preju-
dicial sentences, coupled with the private and public interests in preventing
them, argue in favor of a more careful scrutiny of unexplained decisions to
impose consecutive sentences.
b. Application of the Reasoned Basis Requirement
Despite Davis and Hicks, a number of cases have reached the adequacy
of particular judicial explanations of sentencing decisions. A peculiar di-
chotomy has developed in the appellate courts in these cases. On the one
hand, when sentences have been imposed consecutive to the completion of
unexpired sentences for prior unrelated crimes, a stringent standard of review
has usually been applied. On the other hand, when consecutive sentences for
two related crimes have been challenged on appeal, an extremely lenient
239. 93 I11. 2d 155, 442 N.E.2d 855 (1982).
240. 101 Ill. 2d 366, 462 N.E.2d 473 (1984).
241. 93 111. 2d 155, 162, 442 N.E.2d 855, 858 (1982).
242. For an analysis and criticism of the supreme court's decisions in Davis and Hicks, see
Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 681-85.
243. 101 Il1. 2d at 374-75, 462 N.E.2d at 476-77.
244. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 684.
245. "Prejudice" in this context means a colorable showing that a less severe sentence was
appropriate. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 680-81, 683-84.
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standard has been applied. This dichotomy has no basis in the Act. It is
doubly perplexing because the potential harm of an unduly disparate con-
secutive sentence is greatest in the case of related crimes, when the level of
scrutiny applied is the least thorough.
1. Unrelated Crimes.-ln imposing sentences on offenders who are already
imprisoned or on probation or parole, judges will frequently elect to make
punishments for the current offenses run consecutive to the sentences imposed
for earlier convictions. 246 These later sentences will be referred to as consec-
utive sentences for unrelated crimes. The general trend in such cases is to
make the second sentence relatively modest, so that the defendant's total
period of incarceration does not exceed that which could have properly been
imposed concurrently. 247 Sentences are probably imposed in this way because
of judicial antipathy to allowing offenders to work off newer sentences while
serving those imposed for earlier crimes, a circumstance which seems to
discount the second sentences. Nonetheless, the Act does not permit this
perfectly understandable sentiment to serve as a basis for imposing sentences
consecutive to those being served for unrelated crimes. Only a public pro-
tection rationale will suffice. 248
Given the availability of an equally onerous concurrent sentence, the public
protection rationale may be too difficult a standard to meet. Perhaps for
this reason, courts of review have been ruthless in policing consecutive
sentences imposed on defendants already under sentence for unrelated crimes.
People v. Green24' provides an excellent illustration. In Green, the defendant
was given concurrent ten-year sentences for three class X felonies, to be
served consecutive to two concurrent sentences for unrelated burglary offen-
ses. 250 The trial judge did not explain why he had imposed consecutive rather
than concurrent sentences. Given the defendant's prior record, however, the
appellate court could have inferred that the trial judge had believed that the
prerequisites for imposing consecutive terms had been met. Instead, the
appellate court decided that it could not make that determination on the
basis of the record before it.25 The appellate court stated that it should not
have to speculate as to the reasons for the trial judge's action, and concluded
that the sentencing decision could not be properly reviewed on appeal absent
the trial judge's explanation of his decision. As a result, the sentences were
vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.252
246. See People v. Ferguson, 99 I1l. App. 3d 779, 425 N.E.2d 582 (3d Dist. 1981); People
v. Gaston, 88 111. App. 3d 314, 410 N.E.2d 531 (4th Dist. 1980); cases cited supra note 226.
247. See infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text; see also People v. Ferguson, 99 Ill.
App. 3d 779, 425 N.E.2d 582 (3d Dist. 1982) (affirming defendant's five-year sentence for
burglary, consecutive to sentences he was then serving, where his prior criminal record included
convictions for misdemeanor theft, two for felony theft and yet another for burglary).
248. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(b) (1983)).
249. 83 Ill. App. 3d 982, 404 N.E.2d 930 (3d Dist. 1980).
250. Id. at 984, 404 N.E.2d at 931.
251. Id. at 987-88, 404 N.E.2d at 933-34.
252. Id. at 988, 404 N.E.2d at 934.
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This "strict constructionist" position, which has been followed in many
similar cases,253 was coupled with the observation that the Act required an
explanation of the basis for imposing consecutive sentences. A mere parroting
of the statutory criteria was neither necessary nor alone sufficient to sustain
such a sanction. 2 4 As the appellate court sensibly stated in People v. Fer-
guson,2" to rule otherwise "would promote form over substance without
giving defendants any further protection against arbitrary sentencing deci-
sions. ' 25 6 Consequently, Ferguson and numerous other cases upheld consec-
utive sentences in which the records left no doubt of the defendants'
dangerousness or the trial judges' reasons for imposing consecutive sentences,
even though no explicit finding of the statutory prerequisites had been
made. 257
The trend toward a meticulous scrutiny of consecutive sentencing decisions
of the type just described may have been undercut by the recent decision of
the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Pittman."' The defendant in Pittman
had been convicted of unlawful delivery of a small amount of heroin and
was sentenced to six years in prison. His sentence was to be served consecutive
to one imposed for an unrelated offense. 259 The appellate court affirmed the
sentence, even though there was no explicit finding by the trial judge that
the defendant's extended imprisonment was necessary to protect the public. 260
The trial judge had made reference to the defendant's repeated convictions
involving "serious drugs" and the need to deter drug sellers. The appellate
court found that the trial judge's reasoning had been clearly articulated and
that it supported his decision to impose a consecutive sentence. Consequently,
there was no need for a "formalistic recital" of the statutory factors. 261 The
supreme court affirmed the sentence, concluding that the trial judge's rea-
soning, coupled with the defendant's prior criminal record, comprised a
sufficient showing of dangerousness to sustain the sentence. 262
The Pittman decision appears to be unobjectionable on its facts although
somewhat unfortunate in its tone. The six-year sentence imposed on Pittman
was for a class 1 felony, which carries a minimum prison sentence of four
253. See supra notes 226, 227, 246.
254. See People v. Munoz, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1083-84, 432 N.E.2d 370, 373-74 (3d
Dist. 1982); People v. Ferguson, 99 I11. App. 3d 779, 786, 425 N.E.2d 582, 586 (3d Dist. 1981);
People v. Johnson, 98 I1. App. 3d 228, 235, 424 N.E.2d 610, 616-17 (3d Dist. 1981).
255. 99 Il. App. 3d 779, 425 N.E.2d 582 (3d Dist. 1982).
256. Id. at 786, 425 N.E.2d at 586.
257. Id.; see also People v. Logan, 117 Ill. App. 3d 753, 453 N.E.2d 1317 (1st Dist. 1983)
(trial court need not use specific statutory language where record supports imposition of
consecutive sentences).
258. 93 111. 2d 169, 442 N.E.2d 836 (1982).
259. Id. at 171-72, 442 N.E.2d at 837.
260. 100 Ill. App. 3d 838, 427 N.E.2d 276 (5th Dist. 1981).
261. Id. at 844, 427 N.E.2d at 281.
262. 93 111. 2d at 176-78, 442 N.E.2d at 839-41.
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years. 63 This was also the defendant's fourth felony conviction. 64 Although
he had a number of mitigating factors in his background, 265 which the court
ignored, his total time in custody would not have been excessive in light of
the legislatively established penalties for his offense and his prior record. 266
In short, the sentence imposed on Pittman is acceptable because it meets the
test proposed above: he could have been properly subjected to a longer
concurrent sentence that would have left him incarcerated for the same total
time he would be serving under the consecutive sentences.2 67
Nonetheless, the Pittman opinion is not entirely satisfactory. Particularly
regrettable are its reiteration of the great deference to be shown to trial
judges' decisions2 6 and its failure to disapprove of the general deterrence
rationale apparently relied upon by the trial court.2 69 While deference to the
trial judge's determination was entirely appropriate in the Pittman case, it
would be improper in those cases in which sentences of extraordinary length
are imposed. In those situations, the Act's overriding concerns for propor-
tionality and fairness call for a more thorough and careful review of trial
judges' sentencing decisions.2 70
2. Related Crimes. -Consecutive sentences are also occasionally imposed
263. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(4) (1979); id. ch. 56-1/2, § 1401(b).
264. 93 II1. 2d at 178, 442 N.E.2d at 840.
265. While Pittman had a history of narcotic use, he had never been convicted of delivery
prior to the instant offense. 100 III. App. 3d at 844-45, 427 N.E.2d at 281 (Karns, J., dissenting).
The "delivery" in the instant case had been made to a police informant, who was then facing
quite serious drug charges himself, which he was apparently trying to mitigate by helping make
cases against others. Id. at 839-40, 427 N.E.2d at 278. Pittman also was married, the father
of five children, had completed three years of college and was trained as a journeyman pipefitter.
Id. at 845, 427 N.E.2d at 281 (Karns, J., dissenting).
266. It is not clear whether Pittman would have been precluded from obtaining probation
under then-existing law. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3(c)(2)(G), 1005-5-3(c)(4), 1005-
5-3(c)(6) (1979) (all prohibiting probation for class I offenders in a variety of circumstances).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 226-32.
268. 93 III. 2d at 178, 442 N.E.2d at 840.
269. 100 II1. App. 3d at 844, 427 N.E.2d at 281. General deterrence is an inappropriate
reason to impose a consecutive sentence because the imposition of such a severe penalty should
be rooted in the character and background of the particular defendant and the circumstances
of the crime. Perhaps for that reason, the General Assembly decided not to allow a general
deterrence rationale as a basis for imposing an extended term sentence. See supra note 83. Its
use in a consecutive sentence context would be equally invalid.
General deterrence is, of course, a highly desirable attribute of any sentencing system. It is,
however, more properly considered as a goal of a sentencing system as a whole rather than of
a particular sentence. Consequently, general deterrence should be furthered by fashioning a
system of consistently applied, graduated, penalties that most severely punish conduct that is
most undesired and also punishes recidivists more harshly than first-time offenders. The
sentencing guidelines that this article recommends are believed to achieve those objectives. See
infra notes 550-66, 608-38, 754-55, 798-872 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, Part
I, at 396-404; Chart 4, at 405.
270. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 686-91.
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upon defendants convicted of multiple crimes which, while related tempo-
rally, involve more than one criminal episode or more than one victim.
27
'
Such sentences will be referred to as consecutive sentences for related crimes.
The Act imposes no explicit restrictions on the imposition of consecutive
sentences for related crimes unless the offenses were also committed as part
of a single course of conduct in which there was no substantial change in
the nature of the criminal objective.2 72
The use of consecutive sentences for related crimes, whether within or
outside of the statutory exceptions, has generated undue sentencing disparity.
The defendants who receive these sentences appear to be indistinguishable
from the many who do not. 273 This largely arbitrary selection process is
clearly at odds with the Act's goals of consistency and proportionality in
sentencing.
The Act's consecutive sentencing provisions permit a number of sentences,
perhaps appropriate in their own right, to be strung together to create a
sanction of truly draconian proportions.2 74 Consequently, a judiciary con-
cerned with preventing undue sentencing disparity would subject such a
sentencing decision to particularly intensive review, especially if the resulting
period of incarceration were quite lengthy. Nothing of the sort, however,
has occurred. Instead, cases reviewing consecutive sentencing decisions of
this type have a peculiar, almost abstract, quality in which the focus of
review is whether consecutive sentences were proper at all, not whether the
length of the aggregate term was proper. It seems that if a consecutive
271. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 123 Ill. App. 3d 899, 463 N.E.2d 1030 (1st Dist. 1984)
(consecutive 57-year sentences for murder, attempted murder and aggravated battery of three
victims); People v. Schlemm, 82 111. App. 3d 639, 402 N.E.2d 810 (4th Dist. 1980) (consecutive
38-year sentences for murder of two persons), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
272. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983)).
273. See infra notes 276-316, 519-49 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 123 I11. App. 3d 899, 463 N.E.2d 1030 (1st Dist. 1984)
(four consecutive sentences totaling 57 years); People v. Griffin, 113 Ill. App. 3d 184, 446
N.E.2d 1175 (tst Dist. 1982) (four consecutive sentences of five years each for retail theft;
appellate court made them concurrent); People v. Smith, 111 111. App. 3d 494, 444 N.E.2d 565
(1st Dist. 1982) (four consecutive sentences totaling 96 years); People v. Schlemm, 82 Il1. App.
3d 639, 402 N.E.2d 810 (4th Dist. 1980) (two consecutive 38-year sentences for double murder),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
A number of cases involve the concatenation of sentences in rather inexplicable circumstances.
For example, in People v. Baker, 127 I11. App. 3d 565, 469 N.E.2d 602 (1st Dist. 1984), the
defendant, acting in a jealous rage, broke into a residence and stabbed a man to death. Id. at
569-70, 469 N.E.2d at 606. A 35-year sentence was deemed a sufficient punishment for the
homicide, but because the defendant had broken into a residence to commit it, he also was
convicted of home invasion. A 25-year sentence imposed for that offense was then made to
run consecutively to that imposed for murder, resulting in a total 60-year sentence. No basis
for the decision to impose consecutive sentences appears in the opinion, though it may be
significant that the defendant did not raise the propriety of the sentences on appeal.
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sentence of any length could be sustained on a given set of facts, the
consecutive sentence actually imposed will be upheld. 2"
The careless approach taken in these related-crime cases is exemplified by
People v. Tucker.276 In Tucker, the defendant committed an armed robbery
and initiated a shootout with police during which two officers were seriously
wounded. 2" 7 The defendant was tried and convicted of two counts of at-
tempted murder, one count of armed robbery, and numerous other crimes
growing out of this episode.217 The evidence revealed that the defendant had
no serious criminal record and a substantial period of steady employment.
2 19
The trial judge sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years for the armed
robbery, noting that the maximum regular term had not been imposed
because of those mitigating factors. The judge then completely undid that
act of clemency by imposing two thirty-year sentences for each attempted
murder conviction, to run concurrent with each other but consecutive to the
twenty-five year armed robbery sentence. The trial judge's stated reasons for
doing so were that the preconditions for consecutive sentences were "not
only met but . . . demanded" by the totality of the circumstances. 0
Consequently, the defendant was to be incarcerated for a total of fifty-five
years.2"'
A majority of the appellate court found that these brief remarks complied
with the reasons requirement of Act. 282 One judge dissented, however, stating
275. People v. Perruquet, 118 Ill. App. 3d 293, 454 N.E.2d 1055 (5th Dist. 1983), provides
a good example of this phenomenon. Perruquet received consecutive 60-year sentences for twice
raping the same victim within several hours. Id. at 294-95, 454 N.E.2d at 1056-57. In a related
proceeding, Perruquet received a 20-year sentence for another sex offense, which was affirmed
by the appellate court. People v. Perruquet, 118 Ill. App. 3d 339, 454 N.E.2d 1051 (5th Dist.
1983). The consecutive 60-year sentences for the two rapes were to be served consecutively to
the 20-year sentence for the other sex offense. 118 Ill. App. 3d at 294, 454 N.E.2d at
1056. Although neither crime was particularly brutal, the use of the maximum extended term
sentence for each constituent offense was upheld in an almost off-hand manner. 118 II. App.
3d at 299, 454 N.E.2d at 1060.
276. 99 Ill. App. 3d 606, 425 N.E.2d 511 (2d Dist. 1981).
277. Id. at 608-09, 425 N.E.2d at 513-14.
278. Id. at 607-08, 425 N.E.2d at 512-13. In his defense, Tucker attributed his behavior to
an "acute brain syndrome" that was "due to cocaine intoxication that had caused an altered
mood." Id. at 609, 425 N.E.2d at 514. The state's expert said Tucker was not mentally ill at
the time of the crime. Id.
279. Id. at 609-10, 425 N.E.2d at 514.
280. The apellate court quoted the trial court's explanation of its decision to impose consec-
utive sentences follows:
"The court can further not impose consecutive sentences unless, having regard to
the nature and circumstances, [it] is of the opinion that such terms are required to
protect the public from further criminal conduct. It is abundantly clear that in this
case the requirements of consecutive sentences are not only met but are demanded.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds this to be the proper case
for consecutive sentences; and it is the duty of the Court to impose such."
Id. at 612, 425 N.E.2d at 515-16.
281. Id. at 610, 425 N.E.2d at 514.
282. Id. at 612, 425 N.E.2d at 516.
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that he found nothing in the record to indicate why consecutive sentences
were necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the
defendant. 213 In his view, the record indicated the trial judge's belief that
consecutive sentences were required to serve the ends of general, rather than
specific, deterrence. 214 The dissent also noted the apparent inconsistency in
the trial judge's simultaneous findings of mitigating circumstances sufficient
to support a less-than-maximum regular term for the armed robbery and
dangerousness sufficient to justify imposition of consecutive sentences. The
dissent would have remanded the case to the trial court for clarification and
resentencing. 215
The Tucker dissent seems to have the better argument. The trial court's
purported basis for imposing consecutive sentences suffers from both of the
vices condemned in cases like Green and Ferguson: it is conclusory and it is
unclear. 2 6 If conclusory and unclear statements are not sufficient even for
cases involving relatively short terms, they certainly should not be found
sufficient for more severe sentences, especially when imposed on offenders
such as Tucker who do not appear to be hardened criminals. 28 7
A decision to impose consecutive sentences in a related crime context
should be subject to the same threshold requirement of reasonableness that
should prevail in the unrelated crime context: whether, in light of all relevant
circumstances and factors,2 8 a concurrent sentence equal to the defendant's
total period of incarceration under consecutive sentences would have been
proper. 2 9 When the fifty-five years of consecutives sentences in Tucker are
283. Id. at 614-15, 425 N.E.2d at 517-18 (Hopf, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
284. Id. at 615, 425 N.E.2d at 518 (Hopf, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
285. Id. (Hopf, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
286. See Ferguson, 99 I1. App. 3d at 786, 425 N.E.2d at 586; Green, 83 I11. App. 3d at
988, 404 N.E.2d at 934.
287. Tucker can be usefully contrasted with People v. Finkey, in which the defendant
wounded three police officers in a gun battle. 105 Ill. App. 3d 230-31, 434 N.E.2d 18-19 (4th
Dist. 1982). Although Finkey had a history of emotional problems stemming from alcoholism,
the court found that he was in control of his faculties on the occasion in question. Id. at 232-
33, 434 N.E.2d at 20-21. Despite the harm he had caused (and despite a criminal history that
included a conviction for assault with intent to commit rape) Finkey was deemed sufficiently
punished by concurrent 30-year terms for his two attempted murder convictions. Id. at 233,
434 N.E.2d at 21.
Tucker also can be profitably compared with People v. Timmons, 127 Ill. App. 3d 679, 469
N.E.2d 646 (1st Dist. 1984). Timmons' consecutive 25-year sentences for two acts of voluntary
manslaughter committed as part of a single criminal episode were modified to run concurrently,
even though Timmons had a criminal record that included a prior class 1 felony conviction.
Id. at 686-88, 469 N.E.2d at 651-52.
288. For a discussion of some of these factors and how they would affect the defendant's
sentence, see infra notes 551-60, 798-872 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, Part 1,
at 396-404; Chart 4, at 405.
289. Consecutive sentences can, of course, exceed the longest extended term that may be
imposed for any constituent offense. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(c)(2) (1983). Where
such sentences are involved, the test would have to be framed somewhat differently: whether,
in light of all relevant circumstances and factors, the defendant should be punished more
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examined from this perspective, they appear to be excessive. The aggravated
nature of Tucker's crimes obviously called for sanctions substantially in
excess of the minimum terms. By imposing consecutive sentences, however,
the trial judge was actually punishing Tucker more severely than over ninety-
four percent of the armed robbers and over eighty-eight percent of the
attempted murderers convicted in the year his sentence was reviewed. 290 No
basis for placing the defendant in such a hard core group is apparent from
the appellate court's opinion. Even if the trial judge was right in treating
the defendant in this manner, fundamental fairness would require a fuller
explanation of the judge's reasoning before affirming the sentence.
The Act's overriding concern for fairness and proportionality in sentencing
matters underlies this proposed test. This concern has occasionally motivated
appellate courts to subject consecutive sentences to a more exacting scru-
tiny. 9 ' For example, in People v. Griffin,192 a young man used his apparently
considerable charm and thespian talents to commit four retail thefts in a
two-day period.2 93 Finding that the four transactions involved did not con-
stitute a single course of conduct, the trial judge imposed four consecutive
five-year terms, the maximum allowable. 294 The trial judge explained that he
had imposed this sentence because the defendant was a cunning, intelligent
individual of great charm who, among his other questionable qualities, 29
had no compunctions about "taking advantage of people and using people
for his own benefit and his own needs and desires, whatever they may be. '296
severely than others who receive only extended term sentences. For a discussion of questions
concerning proportionality and fairness raised by this analysis, see infra notes 330-51 and
accompanying text.
290. See POLICY DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 1981 STA-
TISTICAL PRESENTATION Table 6 [hereinafter cited as [Year] STATISTICAL PRESENTATION]. The
DOC prepares a similar report each year.
291. See, e.g., People v. Timmons, 127 Ill. App. 3d 679, 469 N.E.2d 646 (lst Dist. 1984)
(consecutive 25-year sentences for two acts of voluntary manslaughter committed during single
criminal episode modified to run concurrently); People v. Merz, 122 Il1. App. 3d 972, 461
N.E.2d 1380 (2d Dist. 1984) (consecutive sentences vacated where trial judge's finding that
defendant was unlikely to commit another crime was incompatible with rationale for consecutive
sentences); People v. Gray, 121 Ill. App. 3d 867, 460 N.E.2d 354 (1st Dist. 1984) (defendant
with no prior criminal record received consecutive sentences in connection with death of child
and efforts to conceal body; modified to run concurrently); People v. Griffin, 113 Ill. App. 3d
184, 446 N.E.2d 1175 (1st Dist. 1982) (four consecutive five-year sentences for retail theft
modified to run concurrently); People v. Johnson, 104 Il1. App. 3d 572, 432 N.E.2d 1232 (1st
Dist. 1982) (sentence of 100 to 200 years for rape to run consecutively to earlier 50- to 100-
year sentence modified to run concurrently); People v. Zadel, 69 Il. App. 3d 681, 387 N.E.2d
1092 (1st Dist. 1979) (seven-year sentence for armed robbery to run consecutively to sentence
for natural life modified to run concurrently).
292. 113 Ill. App. 3d 184, 446 N.E.2d 1175 (1st Dist. 1982).
293. Id. at 187-88, 446 N.E.2d at 1177-78.
294. Id. at 192-93, 446 N.E.2d at 1181.
295. The trial court found that the defendant had circumvented the law all of his life and




The appellate court vacated the defendant's sentence and imposed con-
current five-year terms instead.297 It noted that, both before and after the
effective date of the Act, Illinois law had provided that consecutive sentences
were rarely appropriate and should be imposed sparingly. The Griffin court
concluded that, in light of the nonviolent nature of the offenses and the
mitigating factors in the defendant's background, the trial court had not
explained sufficiently why consecutive sentences were necessary to protect
the public from future criminal conduct by the defendant. 298
The result in Griffin is sound, even though it is inconsistent with the great
deference that, according to Pittman, should be shown to sentencing judges'
decisions to impose consecutive sentences. 299 The supreme court's ready
affirmance of the sentence imposed in Pittman was probably influenced by
the moderate nature of the consecutive sentences imposed in that case. 3°°
When such moderation is not clearly apparent, however, a careful review of
consecutive sentences from both a reasoned basis viewpoint and a propor-
tionality perspective should be undertaken in order to insure a principled,
consistent application of the courts' consecutive sentencing powers. If that
review discloses a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the sentence
normally imposed, it should be vacated even though the trial judge had
explained his decision fully. 301
3. Imposition of Consecutive Sentences in "Single Course of Conduct" Cases
Although the Act left the imposition of consecutive sentences for unrelated
crimes largely unrestrained,30 2 it prohibited consecutive sentences for most
297. Id. at 194, 446 N.E.2d at 1182.
298. The defendant, 21, was pursuing a college education and had no history of violent or
dangerous criminal activity; but he was on parole for a Federal Firearms Act violation at the
time he committed the offenses at bar. Id.
299. Pittman, 93 111. 2d at 178, 442 N.E.2d at 840. The Griffin court sought to come within
the Pittman analytical framework by claiming that it could not tell why the trial court imposed
such sentences. This claim, however, appears to be a red herring. The trial court explained
that it took the action it did because Griffin was an unrepentent, amoral, utterly incorrigible
offender. 113 Ill. App. 3d at 192, 446 N.E.2d at 1181. This type of credibility determination
would normally be entitled to greater-than-usual deference on appeal. Indeed, the supreme court's
opinions eulogizing the role of trial court judges in sentencing matters greatly rely on that
factor. See People v. Cox, 82 I11. 2d 268, 281, 412 N.E.2d 541, 548 (1980); People v. Perru-
quet, 68 111. 2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d 882, 884 (1977).
300. Pittman, convicted of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, was sentenced to six
years imprisonment consecutive to a five-year term imposed in another case. 93 111. 2d at 171-
72, 442 N.E.2d at 837. The trial record showed that Pittman had several felony convictions,
including convictions for unlawful use of weapons, possession of heroin, and unlawful sale of
cocaine. Id. at 178, 442 N.E.2d at 840.
301. Griffin's punishment was twice as severe as any other reported theft sentence. See Table
5 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290. Moreover, his total period of incarceration
would have been longer than that given to most robbers, armed robbers, and rapists. See Tables
4, 13, 15, 17 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290.
302. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
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crimes that "were committed as part of a single course of conduct during
which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objec-
tive." 30 3 In these "single course of conduct" cases, consecutive sentences are
available only if "the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury" in the course
of a class X or class 1 felony. °4 These limitations, however, have been
ineffective. In virtually every case in which a defendant was convicted of
two distinct felonies the court has concluded either that the offenses were
not part of a single course of conduct or that there had been a change in
the nature of the criminal objective. Thus, this prohibition has been effec-
tively nullified." 5 Moreover, the supreme court has erroneously concluded
that any codefendant-not just the codefendant who actually inflicted serious
bodily injury-may receive consecutive sentences if the Act's other prereq-
uisites are satisfied. Thus, the Act's other intended restriction on consecutive
sentences has been invalidated as well. 30 6
a. The "Single Course of Conduct" Limitation
The effect on the availability of consecutive sentences of the Act's "single
course of conduct" exception has been minimized by the narrow range of
activity that the term is held to embrace. The position established under
prior law was that the exception was not "adopted to free a defendant from
the consequences of a series of crimes involving separate acts, committed
against several individuals." ' 0 7 This position was adopted in People v.
Schlemm,5 0' which upheld consecutive thirty-eight-year terms for a defendant
convicted of murdering two individuals within a short time.3°9 In the wake
of Schlemm, consecutive sentences for crimes committed in the course of a
few hours have been approved in a number of cases. °10 When multiple victims
are involved, defendants do not even try to argue that temporally related
crimes come within the "single course of conduct" limitation, apparently
realizing that a change in the victim necessarily amounts to a change in the
nature of the criminal objective. 3 '
303. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I1. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983)).
304. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983)).
305. See infra notes 307-16 and accompanying text.
306. See infra notes 317-29 and accompanying text.
307. People v. Lindsay, 67 Ill. App. 3d 638, 647, 384 N.E.2d 793, 800 (1st Dist. 1978).
308. 82 Il. App. 3d 639, 402 N.E.2d 810 (4th Dist. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
309. Id. at 648-49, 402 N.E.2d at 817-18 (dictum).
310. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 124 Il. App. 3d 14, 463 N.E.2d 981 (1st Dist. 1984)
(affirming several concurrent sentences to run consecutively to those imposed in connection
with other crimes committed earlier in the same evening); People v. Mathes, 101 Ill. App. 3d
205, 427 N.E.2d 1269 (3d Dist. 1981) (consecutive sentences of nine and six years for two
armed robberies committed approximately two hours apart, to be served consecutively to existing
terms).
311. See, e.g., People v. Edmondson, 106 Il. App. 3d 716, 435 N.E.2d 870 (2d Dist. 1982)
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Consecutive sentences have also been upheld when a defendant committed
more than one crime against a single victim. In People v. Perruquet,3 12 the
defendant abducted and sexually assaulted his victim and, after several hours
had elapsed, sexually assaulted her again." 3 The trial judge found that these
two attacks were not part of a single course of conduct, so that consecutive
sentences could be imposed even though the victim had not suffered serious
bodily injury.3' 4 The sanctions he chose-two consecutive sixty-year terms-
were upheld on appeal.315
According to these cases, then, virtually any change in a defendant's
conduct sufficient to permit convictions of separate crimes will also be
sufficient to take the defendant outside the *"single course of conduct"
limitation. Under this interpretation, of course, the Act does not narrow the
group of defendants eligible for consecutive sentences to any appreciable
extent. 1 6
b. The Requirement of Serious Bodily Injury
While the "single course of conduct" limitation has not effectively cur-
tailed consecutive sentences, the Act contained another provision that seemed
certain to fare better: the requirement that the defendant have inflicted severe
bodily injury on the victim.31 7 That the General Asssembly intended that a
defendant personally have inflicted the requisite harm seems clear for three
reasons. First, this is the most obvious reading of the language requiring
that the "defendant [have] inflicted" the harm. Second, the General Assem-
bly used different language elsewhere in the Act to expose all offenders
committing a crime to the possibility of a certain penalty, providing instead
that the "offense [be] accompanied by" the requisite behavior."' Finally,
(consecutive sentences totaling 36 years for rape and robbery of an elderly woman and severe
beating of her husband); People v. Hicks, 101 Ill. App. 3d 238, 427 N.E.2d 1328 (4th Dist.
1981) (consecutive sentences totaling 70 years for execution-style murder and attempted murder
committed in connection with armed robbery); cf. People v. Klinkhammer, 105 Ill. App. 3d
747, 434 N.E.2d 835 (3d Dist. 1982) (consecutive sentences totaling 70 years imposed for
kidnapping and execution-style murder of armed robbery victim vacated, but with observation
that they were not necessarily excessive).
312. 118 Ill. App. 3d 293, 454 N.E.2d 1055 (5th Dist. 1983).
313. Id. at 294-95, 454 N.E.2d at 1056-57.
314. Id. at 296, 454 N.E.2d at 1057-58.
315. Id. at 296-99, 454 N.E.2d at 1057-60.
316. Many courts, however, have imposed concurrent sentences in situations similar to those
presented in Perruquet. See, e.g., People v. Sanford, 119 Ill. App. 3d 160, 456 N.E.2d 333 (3d
Dist. 1983) (multiple sexual assaults; concurrent 45-year sentences); People v. Medley, Ill Ill.
App. 3d 444, 444 N.E.2d 269 (4th Dist. 1983) (multiple sexual assaults; concurrent 45-year
sentences). Thus, it is possible that either customary judicial sentencing practices or the Act
itself has tended to restrain the pyramiding of sanctions undertaken in Perruquet.
317. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 II1. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983)).
318. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Il1. Laws 3264, 3301, 3308 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.2(b)(2), 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1983)).
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the General Assembly specifically rejected legislation that would have per-
mitted the imposition of consecutive sentences on an accountability rationale.
The Act's consecutive sentence provision derived from alternative propos-
als contained in two bills introduced in the First 1977 Special Session of the
Illinois General Assembly. H.B. 15, called for consecutive sentences when
one of the offenses involved was a class 1 felony in which "the defendant
inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily injury to another." 3 9 The
competing bill, S.B. 11, called for consecutive sentences when at least one
class X or class 1 felony was involved and "extreme violence or severe bodily
harm occurred.""32 This provision was obviously narrower than that of H.B.
15, insofar as it required that the bodily injury have actually occurred. On
the other hand, by providing only that the defendant have been convicted
of a class X or class 1 offense in which serious bodily harm was inflicted,
but not that the defendant be the one to have inflicted it, S.B. 11 broadened
the potential reach of consecutive sentences to embrace passive accom-
plices.32 Ultimately, the Act adopted a more restrictive position than that of
either of those two bills by combining S.B. l's actual injury requirement
with H.B. 15's requirement that the defendant personally inflict such in-
jury.3 22 The clear import of this change was to limit the availability of
consecutive sentences to those defendants actually inflicting the harm in-
volved.
The issue of the availability of consecutive sentences for passive accom-
plices came before the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Sangster.3 23 Sangster
reversed an appellate court opinion 324 that had relied solely on a statutory
construction argument in concluding that a person convicted of murder,
armed robbery, and aggravated kidnapping on an accountability theory could
not receive consecutive sentences. 25 The supreme court's reversal was based
on a pre-Act decision establishing that the then-existing law permitted con-
secutive sentences to be imposed on an accountability basis.32 6 Because the
Sangster court could find no indication that the General Assembly had
wished to overturn that earlier construction, it decided that the earlier rule
of law had been retained under the Act as well.3 27
Sangster's analysis is unconvincing because it is contrary to both the plain
319. H.B. 15, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-8-4(a) at 56 (emphasis added).
320. S.B. 11, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-8-4(a) at 61-62 (emphasis
added).
321. S.B. 1I, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, Ist 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-8-4(a) at 61-62.
322. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983)).
323. 91 111. 2d 260, 437 N.E.2d 625 (1982).
324. People v. Sangster, 95 Ill. App. 3d 357, 420 N.E.2d 181 (4th Dist. 1981).
325. Id. at 364-65, 420 N.E.2d at 186-87.
326. 91 Ill. 2d at 264-66, 437 N.E.2d at 627-28 (relying on People v. Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d 493,
315 N.E.2d 29 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1054 (1974)).
327. 91 111. 2d at 265-66, 437 N.E.2d at 628.
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meaning of the Act and its legislative history.3 2s Furthermore, the sound
exercise of judicial discretion would seem to preclude the imposition of
consecutive sentences on one defendant because of the injury inflicted by
another defendant. Given the potentially staggering severity of consecutive
sentences, one would expect that they would be imposed only on those
offenders who had demonstrated a personal capacity for dangerousness.
Indeed, this is precisely what the Act itself requires, by predicating a con-
secutive sentence upon a showing that it is necessary "to protect the public
from further criminal conduct by the defendant." '329 One can only hope that
the supreme court will have occasion to reconsider Sangster.
B. Possible Judicial Guidelines Governing
Imposition of Consecutive Sentences
The present system of imposing consecutive sentences is fundamentally
flawed and efforts to rationalize it are largely nonexistent. The blame for
this situation, however, cannot in fairness be placed solely on the judiciary.
The Act itself is responsible, directly or indirectly, for many of the problems
that have arisen.330 While broad legislative measures provide the brightest
hope for reform in this area, substantial improvements could be brought
about within the existing legislative framework if a few basic guidelines were
developed and followed.
Beginning at the greatest level of generality, it should be remembered that
the rule developed under prior law disfavoring consecutive sentences remains
good law under the Act.' Moreover, in imposing consecutive sentences, due
consideration must be given to the Act's concerns for fairness and propor-
tionality in sentencing and its adoption of "least restrictive alternative"
sentencing principles.332 Consequently, before imposing lengthy333 consecutive
sentences, a judge should be able to point to objective factors that serve to
distinguish the particular defendant from other extremely aggravated of-
fenders who nonetheless were deemed sufficiently punished by concurrent
regular or extended term sentences. Additionally, the sentencing judge should
be required to treat seriously the Act's requirement that a consecutive
sentence is necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct by
the defendant.
328. The supreme court may have been unaware of the provision's evolution, as the court
did not discuss its legislative history.
329. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-4(b) (1983)) (emphasis added).
330. See supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
331. See, e.g., People v. Griffin, 113 Ill. App. 3d 184, 446 N.E.2d 1175 (1st Dis. 1982);
People v. Zadel, 69 Ill. App. 3d 681, 387 N.E.2d 1092 (1st Dist. 1979).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 52-68.
333. For these purposes, "lengthy" consecutive sentences are those resulting in a longer
aggregate prison term than the maximum extended term for the most serious offense of which
the defendant was convicted.
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Second, courts generally should restrict the availability of consecutive
sentences in all cases involving related crimes334-not just in "single course
of conduct" cases 3"-to those in which the defendant personally inflicted
serious bodily injury during the course of a class X or class 1 felony. By
and large these measures of self-restraint seem to have been adopted tacitly
by the judiciary already. Consecutive sentences imposed for nonviolent crimes
in related cases, for example, have been routinely reversed on appeal.116 In
addition, consecutive sentences are rarely imposed on defendants who did
not personally inflict severe bodily harm.3" Thus, adoption of the suggested
standard would go a long way to rationalize the law of consecutive sentencing
while affecting the decisions in just a few aberrant cases.
Finally, in order to promote a greater degree of justice, fairness, and
proportionality in sentencing, special guidelines should be developed con-
cerning resort to the lengthier sentences within the Act's consecutive sentence
ranges. To that end, judges should deny themselves the upper one-fourth to
one-third of the present consecutive sentencing ranges, even in aggravated
cases. While such a proposal obviously runs counter to much current public
sentiment, it would be in accord with both explicit and implicit limitations
contained in the Act. Moreover, it would alleviate prison overcrowding
without jeoparding public safety in the slightest.
Perhaps the easiest way to see the merits of this proposal is to examine
how it would work in a "hard" case-one involving an offender whose
conduct and background were unquestionably of the type the General As-
sembly had in mind when adopting the present longer ranges. People v.
DeSimone338 is a good example. In that case, during the armed robbery of
a medical clinic, the defendant shot a doctor in the head at close range,
apparently without provocation. The victim was bound hand and foot and
left bleeding profusely as the defendant and his confederates ransacked the
office. The doctor requested that the offenders summon medical assistance
but their only answer was an obscene remark.3 9
DeSimone was tried and convicted of attempted murder, aggravated bat-
tery, armed robbery, and armed violence. He was given the "jackpot" of
two consecutive sixty-year sentences on the armed robbery and attempted
murder counts.3 40 The trial judge found no factors in mitigation of the
defendant's conduct, and in aggravation he noted that the defendant had a
history of serious prior delinquencies and criminal convictions, including one
for murder.3 4' The record also revealed that the defendant did not show any
334. See supra text accompanying notes 271-301.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 302-16.
336. See, e.g., People v. Griffin, 113 111. App. 3d 184, 446 N.E.2d 1175 (1st Dist. 1982).
337. But see People v. Sangster, 91 111. 2d 260, 437 N.E.2d 625 (1982). This is the only case
of which the author is aware.
338. 108 II1. App. 3d 1015, 439 N.E.2d 1311 (2d Dit. 1982).
339. Id. at 1017-18, 439 N.E.2d at 1312.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1019, 439 N.E.2d at 1313.
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remorse "but rather demonstrated a deliberate and calculated attitude of
contempt for the judicial system. 3 42 The appellate court affirmed, conclud-
ing that both the extended term and consecutive sentences were appropriate
on that record.3 43
What should the appellate court have considered in making that deter-
mination? To begin with, DeSimone presented an exceptionally aggravated
version of the offense, a particularly egregious prior record, and extremely
limited prospects for rehabilitation. Indeed, the defendant's behavior was so
aggravated that any "worse" offenders are unlikely to be found. Conse-
quently, it seems clear that DeSimone was the type of offender that the
General Assembly had in mind in authorizing consecutive, extended term
sentences. Nonetheless, when DeSimone's sentence is examined in light of
the Act's goals and purposes, a penalty in the eighty-to-ninety year range
seems more than ample.
DeSimone's sentence is questionable in two ways. First, a comparison of
DeSimone's sentence to those imposed in closely parallel cases reveals that
his 120-year sentence was twice as long as the next most serious sentence
imposed on persons convicted of armed robbery or attempted murder in the
year he committed his crimes. 3" The Act requires that some reason for this
differential appear of record. Even assuming that DeSimone possessed a
vileness and despicability in measures not approached by most of his fellow
inmates convicted of the same crimes, it seems improbable that he was sixty-
years "worse" than the small minority of similar offenders receiving extended
term sentences.
Second, DeSimone's sentence was substantially more severe than that of
seventy-nine percent of all murder sentences imposed in 1982, even though
his actions did not result in loss of life.3 4- Only the rarest of cases should
justify imposition of consecutive sentences for class X felonies that exceed
the maximum extended term sentence available for murder.146 Consequently,
a rule of thumb putting an eighty-year "cap" on consecutive sentences for
two class X felonies would be an entirely appropriate and prudent limitation
on judicial discretion.3 47
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1019-26, 439 N.E.2d at 1313-17.
344. See Table 6 in 1980 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290. Only 4% of armed robbers
and 20% of attempted murderers sentenced in 1982 received extended term sentences. Id.
345. In 1982, of the 320 individuals committed to the DOC for murder, 210 received sentences
of 40 years or less, an additional 43 received sentences from 40 to 80 years, none received
a definite term of more than 80 years, 52 received natural life, and 15 received death. See
Tables 11, 12, 25 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290.
346. The need to maintain some degree of proportionality between the sentences imposed
for murder and those for class X felonies suggests this result even when the aggravating
circumstances justify consecutive extended term sentences. For a fuller discussion of this concern,
see infra note 349.
347. The sentencing guidelines proposed herein would provide that a defendant in DeSimone's
situation receive a maximum sentence of 70 years. See Appendix to text, Chart 4, at 405.
Incomplete information concerning DeSimone's prior adult and juvenile record and his parole
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Moreover, an eighty-year sentence for DeSimone cannot be criticized from
either a "justice" or a "public safety" perspective. Such a sentence would
clearly differentiate him from all but a handful of those convicted of similar
crimes. As for public safety, releasing DeSimone in forty years, when he is
around seventy years old, is unlikely to result in any greater danger to the
public than would releasing him twenty years later. Violent crimes simply
are not committed with any great frequency by the elderly.3 4 Moreover,
from a broader perspective, keeping DeSimone in prison after he turns
seventy actually may decrease public safety by lessening the willingness or
the ability of the criminal justice system to impose longer sentences on
younger, more dangerous offenders.149
Judges should also ignore the upper portions of the sentencing ranges for
combinations of other felonies. This follows from the above reasoning and
from a need to maintain an appropriate differential between the sentences
available for class X offenses and those available for lesser felonies. 50 In
conjunction with the other measures called for above,"' such an exercise of
judicial discretion would go a good way toward the development of a more
consistent and rational imposition of consecutive sentences within existing
law.
status prevents a precise determination of what his sentence would be. Based on the information
available, however, he would have a criminal history score of at least 15 because of his prior
murder conviction and his exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior in connection with the
instant offense. See infra notes 830-33, 847-51 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, § la,
c, at 396-97, § 2a(2)(a), (b), at 399-401. A score of 15 would involve a presumptive sentence
of 45 to 50 years; each one-point increase in that score would add five years to that presump-
tive sentence. See Appendix to text, Chart 4, at 405.
348. Unfortunately, exceptions to this rule exist. See People v. Smith, I l I Ill. App. 3d 494,
444 N.E.2d 565 (1st Dist. 1982) (62-year-old defendant with a criminal record extending over
40 years shot store clerk in course of armed robbery).
349. There are two other aspects to a complete review of a sentence such as DeSimone's
from the perspective of consistency and proportionality; but their proper resolution in De-
Simone's case is not clear from the facts available. First, a sentence of 120 years is, under
allowable good-time provisions, the equivalent of a life sentence as it will likely keep the
defendant incarcerated for 60 years. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(a) (1983). Before
imposing such a sentence, the record should clearly demonstrate that no reasonable basis exists
for concluding that the defendant would be rehabilitated in the foreseeable future. At the very
least, it seems likely that condition was satisfied in DeSimone's case.
Second, the sentences in DeSimone should be subject to additional scrutiny because they
were imposed for offenses not resulting in death. The General Assembly has required the
commission of at least three class X or greater class offenses on separate occasions for imposition
of natural life sentences in noncapital cases. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33B (1983).The
sanctions against DeSimone were equivalent to a natural life sentence, which normally should
not be imposed on an offender whose criminal record does not show the requisite aggravating
factors. However, that three offense condition may also have been met here. See DeSimone,
108 I1. App. 3d at 1019, 439 N.E.2d at 1313 (defendant "had a history of serious prior
delinquencies and criminal activities, including a prior murder conviction").
350. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 686-91.
351. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
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IV. EXTENDED TERM SENTENCES
In addition to the natural life and consecutive sentences already discussed,
the Act authorized extended terms of imprisonment in certain circumstances.
Extended term sentences double the maximum sanction that can be imposed
on a felony offender. They could be imposed on convicted felons who were
seventeen years old when the offense was committed,352 if either of two
factors were present: (1) the defendant had been previously convicted in
Illinois of the same or greater class felony within ten years, excluding time
spent in custody, if charges had been separately brought and tried and had
arisen out of different series of acts;353 or (2) the instant felony had been
accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wan-
ton cruelty.5 4 Since the Act's passage, the General Assembly has made
extended terms available for some gang-rapists and felons whose victims
were under twelve, over sixty, or physically disabled.355
All of these qualifying factors function as direct limitations on the avail-
ability of extended term sanctions: they must be "found to be present"
before an extended term sentence may be imposed.35 6 Both the language and
the legislative history of the Act, however, show that judges were not expected
to impose extended term sentences as a matter of course whenever the factors
were present.357 Rather, such sentences were to be imposed only when it
would be consistent with the Act's overriding sentencing reform objectives
to do so.a58 The legislature's expectation was that the Act's provisions
structuring the imposition and review of sentences would result in stringent
judicial limitations on their use. 359
By and large, this expectation has not been borne out. Although there are
numerous instances in which extended term sentences seem to have been
352. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Il. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b) (1983)).
353. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(1) (1983)).
354. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(2) (1983)).
355. See supra note 114.
356. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3310 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-2(a) (1983)).
In addition to the foregoing limitation, the Act specified that no such sentence could be
imposed pursuant to a plea bargain unless it affirmatively appeared that the defendant was
aware of that possibility at the time of the defendant's plea. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977
Ill. Laws 3264, 3310 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-2(b) (1983)). This requirement
remains operative even for sentences imposed upon revocation of probation when the original
probation sentence was imposed pursuant to a plea bargain. See People v. Eisenberg, 109 111.
App. 3d 98, 100, 440 N.E.2d 259, 260 (1st Dist. 1982).
357. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
358. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
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properly and sensibly imposed, 36° the outright invalidation or crimped con-
structions of the Act's various structural sentencing reforms have greatly
hindered the development of a rational approach to extended term sent-
encing.16'
There are two principal conceptual problems concerning the use of ex-
tended term sentences: what additional nonstatutory factors should be present
before extended terms are imposed, and how to determine the length of the
sentence, once a judge decides that some extended term sentence is appro-
priate. These two concerns have been completely ignored by the Illinois
reviewing courts. Instead, two erroneous notions have taken root that thus
far have undermined any efforts to bring about a minimal degree of con-
sistency and rationality in sentencing. The first mistaken view is that extended
term sentences are appropriate whenever a reason for which they may be
imposed exists and that it is only a matter of mercy when one is not selected.3 62
The second erroneous view is that there are no explicit statutory restraints
on selecting a sentence from within the lawful range.3 63
A. Extended Term Sentences Based Solely
on a Prior Criminal Record
As noted, the Act permits imposition of an extended term sentence on a
felony offender based solely on a sufficiently recent prior felony conviction
if that prior conviction was for the same or greater class of felony.364
360. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 122 Il1. App. 3d 362, 461 N.E.2d 493 (Ist Dist. 1984)
(60-year maximum extended term for attempted murder and armed robbery; defendant, who
had five prior felony convictions, beat victim with claw hammer); People v. Woods, 122 Il1.
App. 3d 176, 460 N.E.2d 880 (Ist Dist. 1984) (60-year maximum extended term sentence for
rape; defendant, who had prior armed robbery conviction, tried to put a contract out on
victim's life); People v. Shepard, 114 I1. App. 3d 598, 449 N.E.2d 222 (1st Dist. 1983) (60-
year maximum extended term sentences for rape, armed robbery and home invasion affirmed;
defendant, who had prior convictions for rape and deviate sexual assault, nearly killed arresting
officer); People v. Freeman, 104 Il. App. 3d 980, 433 N.E.2d 974 (1st Dist. 1982) (40-year
extended term sentence for armed robbery affirmed; extensive, extremely brutal torture of
victim by defendant).
361. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 645-57, 675-86, 691-707.
362. See People v. Morton, 102 II1. App. 3d 280, 430 N.E.2d 383 (3d Dist. 1981).
363. See infra notes 494-518 and accompanying text.
364. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 III. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(1) (1983)). This language arguably left open the possibility that a defendant
with a prior felony record could commit a misdemeanor that could be enhanced to a felony
by virtue of the prior conviction(s), and then have the sentence for that latter crime enhanced
to an extended term because of that same prior felony. The early appellate court opinions
split on the propriety of this double enhancement; but in People v. Hobbs, 86 I11. 2d 242,
427 N.E.2d 558 (1981), the supreme court put the issue to rest in holding that a prior felony
conviction could not be used both to enhance a charge from a misdemeanor to a felony and
to enhance the penalty. Id. at 246, 427 N.E.2d at 559-60.
An interesting issue that the Hobbs court commented on but did not resolve was whether a
defendant having multiple prior convictions and then convicted of a misdemeanor enhanceable
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Although this limitation serves a salutary purpose,3 65 it also creates an
anomaly: The lower the class of felony a defendant has commited, the more
likely it is that any prior criminal record qualifies the defendant for an
extended term sentence. A wooden application of this provision would thus
result in the imposition of extended term sentences at a greater frequency
for minor offenses than for major ones.
Happily enough, this peculiarity has received widespread but tacit recog-
nition. As a general rule, judges have generally exercised their discretion in
favor of not considering a prior record as a sufficient basis to impose an
extended term sentence for less serious felonies. Even for crimes as serious
to a felony by virtue of more than one of these prior offenses, could be sentenced to an
extended term by using one of those offenses to enhance the misdemeanor to a felony and
another to extend the sentence for that felony. In Hobbs, the defendant had a prior misde-
meanor conviction, which could have been used to enhance the instant conviction to a felony,
leaving his prior felony conviction to enhance his sentence. The court described this as "irrele-
vant," apparently only because it was clear that the prior felony conviction had in fact been
used to enhance the grade of offense. 86 111. 2d at 246, 427 N.E.2d at 560.
Although this language suggests that the court would have approved of splitting the prior
convictions, elsewhere the court seems to rule out that possibility in concluding that a crime
that is a misdemeanor until a prior conviction is established is "simply not [that] at which
section 5-5-3.2(b) is aimed." Id. Picking up on that language, the court in People v. Spearman,
108 II1. App. 3d 237, 438 N.E.2d 1320 (3d Dist. 1982), read Hobbs as precluding enhancement
under § 5-5-3.2(b)(1) if the instant offense, exclusive of any enhancement provisions due to a
defendant's prior criminal record, constitutes only a misdemeanor. Id. at 240, 438 N.E.2d at
1321-22. The court noted rather tartly that that section "should not be interpreted to authorize
imposing up to six years' imprisonment for shoplifting three pieces of meat, unless the General
Assembly clearly expresses itself to the contrary." Id. at 240, 438 N.E.2d at 1322.
The result in Spearman is sound on its facts, but the reasoning is questionable. By providing
for the enhancement of misdemeanors to felonies in certain circumstances, the General Assembly
was clearly manifesting its intention to allow recidivists to be punished more severely solely
because they are recidivists, rather than because of their instant crime. At least where these
offenders had more than the minimal prior record necessary to enhance their misdemeanors to
felonies, it seems reasonable to assume that the General Assembly intended to allow them to
receive the same punishment that felons of that class would receive. The issue of proper
sentencing should not turn on whether the particular felony is an enhanced misdemeanor, but
rather whether the sanction levied is an appropriate one considering all of the facts. The vice
of the approach taken in Spearman is that it does not merely overturn excessive sentences.
Instead, it denies sentencing judges the power to impose lengthy terms in all cases of a given
class, even though these sentences might well be appropriate.
Yet, given the alternatives, the rule in Spearman should be supported on a utilitarian
rationale-as doing the greatest good in the greatest number of cases. The problem with the
sentences levied in Hobbs, Spearman, and similar cases is easily described: Even taking the
defendant's prior records into account, those sentences were clearly excessive both in their own
right and in comparison to sentences imposed on those similarly situated. Ideally, these sentences
would simply be struck down one at a time by utilizing the probing appellate review process
contemplated by the Act. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 685-91. Ironically, however, the
supreme court's enshrinement of trial judges' sentencing decisions has made a conservative
case-by-case approach utterly impractical. Id. Faced with either allowing sentencing judges to
impose disproportionately severe sentences without providing effective checks or banning those
sentences altogether, it is difficult to fault the Spearman court's choice of the latter course.
365. The provision's apparent intent was to prevent substantial increases in an offender's
sentence because the offender had a relatively minor criminal record.
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as class 2 felonies, this generalization seems to hold. For example, extended
terms are quite rare for the most common class 2 felonies, robbery and
burglary.366 Reported decisions involving these felonies usually have discussed
extended term sentences as a theoretically possible, but rejected, sentencing
alternative. 67 When extended terms have been imposed, the defendants' prior
criminal records were almost always far in excess of the minimum number
and severity of convictions required by the Act.
36
8
Regarding more serious felonies such as rape and armed robbery, however,
there is much less consistency in the use of prior records to justify imposing
extended term sentences. A substantial and growing body of cases has viewed
a defendant's prior felony record not merely as a necessary precondition to
imposing an extended term, but as a sufficient basis for such a disposition. 369
Concern for the appropriateness of an extended term, in light of the legis-
lative goals of consistency and proportionality, is nonexistent in many of
these cases. Also missing is any sense of the weighty nature of the sentences
involved or any consideration of the defendant's personal circumstances.
366. Extended term sentences for robbery and burglary comprised only four to six percent
and three to five percent, respectively, of all prison sentences for such offenses from 1978 to
1982. See Table 5 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290. There was, however, a
somewhat higher use of extended term sentences for voluntary manslaughter, then a class 2
felony, with as many as 22% of all offenders receiving such sentences. See Table 5 in 1982
STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290. Additionally, a catch-all "other class 2" category
had a rather high use of extended term sentences, ranging from a low of 20% in 1978 to a
high of 36% in 1980 and 1982. See Table 5 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290.
367. See People v. Morton, 102 Il1. App. 3d 280, 430 N.E.2d 383 (3d Dist. 1981).
The situation is less clear, however, with repect to class 3 and class 4 felonies. Of the four
separately reported class 3 felonies, only forgery has shown a consistently low imposition of
extended term sentences, ranging from one to three percent of all sentences imposed between
1978 and 1982. See Table 5 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290. While theft
showed only a two percent extended term sentence rate in 1982, in prior years that rate had
ranged from 10% to 16%, while aggravated battery ranged from 9% to 13% and unlawful use
of weapons ranged from 7% to 110%. See Table 5 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra
note 290. Class 4 offenses, which are reported only in the aggregate, had ranged higher still,
from 9% to 17% of all sentences for such offenses from 1978 to 1982 were extended terms.
See Table 5 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290.
The cause of this higher usage of extended term sentences is not entirely clear. Possibly, it
reflects a misapplication of the Act-equating the power to impose extended term sentences
with the propriety of doing so. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91. It is equally possible,
however, that these sentences represent particularly aggravated cases-perhaps bargained down
from more serious charges-which could not have been punished appropriately with the shorter
regular term sentences available for these offenses.
368. See, e.g., People v. Bryant, 115 Ill. App. 3d 215, 450 N.E.2d 744 (1st Dist. 1983) (10-
year sentence for escape imposed on offender with three qualifying convictions); People v.
Taylor, 114 Ill. App. 3d 265, 448 N.E.2d 291 (1st Dist. 1983) (10-year sentence for unlawful
use of weapons affirmed where defendant had a "long criminal record" and four prior violations
of probation or parole); People v. Mitchell, 98 Ill. App. 3d 398, 424 N.E.2d 638 (3d Dist.
1981) (45-year sentence for attempted murder imposed on defendant with two prior convictions
for murder).
369. See People v. Cohoon, 120 I1. App. 3d 62, 457 N.E.2d 998 (5th Dist. 1983) (affirming
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A case exemplifying this attitude is People v. Nance,370 in which the
defendant was tried and convicted of a garden-variety armed robbery.3 7' The
defendant had pled guilty to another armed robbery a few years prior to
the instant offense. Based solely on that earlier conviction, he received an
extended term sentence of forty-five years.37 2 The opinion did not mention
the defendant's personal situation, nor did it explain why the defendant
should receive a sentence more severe than almost all of the sentences imposed
on armed robbers in the year his sentence was reviewed.373
The Nance court erred in equating the power of the sentencing judge to
select an extended term for a person having the defendant's criminal history
with the appropriateness of the sentence selected. The extended term pro-
visions of the Act were intended to be applied only if the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the offense and a careful review of the defendant's
background indicated that such a term was appropriate. Moreover, the
particular sentence selected was to be commensurate with that imposed on
similarly situated offenders.
3 74
Nance's sentence failed both aspects of this test. Nance's prior criminal
history was the minimum necessary to qualify him for an extended term,
and there were no other aggravating circumstances to justify an increase in
his sentence. 375 The treatment of similarly situated offenders also demon-
60-year sentence for rape imposed on defendant with prior rape conviction), rev'd on other
grounds, 104 Ill. 2d 295, 472 N.E.2d 403 (1984); People v. Vutia, 116 I1. App. 3d 68, 452
N.E.2d 109 (4th Dist. 1983) (defendant's nine-year sentence for forgery affirmed based on
extensive criminal record); People v. Clay, 98 Il. App. 3d 534, 424 N.E.2d 814 (1st Dist. 1981)
(defendant sentenced to 14 years for burglary based on extensive criminal record including 1969
conviction for armed robbery).
In a number of cases, extended term sentences were ostensibly based on the defendants' prior
records, but they were almost certainly imposed because of some other factors. See, e.g., People
v. Woods, 122 Il. App. 3d 176, 460 N.E.2d 880 (1st Dist. 1984) (defendant with prior armed
robbery conviction sentenced to 60 years for rape, where record reflected that he attempted to
put a contract out on rape victim after he was apprehended); People v. Eddington, 117 I1.
App. 3d 953, 453 N.E.2d 1383 (1st Dist. 1983) (defendant sentenced to 12 years for kidnapping
while on probation for aggravated battery and burglary; he was clearly interrupted in the
process of preparing to sexually assault his victim); People v. Martin, 101 Il. App. 3d 480,
428 N.E.2d 591 (1st Dist. 1981) (defendant given 10-year sentence on conviction of involuntary
manslaughter in connection with shooting of robbery victim). Cases in which a defendant
convicted of one crime is confronted at the sentencing hearing with other purported victims of
his criminal activity also could fall into this category. For a discussion of these types of cases,
see infra notes 783-88 and accompanying text.
370. 100 I1. App. 3d 1117, 427 N.E.2d 630 (4th Dist. 1981).
371. Nance and a companion stopped the victim on the street at gunpoint and demanded
money and drugs. When he said he had neither, they took his wallet and departed. No threats
or brutality were involved. Id. at 1119, 427 N.E.2d at 631.
372. Id. at 1125, 427 N.E.2d at 633.
373. See Table 6 in 1981 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290.
374. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 686-91.
375. See supra note 371.
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strates that Nance's sentence was excessive. Although comprehensive state-
wide sentencing data on persons in Nance's situation have never been compiled,
a recent study of sentencing practices in the Chicago area noted that armed
robbers with previous armed robbery convictions received average sentences
of only eight years.3 76 And apart from statistical evidence suggesting the
anomalous nature of Nance's forty-five year sentence, numerous cases exist
in which defendants who had more serious criminal records3" or who com-
mitted more aggravated armed robberies 78 received substantially shorter
sentences than Nance received. In short, the trial court's willingness to group
Nance with the most culpable or dangerous of armed robbers3 79 was unsub-
stantiated. Consequently, affirming that court's extended term sentence was
erroneous.
A related error frequently occurs in extended term sentencing cases based
solely on a sufficiently aggravated prior criminal record: equating the power
to impose an extended term at all with the power to select the maximum
extended term available. For example, in People v. Davis,3"' the appellate
court upheld sixty-year maximum extended term sentences imposed on two
defendants who were convicted of home invasion and armed robbery.38 Both
had "had a consistent history of legal involvements since 1969," as well as
prior convictions for armed robbery and aggravated battery for which they
were then on parole.382 The reported facts revealed no threats, brutality, or
other aggravating conduct by the defendants.3"3 These sentences were af-
firmed on the theory that the defendants' lengthy records alone would
support the sentences imposed,384 even though the trial judge may have had
an erroneous view of how aggravated the defendants' conduct had been.385
376. See CHICAGO CRIME COMM'N, ARMED ROBBERY IN CHICAGO; THE RESPONSE OF THE
COOK COUNTY JUSTICE SYSTEM 11-15, 27-35 (1984) [hereinafter cited as CCC ARMED ROBBERY
STUDY].
377. See, e.g., People v. Worthen, 105 II1. App. 3d 386, 434 N.E.2d 423 (1st Dist. 1982)
(concurrent sentences of 15 years for attempted murder and 20 years for armed robbery;
defendant had two prior convictions for armed robbery); People v. Rogers, 101 I11. App. 3d
614, 428 N.E.2d 547 (5th Dist. 1981) (30-year sentence for rape of stranded motorist; defendant
had prior convictions for rape and robbery).
378. See, e.g., People v. Worthen, 105 I11. App. 3d 386, 434 N.E.2d 423 (lst Dist. 1982)
(defendant failed in an attempt to kill victim). For a representative sample of brutal rapes in
which defendants received shorter sentences than Nance, despite obviously doing far more harm
to the victim, see cases discussed infra notes 529-31.
379. Only six percent of armed robbers entering the DOC in 1981 received extended term
sentences. See Table 6 in 1981 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290.
380. 124 Ill. App. 3d 813, 464 N.E.2d 1150 (1st Dist. 1984).
381. Id. at 816, 464 N.E.2d at 1152.
382. Id. at 824, 464 N.E.2d at 1154.
383. The victims' testified that the defendants appeared in their home brandishing weapons
and ransacked the house. After they had obtained cash and other valuables, they left without
further incident. Id. at 817, 464 N.E.2d at 1153.
384. Id. at 822-24, 464 N.E.2d at 1157-58.
385. The court appeared to believe that the victims had been bound and possibly terrorized.
Id. at 823-24, 464 N.E.2d at 1157.
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The attitude revealed in Davis is clearly inconsistent with the legislature's
goals of fairness and proportionality in sentencing. 3 6 While the presence of
a single qualifying factor can give rise to an extended term sentence, 87 it
does not follow that a single factor can justify a maximum extended term
sentence. The Act's principal extended term factors can, and frequently do,
occur in combination.3 88 Under the standards set by the General Assembly,
offenders with multiple aggravating factors merit more severe punishments
than those whose crimes involved only one qualifying factor. Criminal
sentences should be imposed to honor that intent.3 89
386. Two other cases involving the same armed robbery, People v. Sanford, 116 I1. App.
3d 834, 452 N.E.2d 710 (1st Dist. 1983), and People v. Poree, 119 Ill. App. 3d 590, 456 N.E.2d
950 (1st Dist. 1983), also seem to manifest the same questionable tendency as Nance and Davis.
In those cases, four defendants held up a gas station at gunpoint. Although the victims were
threatened, no efforts were made to harm them. The defendants escaped, possibly exchanging
shots with pursuing police officers in the process. No one was injured, and the defendants were
not apprehended until some time later. Sanford, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 836-37, 452 N.E.2d at 712-
15.
Each defendant was tried and convicted of armed robbery and received a 60-year sentence.
Sanford, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 836, 452 N.E.2d at 712; Poree, 119 111. App. 3d at 595, 456
N.E.2d at 953. Apparently each defendant had at least one prior class X felony conviction
upon which a lengthy sentence could be based. The trial judge in each case also concluded that
the statute's "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior" provision was applicable. Sanford, 116
Ill. App. 3d at 844-45, 452 N.E.2d at 718; Poree, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 599-600, 456 N.E.2d at
958.
On appeal, these sentences were affirmed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard,
even though each court expressed doubt that the "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior"
proviso was applicable. Sanford, 116 111. App. 3d at 844-45, 452 N.E.2d at 718; Poree, 119 Il.
App. 3d at 599-600, 456 N.E.2d at 958. Both courts concluded that because each defendant
had at least one prior class X or greater felony conviction, any error in the trial judges'
perceptions of the nature of the defendants' behavior was immaterial. Sanford, 116 IIl. App.
3d at 844-45, 452 N.E.2d at 718; Poree, 119 111. App. 3d 599-600, 456 N.E.2d at 958.
387. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I1. Laws 3264, 3301, 3310 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.2(b), 1005-8-2(a) (1983)).
388. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 122 Ill. App. 3d 362, 461 N.E.2d 493 (Ist Dist. 1984)
(defendant's 60-year sentences for attempted murder and armed robbery affirmed where de-
fendant, who beat victim with claw hammer, had five prior felony convictions and was on
parole at time of offense); People v. DeSimone, 108 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 439 N.E.2d 1311 (2d
Dist. 1982) (120 years of consecutive sentences affirmed for brutal attempted murder and armed
robbery where defendant had extensive criminal record including murder conviction); People
v. Mitchell, 98 111. App. 3d 398, 424 N.E.2d 658 (3d Dist. 1981) (45-year sentence for attempted
murder affirmed where defendant had two prior murder convictions).
Such appalling records, however, do not always result in lengthy sentences. See People v.
Surges, 101 II. App. 3d 962, 428 N.E.2d 1012 (1st Dist. 1981) (defendant Banks received
concurrent eight-year sentences for a vicious armed robbery and series of brutal sexual assaults
on victim's wife and young daughter, despite prior murder conviction). Conversely, not all
offenders receiving lengthy sentences have such aggravating factors. See infra notes 440-58,
476-93 and accompanying text.
389. In at least some cases, that concern could be accommodated by imposing consecutive
sentences, which in the aggregate would exceed any extended term sentences that would be
available. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(c)(2) (1983). For a variety of reasons, however,
this author recommends that concerns regarding proportionality not be accommodated in that
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B. Extended Term Sentences Based Solely on
Exceptionally Brutal or Heinous Behavior
Apparently unjustified lengthy sentences based on a prior felony record
are troubling. Those based on the exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
rationale, however, are even more so. This latter provision is used far more
frequently as a basis for extended term sentences and its use, at present, is
almost totally devoid of any meaningful standards or guidelines.
It seems obvious and straightforward that persons who commit crimes
accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wan-
ton cruelty should be eligible to receive extended terms of imprisonment.
Yet, efforts to apply this statutory provision in a rational and consistent
manner have run into almost insuperable difficulties. Problems in definition
and applicability have, in turn, brought the constitutionality of this provision
into question.
1. Constitutionality
The Act's provision allowing extended terms to be imposed for exception-
ally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty has been chal-
lenged as unconstitutionally vague. This issue has been raised and uniformly
rejected in a large number of cases that have expressed confidence that the
provision could be given a clear and consistent interpretation.3 90 Because the
provision supposedly used readily understandable words in their ordinary
senses, these authorities concluded that it is sufficiently precise to withstand
a vagueness challenge.3 9'
Despite the confidence expressed in these opinions that courts would give
a rational and consistent construction to the operative phrase, no such process
has occurred. To begin with, there has been no real effort to clarify the
meaning of the phrase or to delimit its applicability.3 92 Moreover, the ap-
pellate courts have not discussed, much less quantified, the additional factors
that should lead a court to impose or withhold extended terms. 93 A few
isolated instances exist in which courts have found particular conduct not
to involve the requisite aggravated behavior at all.3 94 In the vast run of cases,
manner. See infra notes 806-83 and accompanying text.
390. See, e.g., People v. Sanford, 116 111. App. 3d 834, 452 N.E.2d 710 (Ist Dist. 1983);
People v. Kulpa, 102 III. App. 3d 571, 430 N.E.2d 164 (Ist Dist. 1981); People v. Turner, 93
Ill. App. 3d 61, 416 N.E.2d 1149 (Ist Dist. 1981).
391. See cases cited supra note 390.
392. See infra notes 406-13, 425-39 and accompanying text.
393. See cases cited infra notes 519-49. Perhaps these courts were unaware that the presence
of the necessary egregious behavior was not deemed sufficient to warrant application of the
Act's extended term provisions in every instance. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
394. See People v. Reynolds, 116 III. App. 3d 328, 332, 451 N.E.2d 1003, 1007 (2d Dist.
1983) (not exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior to commit armed robbery in which hand
gun was placed to victim's head and money demanded); People v. Fieberg, 108 Ill. App. 3d
665, 671, 439 N.E.2d 543, 548 (Ist Dist. 1982) (defendant, convicted of aggravated battery,
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however, appellate courts, hobbled by the limitations imposed by the abuse-
of-discretion standard of review, have rubber-stamped the extended terms
imposed by trial courts.
2. Applicability to Brutal or Heinous Crimes
One of the few issues that has been resolved in a manner consistent with
the intent of the General Assembly concerns the effect of this provision on
sentences for crimes such as murder and rape that, even in their unadorned
forms, might be thought of as inherently involving exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior. The General Assembly had already provided for substan-
tially enhanced minimum penalties for most of these severe offenses.395 It
was not entirely clear, however, whether extended term sentences should be
imposed routinely for these crimes or, instead, be reserved for particularly
distasteful instances of them.
The general response to this issue has been to conclude that extended term
sentences were not intended to be routinely available. Some cases, typified
by People v. Merchel,96 reached this result by noting that the Act did not
impose extended terms for the commission of exceptionally brutal offenses,
but rather for exceptionally brutal behavior accompanying a given offense.197
Thus, the mere commission of an appalling crime was not intended to trigger
this provision.198 Other cases noted that, because the statute authorizes
extended terms only for exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, the General
Assembly did not intend to make extended terms available automatically for
the bulk of inherently aggravated offenses. 99 Both of these observations are
entirely sound but, as the succeeding sections show, they have not always
been remembered.
3. Efforts to Define or Limit Key Terms
The salutary judicial interpretations just referred to have been undermined
by the constructions given to the various operative terms of the phrase
found not to have engaged in exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior in macing a police
officer and firing shots during struggle for a gun); People v. Lieberman, 107 Ill. App. 3d 949,
951, 959, 438 N.E.2d 516, 518, 524 (1st Dist. 1982) (rapist who held a knife to victim's throat,
told her not to resist or she would be killed, and said that he had to "cut up another girl"
and "would come back and cut her up . . . if she were to call the police" found not to have
engaged in exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior).
395. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1983) (mandatory minimum prison sentence
of 20 years for murder); id. § 1005-8-1(a)(3) (mandatory minimum prison sentence of six years
for class X felonies). Many class I felonies, which carry minimum prison sentences of four
years, are also nonprobationable. Id. § 1005-8-1(a)(4).
396. 91 111. App. 3d 285, 414 N.E.2d 804 (5th Dist. 1980).
397. Id. at 293, 414 N.E.2d at 811.
398. Id. at 294, 414 N.E.2d at 811-13.
399. See People v. Schlemm, 82 Ill. App. 3d 639, 651, 402 N.E.2d 810, 818-19 (4th Dist.
1980); see also People v. Fieberg, 108 IIl. App. 3d 665, 669, 439 N.E.2d 543, 547 (lst Dist.
1982) (shots fired by defendant during struggle for police officer's gun did not sufficiently
support extended term sentence for previously committed robbery).
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"accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of
wanton cruelty." While a number of these interpretations are defensible,
their cumulative impact has been to increase undue sentencing disparity.
Courts have given broad readings to elements of this factor that tend to
expand its applicability and narrow readings to those that tend to narrow
its scope. Thus, courts have applied this aggravating factor well beyond the
small group of cases for which it is justified.
a. "Accompanied By"
The Act requires only that the requisite egregious behavior accompany the
offense at issue before an extended term is permitted °.4  Case law has made
it clear that the qualifying behavior may occur before,4 ' ° during, '0 2 or after 4 3
an offense for which an extended sentence is imposed. These cases seem
to be sensible and consistent with the Act, even though they temporally
expand the range of behavior that will qualify a defendant for an extended
term sentence. As long as the aggravated behavior is "inseparably linked"
to the underlying offense, 404 imposing an extended term sentence seems





400. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 II1. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(2) (1983)).
401. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 112 III. App. 3d 486, 445 N.E.2d 795 (Ist Dist. 1983)
(defendants beat victim savagely, then decided to kill him); People v. DeSimone, 108 II1. App.
3d 1015, 439 N.E.2d 1311 (2d Dist. 1982) (defendant shot victim and then robbed him).
402. See, e.g., People v. Rosenberger, 125 Ill. App. 3d 749, 466 N.E.2d 608 (4th Dist.
1984); People v. Green, 118 I1. App. 3d 227, 454 N.E.2d 792 (Ist Dist. 1983) (both cases
involving brutal beating of child resulting in death).
403. See People v. Smallwood, 102 Ill. 2d 190, 464 N.E.2d 1049 (1984) (defendant shot
robbery victim after victim had surrendered money without resistance).
404. This was the test adopted by the supreme court in Smallwood. Id. at 196, 464 N.E.2d
at 1052.
405. The law has taken one peculiar turn in this area. In People v. Evans, 87 Ill. 2d 77, 429
N.E.2d 520 (1981), the supreme court construed the Act as authorizing an extended term
sentence only where "the most serious offense of which the offender is convicted [is] accom-
panied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty." Id. at 87,
429 N.E.2d at 525. A number of lower courts have read this language as precluding imposition
of an extended term sentence for any crimes except the most serious one of which the defendant
was convicted, even if all were accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty. See People v. Freeman, 104 Il. App. 3d 980, 433 N.E.2d 974
(1st Dist. 1982); People v. Walsh, 101 I1. App. 3d 1146, 428 N.E.2d 937 (1st Dist. 1981).
Other later cases, however, have concluded that extended term sentences are available for all
offenses accompanied by the requisite exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior. See People v.
Jordan, 114 Il1. App. 3d 16, 448 N.E.2d 237 (3d Dist. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 103
11. 2d 192, 469 N.E.2d 569 (1984); People v. Mims, I11 Ill. App. 3d 814, 444 N.E.2d 684 (1st
Dist. 1983). These later cases appear correct. The language of § 5-8-2 of the Act relied on in
Evans prohibits imposition of "a term of imprisonment in excess of the maximum [regular
term] sentence authorized by Section 5-8-1 for the class of the most serious offense of which
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b. "Exceptionally" Offensive Behavior
Some cases have recognized the theoretical importance of the word "ex-
ceptionally" as limiting the applicability of the "exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior" extended term provision. 40 6 That word, however, has not
been given any operative significance in construing the Act. No cases exist
in which behavior was found to be "brutal or heinous" but not "excep-
tionally brutal or heinous." In fact, the present trend seems to be quite the
opposite: to view "exceptionally" as adding nothing of substance to the
degree of brutal of heinous conduct necessary before an extended term
sentence is proper. This trend is best illustrated by cases such as People v.
Jones4°7 in which extended term sentences based merely on a finding of
"brutal or heinous behavior" have been affirmed on appeal, the missing
qualifier apparently being deemed of no consequence.40 1
Proper consideration for the Act's overriding goals and purposes requires
that the "exceptionally" qualifier be used to limit application of extended
term sentences under this provision to particularly atrocious instances of
criminal behavior. Perhaps the most promising approach to this issue was
the suggestion in Jones that a finding of exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior should depend not only on the nature of the defendant's conduct,
but also on the severity of the sentence that would be imposed if such a
finding were made.4 0 9
the offender was convicted unless the [extended term] factors in aggravation set forth in
paragraph (b) of Section 5-5-3.2 were found to be present." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-
8-2 (1983). The clear effect of this provision is to restrict a court to imposition of regular term
sentences for each offense, unless an extended term factor in aggravation is present. If such a
factor is present, however, its availability in connection with the sentence for a given offense
is governed by § 5-5-3.2(b) of the Act. See id. § 1005-5-3.2(b).
The supreme court, however, has recently concluded that the appellate courts in Mims and
Jordan were incorrect. In reversing the Jordan appellate court, the supreme court in People v.
Jordan, 103 IIl. 2d 192, 469 N.E.2d 569 (1984), concluded that extended term sentences may
only be imposed for the most serious offense of which the defendant was convicted, and then
only if the sentence were otherwise authorized by the Act. Id. at 203-06, 469 N.E.2d at 574-
76. This holding creates an anomalous situation when an offender is convicted of crimes falling
into different felony classes. For example, a rapist who murders his victim can receive only a
30-year sentence for his sex offense. On the other hand, a rapist who brutalizes his victim in
a way not resulting in death can be sentenced to up to 60 years for that same crime. Hopefully,
the General Assembly will address this matter through legislation.
406. See supra text accompanying notes 398-99.
407. 73 Ill. App. 3d 99, 391 N.E.2d 767 (4th Dist. 1979).
408. See, e.g., id. at 104, 107, 391 N.E.2d at 769, 772; cf. People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d
482, 495-96, 431 N.E.2d 344, 353 (1982) (defendant's natural life sentence for murder based
on an exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior rationale affirmed, even though court decided
only that defendant's behavior was "brutal" and "heinous" as those terms are ordinarily defined).
409. 73 IlI. App. 3d at 104, 391 N.E.2d at 770. The Jones court appears to not have applied
its analysis correctly to the defendant's situation. See infra notes 427-38 and accompanying
text.
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An explicit effort to grade brutal or heinous behavior and to relate that
gradation to the length of sentence selected is the sort of inquiry that the
Act intended would occur. That approach could be quite useful in a variety
of contexts. For example, it would allow for distinctions between those
exceptionally brutal or heinous murders punishable by terms of years410 and
those punishable by natural life sentences. 4 ' It also could be of assistance
in selecting appropriate sentences from within the lengthy sentencing ranges
available once an extended term had been found appropriate. 41 2 Regrettably,




c. "Brutal Or Heinous" Behavior
The Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in People v. La Pointe"4 typifies
the prevalent approach to defining "brutal or heinous": consult the dictionary
and see what the words mean. 4 5 The effect of this technique, whether
intended or not, has been to allow trial courts the widest possible latitude
to label particular behavior as brutal or heinous, and to confer the narrowest
possible latitude on reviewing courts to countermand those determinations.
While the dictionary technique is a standard tool of statutory construction ,46
its use has hindered the development of a rational, consistent, and propor-
tional system of sentencing. Broadening the range of conduct deemed brutal
or heinous makes it less likely that any systematic application of that phrase
would develop.
Despite these obstacles, a broad consensus has emerged. There is universal
agreement that behavior qualifying a defendant for an extended term has
occurred when the defendant has inflicted severe, gratuitous, physical abuse
on the victim. 4'1 Similarly, particularly ruthless or cold-blooded murders or
410. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 II1. Laws 3264, 3301, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.2(b)(2), 1005-8-2(a)(2) (1983)).
411. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3308 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(I)(b) (1983)).
412. Various conduct has been found to constitute "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty." When such conduct exists in multiple or particularly aggravated
forms, it would seem appropriate to reflect those circumstances in the sentences selected. The
guidelines set out below propose such a system. See Appendix to text, § 2a(2)(a), (b), at 399-401.
413. See People v. La Pointe, 85 111. App. 3d 215, 407 N.E.2d 196 (2d Dist. 1980), rev'd,
88 III. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1982); supra notes 204-12 and accompanying text.
414. 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1982).
415. 88 III. 2d at 501, 431 N.E.2d at 353; see supra notes 166-72, 204-09 and accompanying
text.
416. See, e.g., Ambassador East, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 399 Ill. 359, 77 N.E.2d 803 (1948);
Culver v. Waters, 248 Ill, 163, 93 N.E. 747 (1911).
417. See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 124 II1. App. 3d 831, 464 N.E.2d 1158 (1st Dist. 1984)
(concurrent 40- and 20-year sentences for multiple acts of rape and deviate sexual assault
accompanied by beatings; defendant had no prior criminal record); People v. Poe, 121 III.
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attempted murders are routinely placed into the exceptionally brutal or
heinous category. 41 Clearly, there is no problem, in principle, in treating
App. 3d 457, 459 N.E.2d 667 (2d Dist. 1984) (50-year sentence for defendant who raped victim,
strangled her into unconsciousness, slashed her throat and left her for dead); People v. Ely,
107 Ill. App. 3d 102, 106-08, 437 N.E.2d 353, 356 (4th Dist. 1982) (60-year sentence for armed
robbery affirmed where trial court had stated that it "could imagine no more heinous or brutal
behavior associated with an armed robbery than that which was present in the instant case").
For a depressing litany of other cases involving particularly brutal or savage acts resulting in
extended term sentences, see People v. Kincy, 106 Il1. App. 3d 250, 435 N.E.2d 831 (2d Dist.
1982); People v. Earl, 104 1I. App. 3d 846, 433 N.E.2d 722 (2d Dist. 1982); People v. Freeman,
104 Ill. App. 3d 980, 433 N.E.2d 974 (1st Dist. 1982); People v. Owens, 99 Ill. App. 3d 730,
425 N.E.2d 527 (2d Dist. 1981); People v. Davis, 98 Ill. App. 3d 461, 424 N.E.2d 630 (1st
Dist. 1981).
418. There are five general categories of murder or attempted murder that frequently are
treated in this manner. The first involves unresisting or particularly blameless or defenseless
victims, such as children. See, e.g., People v. Rosenberg, 125 Il. App. 3d 749, 466 N.E.2d 608
(4th Dist. 1984) (brutal beating of child resulting in death; extended term sentece imposed, even
though defendant had no prior record); People v. Green, 118 Ill. App. 3d 227, 454 N.E.2d 792
(1st Dist. 1983) (beating and kicking 13-month-old child resulting in death; extended term
sentence for murder upheld; extended term sentence for concealing homicidal death not upheld).
The second major category includes murders or attempted murders undertaken in order to
prevent the detection, apprehension, or prosecution of a crime. Cases in which the defendants
kill or attempt to kill someone to prevent their identification, see, e.g., People v. La Pointe,
88 I1. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1981) (murder of armed robbery victim because defendant was
previously known by the victim; extended sentence for murder held not to be an abuse of
discretion by the sentencing judge), and cases in which they take similar action with respect to
police or bystanders seeking to apprehend them, see, e.g., People v. Finkey, 105 Il1. App. 3d
230, 434 N.E.2d 18 (4th Dist. 1982) (police officers wounded when responding to domestic
disturbance; maximum sentence imposed for attempted murder); People v. Tucker, 99 Il. App.
3d 606, 425 N.E.2d 511 (2d Dist. 1981) (police officers were shot while attempting to apprehend
suspect after armed robbery; consecutive sentences for two counts of attempted murder im-
posed), fall within this category. Similarly, cases in which the defendant seeks to prevent his
or her own prosecution, see, e.g., People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (4th
Dist. 1979) (murder of husband and wife who were prosecution witnesses against same defend-
ants in a misdemeanor theft case; consecutive 100 to 300 year sentences imposed on each count),
and those where the defendant seeks to prevent the prosecution of someone else, see, e.g.,
People v. Dixon, 122 Ill. App. 3d 141, 460 N.E.2d 858 (1st Dist. 1984) (defendant murdered
female who was to be a witness in an unrelated and previous killing; life sentence imposed),
are also included. Cf. People v. Woodson, 122 111. App. 3d 176, 460 N.E.2d 880 (lst Dist.
1984) (maximum extended term sentence for rape affirmed where defendant unsuccessfully
solicited murder of his victim, to prevent her from testifying against him).
A third and closely related category involves murders or attempted murders undertaken in
retribution for testimony offered in judicial proceedings. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 113 Ill.
App. 3d 143, 446 N.E.2d 1229 (1st Dist. 1983) (victim brutally tortured, mutilated, and killed
for testifying against fellow gang member of defendant).
The fourth broad category of such aggravated murders or attempted murders consists of
those undertaken for compensation. See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 49 11. 2d 565, 276 N.E.2d
721 (1971) (killing motivated by desire to obtain life insurance proceeds); People v. Russell, 51
Ill. App. 3d 646, 366 N.E.2d 1121 (3d Dist. 1977) (killing for hire).
The final such category, which probably is resorted to less consistently than others, includes
cases involving multiple victims. See, e.g., People v. Schlemm, 82 II. App. 639, 402 N.E.2d
810 (4th Dist. 1980) (finding double murder to be exceptionally brutal or heinous, but imposing
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any of these types of aggravated behavior as exceptionally brutal or hei-
nous.4 19 The same cannot be said, however, of a growing group of cases
finding that exceptionally atrocious or vile threats will also qualify defendants
for extended terms under this provision, even though those threats were not
carried out. 420 Given the all too common nature of such threats in connection
with certain offenses,42' it seems improbable that they can be deemed excep-
tionally brutal or heinous behavior. Perhaps for that reason, many other
courts have declined to impose extended term sentences under this rationale,
even in similarly aggravated cases.4 2
Of these two positions, it seems preferable to relegate all but the most
egregious unfulfilled threats to the category of merely brutal or heinous
behavior, and not to treat them as justifying extended term sentences. Even
the few exceptional cases should not result in the imposition of extended
term sentences beyond the lower end of the range. Lengthier extended term
sentences would be unduly disparate from the regular term penalties imposed
on most equally culpable offenders. Moreover, the Act's emphasis on pro-
portionality requires that even more severe sentences be given to those who
consecutive regular term sentences rather than concurrent extended term sentences); People v.
Smrekar, 68 Il1. App. 3d 379, 386 N.E.2d 848 (4th Dist. 1979) (imposing extended term sentences
for double murder); cf. People v. Rayford, 104 Ill. App. 3d 124, 432 N.E.2d 1041 (5th Dist.
1982) (imposing only concurrent 12 year sentence for brutal double attempted murder).
Each of those types of murders or attempted murders would continue to be treated as a
form of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty under the
sentencing guidelines proposed herein. See Appendix to text, § 2a(2)(a), at 399-400.
419. Occasionally, however, problems have arisen as to whether or not a particular case was
properly placed in one of those categories. For example, La Pointe seems to raise such issues.
See supra text accompanying notes 204-12.
420. See, e.g., People v. Sanford, 119 I1. App. 3d 160, 163, 456 N.E.2d 333, 335 (3d Dist.
1983) (45-year sentence affirmed based on victim's "mental anguish" and "strong possibility
of harm," where the defendant "forced the victim to submit to 40 minutes of continuous
sexual abuse during which 12 acts of sexual and psychological abuse took place"); People v.
Clark, 102 Il. App. 3d 414, 425-26, 429 N.E.2d 1255, 1263-64 (1st Dist. 1981) (50-year sentences
for home invasion, deviate sexual assault, and armed robbery affirmed where defendant
threatened to kill victim's baby, forced husband to watch her repeated violation and otherwise
psychologically abused and humiliated family); People v. Turner, 93 Ill. App. 3d 61, 69, 416
N.E.2d 1149, 1155 (Ist Dist. 1981) (repeated death threats apparently made because of defend-
ant's "disposition to inflict ... suffering or to enjoy its being inflicted" held to justify extended
term sentence); People v. Jones, 73 Ill. App. 3d 99, 102-04, 391 N.E.2d 767, 769-70 (4th Dist.
1979) (defendant's act of repeatedly firing pistol into the air viewed as wanton cruelty, due in
part to "mental anguish to the victims who feared they might be killed").
421. Most cases involving atrocious but unfulfilled threats result in regular term sentences.
See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 422, 698-702. For a discussion of the unjustified disparity that
a finding of "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior" has from case to case, see infra notes
519-49 and accompanying text.
422. See, e.g., People v. Lieberman, 107 Ill. App. 3d 949, 959, 438 N.E.2d 516, 524 (Ist
Dist. 1982) (repeated threats made both during and after rape by knife-wielding defendant to
"cut" victim and to kill her if she reported crime to authorities held not to constitute
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior as a matter of law); People v. Killen, 106 Il. App.
3d 65, 67-68, 435 N.E.2d 789, 790-91 (4th Dist. 1982) (defendant's action in forcing victim to
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actually carry out their threats. 423 Finally, a rational sentencing system should
give a criminal some incentive not to carry out barbaric threats. Reserving
the most severe penalties for those who do not show such restraint would
fulfill that purpose. 424
d. "Indicative of Wanton Cruelty"
Even exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior will not qualify a defendant
for an extended term sentence unless that behavior is also "indicative of
wanton cruelty. ' 425 To date, however, this latter requirement has not acheived
independent significance. No court, after finding that an offense was accom-
panied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behaviour, has concluded that the
behaviour was not indicative of wanton cruelty. Apparently, there has not
been any concerted effort to give a limiting construction to that phrase.4 26
Instead, the broad interpretation given it in People v. Jones4" has set the
tenor for the case law in this area.
perform two acts of fellatio while he threatened to "cut her" and asked her "questions of a
personal nature," but did not physically harm her, held not to constitute exceptionally brutal
or heinous behavior, even though court found that the victim undoubtedly had "suffered deep
and permanent emotional scars"). People v. Lieberman, 107 I11. App. 3d 949, 438 N.E.2d 516
(lst Dist.. 1982), is particularly persuasive because the defendant was the so-called "plumber
rapist" who was suspected of numerous additional rapes, some of which were then being
prosecuted. Id. at 952, 438 N.E.2d at 519-20. Thus, the temptation to stretch the phrase
"exceptionally brutal or heinous" to fit his conduct was particularly strong. See also cases cited
infra note 698.
423. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 637-38, 668-707.
424. The guidelines proposed below allow particularly aggravated threats to be considered as
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, but only if some other
form of such behavior is present. See Appendix to text, § 2a(2)(a)(2), (c), at 399-400, 401.
425. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(2) (1983)).
426. The only supreme court case involving a limitation is People v. Evans, 87 Ill. 2d 77,
429 N.E.2d 520 (1981). Because Evans presented a unique factual situation, however, that
limitation is not likely to have a widespread impact.
In Evans, the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter because he fired a pistol
at one person and accidently killed another, in the unreasonable belief that the actions were
necessary in self-defense. 87 111. 2d at 86, 429 N.E.2d at 524. Although the trial court had
concluded that the defendant's behavior involved wanton cruelty, the supreme court disagreed,
holding that "actions committed under a subjective belief, albeit unreasonable, that the actions
were in self-defense do not constitute wanton cruelty." Id. at 88, 429 N.E.2d at 525.
The reach of Evans in this regard is still undergoing development, but to date it has not
been extended beyond comparable factual contexts. Thus, the appellate courts have held that
Evans does not prohibit a finding that crimes were accompanied by exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, even when they were committed under extreme
mental distress, People v. Cox, 113 IlI. App. 3d 136, 446 N.E.2d 1280 (1st Dist. 1983), or in
the heat of passion, People v. Kalec, 109 II1. App. 3d 696, 440 N.E.2d 1254 (3d Dist. 1982),
as long as the defendant had both realized and intended that the victim would suffer death or
serious bodily injury. See Cox, 113 I11. App. 3d at 138-39, 446 N.E.2d at 1281-82; Kalec, 109
I11. App. 3d at 699-700, 440 N.E.2d at 1255-57.
427. 73 I11. App. 3d 99, 391 N.E.2d 767 (4th Dist. 1979).
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In Jones, the defendant committed an armed robbery in a crowded res-
taurant in the course of which he discharged a gun several times.4 12 The
defendant fired all or most of the shots into the air to frighten the victims
into complying with his demands.4 29 Although no one was serously injured,
the trial court concluded that each crime growing out of the episode was




For that reason, the trial court imposed six concurrent extended term sen-
tences .411
On appeal, the defendant argued that his behavior should not be deemed
"wanton cruelty" within the meaning of the Act because that term should
be given a narrow construction limiting it to conduct that was "heinous,
atrocious, or cruel. 41 3 2 The appellate court, however, rejected the defendant's
proposal as "entirely too narrow and restrictive. ' 433 Instead, the court
defined "wanton cruelty" by combining a dictionary definition of cruelty43 4
with the supreme court's definition of "wanton" in a civil case: "Ill will is
not a necessary element of wanton act. To constitute an act wanton, the
party .. .must be conscious of his conduct, and, though having no intent
to injure, must be conscious ... that his conduct will naturally and prob-
ably result in injury."" The Jones court concluded that the defendant's
repeated discharge of his pistol during the course of his crime satisfied the
wanton cruelty requirement in large part because of the mental anguish such
conduct caused his victims. 36
A definition of wanton cruelty that would permit imposition of an extended
428. Id. at 103, 391 N.E.2d at 770.
429. One shot was fired so close to a deputy sheriff that he suffered powder burns on his
face and hands. Id. The shot, however, did not strike the deputy, and the court never stated
that it was intended to do so. The court might well have believed the defendant had such an
intent, though, because it referred to that action as an "extremely brutal act, one which only
by the grace of God did not result in a homicide." Id. at 101-02, 391 N.E.2d at 769. Later
cases construing Jones, however, have generally regarded all of the shots that were fired as a
way of terrorizing patrons of the establishment rather than as an attempt to kill. See People
v. Clark, 102 !11. App. 3d 414, 425, 429 N.E.2d 1255, 1263 (1st Dist. 1981).
430. Jones, 73 111. App. 3d at 101, 391 N.E.2d at 769.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 103, 391 N.E.2d at 770. The definition the defendant argued for was derived
from State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973), and provided as follows:
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that
atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and that cruel means designed to
inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the
suffering of others.
283 So. 2d at 9.
433. 73 III. App. 3d at 104, 391 N.E.2d at 770.
434. The court settled upon "something that causes pain of suffering" or as a "disposition
to inflict pain or suffering or to enjoy its being inflicted." Id. at 103, 391 N.E.2d at 769.
435. Bartolucci v. Falleti, 382 Ill. 168, 174, 46 N.E.2d 980, 983 (1943) (quoted in Jones, 73
Ill. App. 3d at 103, 391 N.E.2d at 769-70) (emphasis added).
436. 73 Ill. App. 3d at 103, 391 N.E.2d at 770.
[Vol. 34:241
ILLINOIS' DETERMINATE SENTENCING
term of imprisonment on a defendant who did not intend to injure anyone437
seems erroneous. While the definition quoted above makes sense in the civil
context in which it arose, it does not provide a sufficiently culpable basis
for adding a substantial number of years to a defendant's prison sentence.
Before threats should be deemed to rise to the level of "wanton cruelty,"
they should have the terrorizing of the victim as their direct object. 438 Even
then, this type of conduct should seldom result in the imposition of extended
term sentences in the absence of other aggravating circumstances.
e. Conclusion
Through the deemphasis of both the "exceptionally" qualifier to "brutal
or heinous behavior" and the "indicative of wanton cruelty" requirement,
courts have, in effect, amended this provision of the Act. Instead of requiring
that an offense be "accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty" before imposing an extended term sentence,
courts now require merely that the offense was "accompanied by brutal or
heinous behavior."
4. Impact of Judicial Amendments
These judicial amendments have had two disturbing consequences for
fairness in sentencing. First, they have hopelessly blurred any distinction
between defendants whose offenses are accompanied by exceptionally brutal
or heinous behavior and those whose offenses merely "cause . . . serious
harm" for purposes of receiving a regular term sentence. 419 Moreover, the
judicial amendments have permitted extended term sentences to be imposed
in two situations in which they are not appropriate: (1) when a crime victim
has been unduly affected psychologically by an offender's conduct that,
while reprehensible, was well within the normal range of behavior typically
accompanying the particular crime; and (2) when the defendant was a minor,
passive accomplice in a crime made exceptionally brutal or heinous by the
actions of others.
a. Extended Terms Based On Psychological Harm To The Victim
It is not uncommon for courts imposing extended term sentences on the
rationale of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior to focus extensively on
437. The situation would be different in this case were it to turn out that the defendant
actually fired at the deputy sheriff with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm. See
supra note 429. Under the guidelines proposed herein, such conduct committed in the course
of a crime, other than some form of homicide, would constitute exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. See Appendix to text, § 2a(2)(a)(3), at 400.
438. See People v. Clark, 102 II1. App. 3d 414, 429 N.E.2d 1255 (1st Dist. 1981).
439. See infra notes 519-49 and accompanying text. The sentencing guidelines proposed
herein make an effort to bring some order to that situation. See infra notes 754-55 and
accompanying text; Appendix to text, § 2a(l), (2), at 397-401; § 2c(2), (3), at 403-04.
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the psychological trauma that the defendant's conduct caused the victim." °
This focus occurs most frequently in cases in which the defendant's conduct
was both intended and reasonably calculated to produce psychological trauma.
In many of these cases, generating fear or terror appeared to have been an
end in itself rather than merely a means of facilitating the commission of
the crime."'
Considering the adverse psychological consequence of the defendant's
conduct on the victim in cases of that kind is sensible, because the victim's
psychological trauma is a direct outgrowth of the wanton cruelty that is
necessary to qualify a defendant for an extended term sentence. Real diffi-
culties arise, however, if a court focuses on the victim's psychological harm
in itself. If that harm is not examined from the perspective of what it reveals
about the defendant's behavior or state of mind, a defendant may be given
an extended term sentence without any showing that the defendant engaged
in behavior indicative of the wanton cruelty, as required by the Act.
Such an error occurred in the bizarre case of People v. Viens,4 2 in which
the defendant abducted his victim and drove her to his apartment at knife-
point. He told her that she would not be harmed if she did as she was told,
and that he had taken her hostage as part of a plan to free his girlfriend
from jail. The defendant kept the victim tied up during the ordeal, but on
several occasions he removed or loosened her bonds when she complained
of discomfort. The defendant also gave her food and drink and even allowed
the victim to call her mother and a girlfriend." 3 The defendant later forced
the victim to disrobe and indicated that he had lied when he said he would
not hurt her. Fortunately, the victim managed to escape without being hurt
physically. The defendant was apprehended shortly thereafter. 44
The defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and armed viol-
ence. At the sentencing hearing, the judge stated that he found no factors
in mitigation and that the defendant qualified for an extended term sentence
based on exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior. 445 The judge imposed the
maximum extended terms for each offense: thirty years for aggravated
kidnapping and sixty years for armed violence.4 46
440. See cases cited supra note 420.
441. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 102 11. App. 3d 414, 424, 429 N.E.2d 1255, 1262 (1st Dist.
1981) (extended term sentence appropriately imposed for behavior indicative of mental and
emotional cruelty where defendant invaded victims' home, held gun to their one-year-old son,
and forced wife to commit a deviate sexual act while husband and son watched, before he
ransacked their home).
442. 109 Il1. App. 3d 1017, 441 N.E.2d 660 (2d Dist. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 917
(1983).
443. Id. at 1020, 441 N.E.2d at 662-63.
444. Id. at 1020-21, 441 N.E.2d at 663.
445. Id. at 1021, 441 N.E.2d at 664.
446. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 10-2(a)(5), 33B-1, 1005-8-2(a)(2), (3) (1983). The appellate
court vacated the defendant's aggravated kidnapping conviction as a lesser included offense of
armed violence, but let stand the conviction for the latter offense. 109 Ill. App. 3d at 1022,
441 N.E.2d at 664.
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On appeal, the defendant challenged the propriety of any extended term
sentence, arguing that his conduct could not possibly come within the terms
of the statute." 7 The appellate court disagreed. The Viens court relied on
People v. Piontkowski44' as upholding the imposition of an extended term
sentence without proof of serious injury if there had been "needless addi-
tional intrusions upon the physical integrity of the victim." 449 The Viens
court concluded that the defendant's actions could "reasonably be said to
have terrorized and endangered the victim" ' 450 whom, the court noted, had
"suffered substantial emotional trauma as well as some minor physical
injuries" as a result of her ordeal.' Citing People v. Clark,52 the Viens
court concluded that it was entirely proper to base an extended term sentence
on such mental suffering, which "[c]ommon experience teaches . . .often
exceeds that of physical injury." '4"1
Without denigrating the extent of the victim's trauma as a result of the
defendant's activities, it is nonetheless clear that this incident hardly resem-
bles the many truly atrocious or brutal crimes for which extended term
sentences have been imposed.4 14 The Viens court's reliance on Piontkowski
only serves to show how radically out of line Vien's sentence was. In
Piontkowski, the defendant's comparable aggravating activities were only
found sufficient to extend his sentence to two years beyond the minimum
rather than fifty-four years as in Viens.4" The Viens court's reliance on
Clark was likewise misplaced. In Clark, the defendant had not only engaged
in markedly more vile conduct than Viens did, 45 6 but also had a lengthy
record of brutal sex offenses. 45 7 Nonetheless, Clark received a substantially
shorter sentence than Viens did. 458
The supreme court, however, has recently invalidated the practice followed in Viens of
allowing a defendant to be convicted of armed violence based on the commission of a felony
that had itself been enhanced because of the presence of a weapon. People v. Del Percio, 105 Ill.
2d 372, 377, 475 N.E.2d 528, 530-31 (1985). Thus the proper course in Viens would have been
to affirm the defendant's conviction for aggravated kidnapping and to vacate the sentence for
armed violence. Had that been done, Vien's longest possible sentence would have been 30 years
rather than the 60 years he received. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 10-2(a)(5), 10-2(b)(2),
1005-8-2(a)(3) (1983).
447. 109 111. App. 3d at 1027-28, 441 N.E.2d at 668.
448. 77 I11. App. 3d 994, 397 N.E.2d 36 (5th Dist. 1979).
449. Viens, 109 II1. App. 3d at 1028, 441 N.E.2d at 668 (citing People v. Piontkowski, 77
Ill. App. 3d 994, 397 N.E.2d 36 (5th Dist. 1979)).
450. 109 Ill. App. 3d at 1028, 441 N.E.2d at 668.
451. Id. at 1028, 441 N.E.2d at 669.
452. 102 I11. App. 3d 414, 429 N.E.2d 1255 (1st Dist. 1981).
453. Viens, 109 Ill. App. 3d at 1028-29, 441 N.E.2d at 669.
454. See cases cited supra notes 417, 418, 420; see also People v. Medley, Ill Ill. App. 3d
444, 444 N.E.2d 269 (4th Dist. 1983) (defendants took turns raping and sodomizing housewife
and forcing her to perform acts of fellatio; concurrent 45-year sentences imposed).
455. Pointkowski, 77 111. App. 3d at 995, 397 N.E.2d at 37.
456. Clark, 102 I11. App. 3d at 424-25, 429 N.E.2d at 1263-64.
457. Id. at 419, 429 N.E.2d at 1258-59. Clark had a record of "a variety of sexual
perversions, aggression and ... forcing unknown women to perform sexual acts at knifepoint
and gunpoint." Id.
458. Clark's sentence was only 50 years. Id. at 416, 429 N.E.2d at 1256.
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Even accepting the Viens court's doubtful characterization of the defend-
ant's behavior as exceptionally brutal or heinous, the extended term sentence
was erroneous because the statutory element of wanton cruelty was lacking.
By focusing solely on the consequences of the defendant's behavior rather
than on his motivation, the Viens court erroneously read the wanton cruelty
requirement out of the statute. This error has also infected the manner in
which extended term sentences are imposed on passive accomplices in crimes
involving exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior.
b. Extended Terms Based on an Accountability Theory
The Act permits extended term sentences to be imposed when an offense
is accompanied by the requisite behavior, rather than when an offender has
engaged in such conduct.459 Thus, many courts have concluded that, once
an offense of the requisite character has been established, all participants in
that crime are subject to extended term sentences. 4 6 This statement of the
law is essentially correct but nevertheless misleading.
The interpretation is correct in the sense that the General Assembly clearly
intended to subject some passive accomplices to extended term sentences.4 6'
The Act's coupling of an extended term sentence with conviction of an
offense accompanied by the prohibited behavior appears to have been delib-
erate, especially in light of the Act's consecutive sentencing provisions, which
require the defendant being sentenced to have committed the qualifying
behavior. 462 While the General Assembly's intent is obscure, its decision
could have resulted from a belief that all perpetrators involved in exception-
ally brutal criminal behavior, whether active or passive, frequently have
specifically endorsed the brutal aspects of the offense. 463 This does not mean,
however, that all passive accomplices in such crimes should be eligible for
extended term sentences. Rather, an extended term should not be imposed
unless evidence relating to the defendant's own character, background, or
participation in the offense suggests that the defendant personally deserves
such a sentence.
459. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 II1. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(2) (1983)).
460. See, e.g., People v. Rowe, 115 I11. App. 3d 322, 450 N.E.2d 804 (1st Dist. 1983);
People v. Owens, 99 Ill. App. 3d 730, 425 N.E.2d 527 (2d Dist. 1981); People v. Gray, 87 Ill.
App. 3d 142, 408 N.E.2d 1150 (1st Dist. 1980).
461. This construction does conflict with the interpretation given the identical language in
the Act providing for a natural life sentence for murder. See Merchel, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 293-
94, 414 N.E.2d at 811; Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3308 (codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1983)). As argued above, however, the Merchel construction
is not correct. See supra text accompanying notes 179-83.
462. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983)). The Act's consecutive sentencing provisions have not been
interpreted as incorporating such a limitation. That construction, however, is erroneous. See
supra text accompanying notes 317-29.
463. It frequently is apparent from the facts described in appellate court opinions that trial
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There are three reasons why this is so, the first stemming directly from
the text of the Act and the other two from a regard for its policies and
purposes. To begin with the textual argument, the proposed limitation is
necessary because of the Act's requirement that the brutal conduct be
"indicative of wanton cruelty." This requirement indicates that the General
Assembly wanted the sentencing judge to focus on the defendant's state of
mind, not just on the nature of the behavior involved in the offense. 464
Under such a standard, passive defendants may be properly sentenced to
extended terms if, for example, they originated the idea of a particular
savage act, or ordered it done. Because these defendants have specifically
endorsed the brutal behavior they may be punished as if they had committed
the brutal acts. 465 But only if such an additional factor is present can it be
said that exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior on the part of another is
indicative of wanton cruelty on the part of the person being sentenced.
Two broad principles of sentencing implicit in the Act also require the
proposed limitation on imposing extended term sentences on passive defend-
ants. The first is the Act's goal of fairness and proportionality in sentencing.
The Act intended that a sentence be a measure of the particular defendant's
blameworthiness in relation to others. 466 This intent is not implemented by
imposing an extended term sentence on a defendant because of the unfore-
seeable action or unendorsed conduct of another. The second principle is
courts have implicitly adopted such a rationale in imposing extended term sentences. See, e.g.,
People v. Rivera, 126 Ill. App. 3d 197, 199, 466 N.E.2d 1144, 1147-49 (1st Dist. 1984)
(defendant's extended term sentence for murder affirmed when he held victim while codefendant
repeatedly stabbed him); People v. Reese, 121 Ill. App. 3d 977, 981-82, 460 N.E.2d 446, 449
(1st Dist. 1984) (defendant and his colleagues decided to execute victims of their armed robbery;
although defendant shot at one victim he did not kill him, but his extended term sentences for
the murders committed by his codefendants were affirmed); see People v. Owens, 99 Il. App.
3d 730, 425 N.E.2d 527 (2d Dist. 1981); infra notes 468-75 and accompanying text.
464. Arguably, this requirement could be satisfied if a codefendant had behaved in a manner
"indicative of wanton cruelty" in committing the crime. That position, however, is unsound.
The entire purpose for individualized consideration of each defendant at sentencing runs counter
to the notion that the acts of another, beyond the common criminal design, may be attributed
to the defendant before the bar.
465. In such circumstances, the sentencing guidelines proposed herein would permit a finding
of the requisite behavior by the passive participants. See Appendix to text, § 2a(2)(a), at 399-400.
466. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 687. This is, of course, also the bedrock justification
for broad, unfettered, judicial sentencing discretion. Proponents of that position inevitably
couch their argument in terms of a need to be free to consider all pertinent circumstances of
each offender's case in imposing sentence and to follow that process through to its logical
conclusion by imposing whatever sentence that that examination seems to require. See People
v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d 882, 884 (1977); Aspen, New Class X Sentencing
Law: An Analysis, 66 ILL. B.J. 344, 346 n.27 (1978).
While the author has no quarrel with either of those propositions, that concession does not
invalidate the argument for the reforms sought by this proposal. Granting the need for such
discretion in no way weakens the argument that it should be exercised in a consistent, even-
handed manner, so that sentences imposed on offenders are proportionate to their blame
worthiness, as assessed in accordance with objective criteria. This is what the Act sought to do
and what this proposal seeks to implement.
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that sentencing liability, as opposed to criminal liability, is (and should be)
strictly personal. 467 Admittedly, the fact that a defendant chose to participate
in a particularly sordid criminal episode is frequently relevant to the de-
fendant's blameworthiness and rehabilitative potential. Nonetheless, the de-
fendant's passive participation does not appear to be enough, standing alone,
to justify a conclusion that the defendant acted with the "wanton cruelty"
necessary to support an extended term sentence. Consequently, before im-
posing such a sanction, the court should be satisfied by further evidence
that the defendant being sentenced shared the wanton cruelty of the actual
perpetrator.
People v. Owens46 demonstrates a proper application of this principle. In
Owens, the defendant and his confederates committed a brutal armed robbery
and attempted murder.4 69 The defendant was convicted of a variety of class
X offenses on an accountability theory and, even though he had not per-
sonally committed the more sordid aspects of these crimes, he received the
maximum extended term sentence of sixty years.4 70 The trial court found
that the defendant had been the "ring leader and instigator ' 47' of the whole
episode and that before the series of crimes began, the defendant had
personally assented to "get[ting] rid" of the victim in order to prevent their
apprehension. 472 Moreover, before deciding that an extended term was ap-
propriate, the trial judge also found that the defendant's potential for
rehabilitation was "really very slim" in light of his age and exceptionally
aggravated criminal record.
4 73
The sentence was affirmed on appeal, despite the defendant's argument
that an extended term was inappropriate because he was not directly involved
in the brutal aspects of the crime.4 7 4 It is difficult to find fault with this
467. This principle has not always been acknowledged. The appellate court in People v.
Sangster, 95 Ill. App. 3d 357, 420 N.E.2d 181 (4th Dist. 1981), rev'd, 91 I1. 2d 260, 437
N.E.2d 625 (1982), did recognize it when it distinguished between a defendant's criminal liability
for a brutal murder committed by another defendant on an accountability rationale and his
liability for consecutive term sentences based on his confederate's infliction of "severe bodily
injury" in the course of that episode. 95 Ill. App. 3d at 364, 420 N.E.2d at 186. Unfortunately,
the supreme court's reversal of the appellate court's decision has cast a pall over this principle.
It appears, however, that a separate line of cases justifying distinctions between the sentences
imposed on codefendants based on the nature of their participation in the offense, among other
things, support the same result. See, e.g., People v. Kline, 92 III. 2d 490, 507-09, 442 N.E.2d
154, 162-63 (1982); People v. Godinez, 91 Il. 2d 47, 55, 434 N.E.2d 1121, 1125-26 (1982).
468. 99 Il. App. 3d 730, 425 N.E.2d 527 (2d Dist. 1981).
469. Id. at 733-34, 425 N.E.2d at 530. The victim was driven to a deserted field, forced
to disrobe, struck over the head, stabbed and slashed repeatedly, and then was left for dead. Id.
470. Id. at 739, 425 N.E.2d at 534.
471. Id. at 740, 425 N.E.2d at 535.
472. Id. at 739, 425 N.E.2d at 534.
473. Id. at 740, 425 N.E.2d at 534-35. Owens, 43, had a "past history of violent crime,
including rape." Id.
474. Id. at 740, 425 N.E.2d at 535.
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decision. The record revealed that the defendant was an older, hardened
criminal with a propensity for violence. His passive role in the offense was
probably due to his ability to manipulate others into doing his dirty work
for him. His status as an "accomplice" was thus more readily viewed as
nothing more than a factor in aggravation. Both the language of the Act
and common sense suggest that extended term sentences should be available
for criminal masterminds like Owens. 475
Unfortunately, however, it is more common to ignore the rationale of
Owens and impose extended term sentences on passive, peripheral accompl-
ices based on the brutal or heinous behavior of their colleagues. The case
of People v. Tibbs,4"76 provides an excellent illustration of this tendency. In
Tibbs, the defendant and two compatriots agreed to steal a vehicle. The
unarmed defendant knew that his associates were armed with a shotgun and
a pistol. 477 Tibbs's two confederates forcibly abducted the victim, robbed
him, and made him lie face down by the side of the road in a deserted
area. 48 The defendant, who had been following the others in a separate car,
joined his accomplices. One of the defendant's colleagues then fired a
shotgun, hitting the victim in the arm and hand. 47 9
The defendant was convicted of attempted murder, armed robbery, and
aggravated kidnapping on an accountability theory. He received concurrent
prison terms of fifty-five, thirty, and fifteen years, respectively. 4 0 The de-
fendant apparently did not dispute the characterization of this offense as
involving exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, arguing only that his
fifty-five-year sentence was excessive. 48' Despite the fact that the defendant's
role in the planning and the execution of this criminal episode was entirely
passive and clearly the least culpable of the three offenders, the appellate
court affirmed his sentence. 412 Moreover, it did so without ever alluding to
the defendant's age, personal circumstances, record of prior delinquency or
criminal activity, or other factors that might have borne on his rehabilitative
potential .413
People v. Rowe 84 also involved the imposition of extended term sentences
on a passive accomplice in questionable circumstances. In Rowe, the unarmed
475. That conclusion remains true under the sentencing guidelines proposed herein. See
Appendix to text, § 2a(2)(a), 2a(2)(a)(4) at 399-400.
476. 103 I1. App. 3d 73, 430 N.E.2d 681 (4th Dist. 1981).
477. Id. at 75, 430 N.E.2d at 682.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 74, 430 N.E.2d at 681.
481. Id. at 75-76, 430 N.E.2d at 682.
482. Id. at 77-78, 430 N.E.2d at 683-84.
483. Id. In fairness to the court, it is unclear whether or not Tibbs assented to his
codefendant's attempted murder. Just prior to the shooting, all the defendants had a whispered
conference that might well have involved the subsequent shooting of the victim. Id. at 75, 430
N.E.2d at 682. The court, however, did not purport to base Tibbs' sentence on the theory that
he had endorsed efforts to dispatch the victim in that conversation.
484. 115 I1. App. 3d 322, 450 N.E.2d 804 (1st Dist. 1983).
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defendant and a confederate who was armed with a shotgun robbed a grocery
store. For no apparent reason, Rowe's codefendant shot and killed the store
owner.485 Rowe was convicted of murder and armed robbery and received a
sixty-year extended term sentence for the murder on the basis of exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior. 486 The appellate court affirmed the sentence
without any inquiry into the defendant's personal circumstances, prior crim-
inal history, or rehabilitative potential.4 87 The case of People v. Rogers,
'4 88
which involved remarkably similar facts to Rowe, 4 9 also resulted in a cur-
sory appellate affirmance of the "lookout" defendant's sixty-five-year
sentence.'9
The sentences in these three cases, and others like them,491 are clearly
inconsistent with the Act. Their ready affirmation on appeal is due to the
erroneous equation of the power to impose extended term sentences with the
propriety of doing So. 492 Clearly, the General Assembly was willing-even
eager-to have lengthy extended terms imposed in factually appropriate cases.
But, given the legislature's concern about a careful grading of sanctions and
a desire to achieve a fairness and proportionality among differently situated
offenders, it is not consistent with the legislature's will to punish offenders
like Tibbs, Rowe, and Rogers as severely as those resembling Owens.4 93
C. Extended Term Sentences Involving
Multiple Factors in Aggravation
Case law has established that an extended term sentence may be imposed
when only one of the Act's aggravating factors is present. 494 Yet, cases
485. Id. at 323, 328-29, 450 N.E.2d at 806, 809.
486. Id. at 328-30, 450 N.E.2d at 809-10.
487. Id. (relying on People v. Gray, 87 II1. App. 3d 142, 153, 408 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ist
Dist. 1980)). Once again, however, a basis in the record existed for believing that the defendant
had affirmatively assented to his codefendant's decision to kill. The evidence on that point was.
an overheard conversation at a pre-trial hearing in which the defendant supposedly told his
confederate, "We should have killed (a witness against them] too." Id. at 324, 450 N.E.2d at
806. The appellate court, however, did not base its decision on that rationale.
488. 122 Ill. App. 3d 384, 461 N.E.2d 511 (lst Dist. 1984).
489. Id. at 389-90, 461 N.E.2d at 514-15. Rogers' circumstances were more mitigated than
Rowe's, however, because no evidence in the record suggested that Rogers knew of or assented
to his codefendant's murderous designs. Id; see supra note 487.
490. 122 I11. App. 3d at 387, 393, 461 N.E.2d at 512, 519.
491. See, e.g., People v. Clay, 124 I11. App. 3d 140, 150-57, 463 N.E.2d 929, 938-42 (lst
Dist. 1984) (defendant received 60-year sentence for participation in attempted armed robbery
in which 10-year-old child was killed; defendant not present at killing; codefendant, who was
with actual perpetrator, allowed to plead guilty to only attempted armed robbery, receiving 10-
year sentence); People v. Feagans, 119 Ill. App. 3d 941, 944-46, 457 N.E.2d 459, 461-62 (4th
Dist. 1983) (60-year sentence imposed for murder committed in course of armed robbery;
defendant's role relatively minor and supposedly undertaken under duress).
492. See supra text accompanying notes 85-92.
493. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 687.
494. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 119 III. App. 3d 615, 630 456 N.E.2d 926, 938 (1st Dist.
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frequently occur in which multiple factors exist. 495 The offenders in these
latter cases are generally both more culpable and demonstrably less amenable
to rehabilitation than offenders in cases presenting only one qualifying factor.
Thus, the Act's goal of proportionate sentencing seems to mandate reserving
sentences in the upper end of the extended term range for multiply qualified
offenders with multiple aggravating factors. 496 To that end, if only one
qualifying factor is present the sentence imposed should be in the lowest
portion of the extended term range. 497 Similarly, if more than one factor is
1983); People v. Lucien, 109 I11. App. 3d 412, 420, 440 N.E.2d 899, 905-06 (2d Dist. 1982),
cert. denied sub norn. Lucien v. Illinois, 459 U.S. 1219 (1983); People v. Hamilton, 81 111.
App. 3d 297, 302, 401 N.E.2d 318, 323 (4th Dist. 1980).
495. See cases cited supra note 388. The most frequent combination of factors is a sufficiently
aggravated prior criminal record and a current offense accompanied by exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior. In a number of recent cases, however, courts have relied on the fact that
the victim was under 12 or over 60 to support an extended term sentence, as authorized by
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(3) (1983). See, e.g., People v. Rosenberger, 125 I11.
App. 3d 749, 751, 466 N.E.2d 608, 610 (4th Dist. 1984) (murder victim 23 months old); People
v. Jones, 119 III. App. 3d 615, 631, 456 N.E.2d 926, 938 (1st Dist. 1983) (murder victim 65
years old); People v. Green, 118 Ill. App. 3d 227, 229, 454 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1st Dist. 1983)
(murder victim 13 months old).
The defendants' treatment of the victims in these cases, in and of itself, justified extended
term sentences. Frequently, however, this will not be so. In these cases, the age of the victim
alone should not justify an extended term sentence, because age does not serve to single out
offenders who are either more culpable or more dangerous than their fellow criminals with any
degree of consistency. Accordingly, the sentencing guidelines proposed herein reduce the im-
portance of the age of the victim. See Appendix to text, § 2a(l)(a)(6). at 398; § 2a(l)(b)(3), at 399.
496. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
497. There appears to be a dichotomy between the approach to extended term sentences in
cases of serious and less serious crimes. In the case of murder or class X felonies, a number
of courts may have tacitly recognized a rule to refuse to sentence an offender to more than
the median extended term sentence when only one of the Act's two principal extended term
factors was present. See People v. Green, 125 Ill. App. 3d 734, 747-48, 466 N.E.2d 630, 639
(4th Dist. 1984) (defendant with no prior record sentenced to 60 years for murder based on
the defendant's exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior); People v. Rosenberger, 125 I11. App.
3d 749, 766, 466 N.E.2d 608, 620 (4th Dist. 1984) (defendant with no prior record sentenced
to 60 years for murder of infant based on the defendant's exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior; court considered and rejected sentences of natural life and 80 years); People v.
Sanford, 119 II1. App. 3d 160, 163, 456 N.E.2d 333, 335 (3d Dist. 1983) (defendant sentenced
to 45 years for rape and deviate sexual assault; since court failed to mention prior offenses,
sentence apparently was based solely on the defendant's exceptionally brutal or heinous be-
havior); People v. Gallardo, 112 I11. App. 3d 764, 775-76, 445 N.E.2d 1213, 1222 (1st Dist.
1983) (defendant with no prior record sentenced to 60 years for brutal murder of defenseless
victim); People v. Nance, 100 I11. App. 3d 1117, 1125, 427 N.E.2d 630, 636 (4th Dist. 1981)
(45-year sentence for unaggravated armed robbery based on single prior conviction for armed
robbery).
When lesser classes of felonies are involved, however, court's have had a tendency to find
less serious behavior to be exceptionally brutal or heinous and to impose maximum sentences
based on that behavior. The attitude of the court in these situations appears to be that the
defendant is fortunate not to have been convicted of a more serious offense. See, e.g., People
v. Cox, 113 I11. App. 3d 136, 137-39, 446 N.E.2d 1280, 1280-82 (1st Dist. 1983) (defendant
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the death of her own child resulting from
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present, but only to some minimal degree, 498 an extended term sentence that
is still substantially less than the maximum is appropriate. 499
A review of reported sentencing decisions strongly suggests that present
sentencing practices for class 2, 3, and 4 felony offenses follow these precepts.
Because class 2, 3, and 4 felonies are rarely accompanied by exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior,5 °0 the only common route to an extended term
would be a sufficiently aggravated criminal record. For most of these offen-
ses, then, application of the proposed guidelines would render maximum
extended term sentences virtually a dead letter.
The cases show that this has occurred. Almost no cases exist in which
class 2 felons are given extended terms in excess of ten years, class 3 felons
in excess of seven years, or class 4 felons in excess of four years. The
exceptions generally involved the unusual cases in which a lesser class felony
was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior,50 or cases in
repeated and extremely severe child abuse; sentenced to maximum extended term of 10 years);
People v. Brown, 104 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1121-22, 433 N.E.2d 1081, 1084-86 (lst Dist. 1982)
(defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and arson for beating two victims into
unconsciousness and then, attempting to conceal his crime, starting a fire in which both men
died; sentenced to concurrent 14-year maximum extended terms); People v. Warfel, 67 Ill. App.
3d 620, 385 N.E.2d 175 (4th Dist. 1979) (defendant was sentenced to eight-year term for
aggravated battery; although victim was physically abused, likely reason for the length of the
sentence was the court's belief that the defendant would have sexually assaulted the victim had
he not been interrupted by passerby).
The willingness to invoke an extended term sentence based upon exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior should vary in accordance with the severity of the sentencing consequences
for the defendant. Such a suggestion has been advanced, but has not been acted on explicitly.
See, e.g., People v. Jones, 73 III. App. 3d 99, 102-04, 391 N.E.2d 767, 769-70 (4th Dist. 1979).
498. The possible range of behavior is truly extraordinary. See, e.g., People v. Gacy, 103
III. 2d I, 468 N.E.2d 1171 (1984) (defendant convicted of 33 homosexually motivated torture-
slayings); People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 10-16, 36, 447 N.E.2d 353, 357-60, 370 (1983) (defendant
convicted of third murder, unrelated to prior murder convictions, and indicted for several more,
all apparently committed in cold blood to prevent victims from identifying him); People v.
DeSimone, 108 III. App. 3d 1015, 1017-18, 439 N.E.2d 1311, 1312-13 (2d Dist. 1982) (defendant
with a history of serious delinquencies and criminal convictions, including conviction for murder
was convicted of attempted murder, aggravated battery, armed robbery, and armed violence
growing out of a single incident); People v. Bryant, 105 Il1. App. 3d 285, 291, 434 N.E.2d 316,
320 (Ist Dist. 1982) (defendant with five prior convictions for rape convicted of brutal murder).
499. Indeed, many defendants whose offenses have involved a minimum degree of exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior and who also have a prior criminal record presently do not receive
extended term sentences at all. See infra notes 519-49 and accompanying text.
500. The few class 2, 3, or 4 felony offenses that do often involve exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior include voluntary manslaughter, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 (1977) (amended
1981); involuntary manslaughter, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-3 (1983); and aggravated battery,
id. § 12-4. Voluntary manslaughter was recently reclassified from a class 2 felony to a class I
felony. See Act of 1982, Pub. Act No. 82-517, § 1, 1981 Ill. Laws 2618, 2618 (codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 (1983)).
501. See, e.g., People v. Matthews, 126 II1. App. 3d 710, 711-12, 716, 467 N.E.2d 996, 998,
1001 (lst Dist. 1984) (defendant sentenced to maximum extended term of 10 years for aggravated
battery involving severe beating of two women and a child with a pistol and a baseball bat);
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which the extended term sentence imposed for the lesser class felony was
rendered a meaningless gesture by the imposition of a longer concurrent
sentence for a more serious offense.50 2
A great deal of injustice would be prevented if the proposed rule of thumb
were recognized and consistently applied to the imposition of extended term
sentences for the more violent and emotion-laden crimes of murder, class
X, and class 1 felonies. Given the breadth and severity of the penalties
available for those offenses, the most severe extended terms should not be
imposed unless the offender had an exceptionally aggravated prior record
and had exhibited exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior in committing
the crime. 03 This two-pronged test could, and should, be implemented
People v. Cox, 113 Ill. App. 3d 136, 137-39, 446 N.E.2d 1280, 1280-82 (1st Dist. 1983)
(defendant, who was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the death of her own child
resulting from repeated and extremely severe child abuse, was sentenced to maximum extended
term of 10 years); People v. Brown, 104 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1121-22, 433 N.E.2d 1081, 1084-
86 (1st Dist. 1982) (defendant who beat two victims into unconsciousness, and then started fire
in which both victims died, sentenced to concurrent 14-year maximum extended terms). But see
People v. Baker, 114 Il. App. 3d 803, 812, 448 N.E.2d 631, 636-37 (2d Dist. 1983) (14-year
maximum extended term sentence for burglary based solely upon defendant's extensive nonvi-
olent felony record).
502. See, e.g., People v. Adams, 106 Ill. App. 3d 467, 476, 435 N.E.2d 1203, 1210 (1st
Dist. 1982) (defendant committed armed robbery in dwelling; sentenced to 35 years for armed
robbery and 14 years for burglary). Under the Act, a defendant will earn good conduct credits
simultaneously and at the same rate on all outstanding sentences. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099,
§ 3, 1977 Il1. Laws 3264, 3289-90, 3314 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-6-3, 1005-
8-7(b) (1983)). Thus, the defendant's release date is determined solely by the longest sentence
imposed, frequently called the "controlling" sentence.
In the wake of the supreme court's decision in People v. Jordan, 103 Il1. 2d 192, 469 N.E.2d
569 (1984), defendants convicted of more than one felony should receive extended term sentences
for only the most serious felony of which the defendant is convicted. See supra note 405.
503. Some cases that involve the imposition of extremely lengthy sentences appear to meet
this test. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 122 111. App. 3d 362, 461 N.E.2d 493 (1st Dist. 1984);
People v. DeSimone, 108 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 439 N.E.2d 1311 (2d Dist. 1982); People v. Mit-
chell, 98 Ill. App. 3d 398, 424 N.E.2d 658 (3d Dist. 1981). There are a substantial number
of cases, however, which appear to reject it by imposing lengthy extended term sentences based
on the presence of a single aggravating factor. See, e.g., People v. Cohoon, 120 Ill. App.
3d 62, 65-66, 457 N.E.2d 998, 1003 (5th Dist. 1983) (court affirmed 60-year sentence for defen-
dant with prior rape conviction; victim bound but not otherwise abused); People v. Clay, 98
Ill. App. 3d 534, 545, 424 N.E.2d 814, 820 (1st Dist. 1981) (court affirmed 14-year sentence
for unexceptional burglary based solely on defendant's criminal record).
Moreover, a number of decisions have implicitly rejected the two prong test by refusing to
vacate lengthy extended term sentences that were apparently imposed on the trial judges'
mistaken belief that several aggravating factors were present rather than just one. See People
v. Rosenberger, 125 11. App. 3d 749, 751, 466 N.E.2d 608, 610 (4th Dist. 1984); People v.
Jones, 119 Ill. App. 3d 615, 631, 456 N.E.2d 926, 938 (1st Dist. 1983); People v. Poree, 119
Ill. App. 3d 590, 601, 456 N.E.2d 950, 958 (lst Dist. 1983); People v. Green, 118 Il. App. 3d
227, 229, 454 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1st Dist. 1983); People v. Sanford, 116 11. App. 3d 834, 845,
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through the unilateral action of the judiciary5°4 by adding specific ceilings
to the proposed judicial rule of thumb: Absent both an exceptionally brutal
offense and an exceptionally aggravated prior record, no murderer should
be sentenced to more than sixty years, no class X felon to more than forty
years, and no class 1 felon to more than twenty years. 05
While anyone who proposes sentencing limitations of this magnitude risks
the label of misguided reformer, if not worse, the historical records suggest
that these measures are entirely supportable. A review of the sentences
imposed for serious offenses in recent times demonstrates that those bench-
marks would result in reserving sentences for exceptionally aggravated of-
fenders that are harsh enough to satisfy all but the Torquemadas among us.
For example, the proposed sixty-year cutoff figure for murder represents
the middle of the extended term range for that crime. In each of the first
five years since the Act's passage, seventy-one to eighty-two percent of all
murderers sentenced to terms of years received regular term sentences of
forty years or less.10 Even greater numbers received sentences of sixty years
or less.10 Thus, sentences in excess of sixty years are in the distinct minority.
452 N.E.2d 710, 718 (1st Dist. 1983). These decisions are erroneous because they fail to give
due consideration to the goals of fairness and proportionality in sentencing. The penalties
imposed on offenders in cases where only one aggravating factor is present should not be as
severe as the penalties imposed in cases where several factors are present. Instead, each
aggravating factor should enhance a defendant's sentence.
504. The supreme court may "prescribe such practices and procedures as will promote a
uniformity and parity of sentences . . ." Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264,
3302 (codified at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.2 (1983)); see also Schuwerk, supra note
2, at 713-14 (suggesting steps the supreme court should take).
505. The current extended term maxima for murder, class X and class I felonies are 80 years,
60 years, and 30 years respectively. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-2(a)(1), (2), (3) (1983).
The maximum consecutive sentences available for those same felony classes, assuming two
felonies of like grade are committed, are twice those figures. See id. § 1005-8-4(c)(2). Certain
murders also are punishable by sentences of death or natural life. Id. §§ 9-1(b), 1005-8-
l(a)(l)(b), (c).
For a more precise meaning of "exceptionally brutal offense" and "exceptionally aggravated
prior record," see infra notes 819-49; Appendix to text, § 1, at 396-97; § 2a(2)(a)(l)-(4) at
400; Chart 4, at 405.
506. See Table II in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290. In addition, a number
of murderers received sentences of natural life or death, data for which, however, is available
only for 1982. In 1982, 52 murderers received natural life sentences and an additional 16 were
sentenced to death. Table 25 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290. When those
67 cases are added to the 253 defendants receiving sentences of terms of years for murder in
1982, it appears that approximately 21% of all murderers were punished by longer sentences
than those appearing Table I1 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290. Assuming
that this percentage approximates the percentages of such sentences in other years, then the
percentages of all murderers deemed to be sufficiently punished by terms of 40 years or less
would decline to between 59% and 68%.
507. Table II in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290. If it is assumed that
extended term sentences above the medium 60-year figure approximately equal those below it,
a rough calculation of the total percentages of murder sentences below that figure is possible.
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Moreover, sentences of sixty years or more would place offenders among
the tiny fraction of most severly punished murderers in terms of time actually
served. Under present statutory good conduct provisions, a murderer sen-
tenced to sixty years imprisonment must serve at least thirty years."0 8 A
thirty-year period of incarceration would exceed the longest time served by
all murderers released from Illinois prisons during three of the five years
since the effective date of the Act."09 Thirty years is also three to four times
the average period of incarceration served for those released during that
period.' In short, a sixty-year sentence seems well suited to serve as a bench-
mark for distinguishing the most culpable murderers from the bulk of their
fellow offenders.
The same is true for the proposed forty-year cutoff for class X felons. A
forty-year sentence would place an offender in a distinct minority of class
X felons, because it would be more severe than that imposed on seventy to
ninety-three percent of all attempted murderers, eighty-eight to ninety-five
percent of all rapists, ninety-four to ninety-six percent of all armed robbers,
and seventy-four to ninety-three percent of all those convicted of other class
X felonies in the first five years since the Act went into effect.", Looking
at the issue of severity from the perspective of time served, a forty-year
sentence will result in at least twenty years of imprisonment, 12 which would
be four to six times as long a period of incarceration as the average sentence
served by class X felons released in each year since the Act went into effect.5 '
It also would exceed all but a miniscule fraction of the sentences served
by class X convicts released during that period."' Twenty years imprison-
ment is, in other words, hardly a trifling penalty.
Finally, adoption of the proposed twenty-year maximum guideline for all
but the few most aggravated class 1 felonies would result in the possibility
of only the most egregious class 1 offenders being punished as severely as
murderers are.515 This is hardly a startling proposition. Moreover, in the first
five years since the Act became effective, seventy-four to ninety-four percent
of all rapists and armed robbers receiving regular terms were sentenced to
Those calculations show that from 80 to 91% of all murderers sentenced to a term of years
received sentences of 60 years or less. Adjusting those figures as called for supra note 506
results in figures of from 66 to 75% of all murderers being punished by sentences below that
figure.
508. "[The prisoner shall receive one day of good conduct credit for each day of service in
prison .... Each day of good conduct credit shall reduce by one day the inmate's period of
incarceration .... ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(a) (1983).
509. See Table 31 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290.
510. See Table 31 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290.
511. See Table 4 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290.
512. See supra note 508.
513. See Table 31 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290.
514. See Table 31 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290.
515. The minimum sentence for murder is 20 years. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-
l(a)(l)(a) (1983).
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less than twenty years for those class X crimes. 1 6 Thus, the proposed twenty-
year rule would promote a rational proportionality between the sentences
levied on class I and class X felons. A twenty-year sentence would also be
more severe than that imposed on eighty-three to ninety-six percent of class I
offenders sentenced to prison during those years." 7 Viewed from the per-
spective of time served, the ten-year period of incarceration resulting from
a twenty-year sentence would be approximately three times the average length
of time served by class 1 felons released over this same five-year period.', 8
By all measures, twenty years seems to be a sufficiently harsh penalty for
all but the most aggravated class 1 felonies.
D. Disparities Resulting from the
Inconsistent Application of Aggravating Factors
Thus far this article has been concerned with undue sentencing disparities
that have resulted from sentencing judges' inappropriate applications of
aggravating factors. There is, however, another serious problem: a wide-
spread failure to impose severe sentences in cases clearly calling for harsh
penalties. While it is difficult to document the full extent of this phenomenon
for a variety of reasons, 1 9 it appears to be due primarily to plea bargaining. 20
516. See Tables 13, 15 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290. These percentages
are approximations, because the data referred to break down class X sentences in only an II
to 25 year span. In making the calculations referred to in the text, it has been assumed that
the sentences within that range are distributed evenly, so that approximately one-third of all
sentences in that range are of 20 years or more. That one-third is then added to the percentage
of sentences in the 26- to 30-year range to get estimated total regular term class X sentences of
20 years or more.
517. See Table 5 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290 (between 4 and 170o
of class one offenders received extended term sentences-which begin at 15 years-during the
first five years after the Act became effective).
518. See Table 31 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290.
519. There are three primary reasons why a review of reported cases understates the frequency
of unduly lenient sentences. First, most cases are disposed of by plea bargains and thus are
not reported. The sentences imposed in the bargaining process, however, probably have more
than their fair share of lenient dispositions. Second, a number of cases disposed of by trial
may result in such mild sentences that the defendant elects not to appeal either the conviction
or the sentence. Thus, those lenient sentences also would go unreported. Finally, of the remaining
cases, a number will result in a sentence which the defendant elects not to appeal along with
the conviction. These cases will seldom contain any information that would permit assessments
of the validity of the sentence imposed. As a matter of common sense, those cases also would
contain a disproportionate share of unduly lenient sentences; but there is no ready way to
establish that fact.
Instances of unduly lenient sentences would come to light more frequently if the state were
able to appeal a defendant's sentence. No such appeals are currently provided for by applicable
supreme court rule, however, and the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the General Assembly
is not free to provide for these appeals through legislation. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 691-94.
520. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 645-57; see also People v. Clay, 124 II. App. 3d 140,
463 N.E.2d 929 (1st Dist. 1984) (less culpable perpetrators of an attempted armed robbery that
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Regardless of its orgin, however, this widespread pattern raises an important
question regarding the constitutionality of those longer sentences. It appears
that their imposition has become so arbitrary and capricious as to be cruel
and unusual "in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual." '5 2' Quite apart from any constitutional issue, however, this state
of affairs seems fundamentally at odds with the Act's broad goals and
purposes.
A few examples will serve to illustrate the problem. Turning first to
extended term sentences based on the exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
rationale, a number of cases already discussed have shown relatively unag-
gravated offenders drawing truly draconian sanctions. It is even more com-
mon, however, to find cases in which clearly qualifying offenses result in
quite lenient sentences. 22 The caprice involved in the leniency shown in these
cases emerges by comparing them to cases such as People v. Medley,523 in
which the defendant did not contend that his concurrent forty-five year
sentences for rape and home invasion were excessive. The facts revealed that
the defendant and his confederate committed ten acts of sexual assault on
a young housewife.124 Taking that sentence as a benchmark for aggravated,
multiple sexual assaults,5 25 it is difficult to justify the consecutive sixty-year
sentences imposed for two substantially less aggravated acts of rape in People
v. Perruguet 26 Likewise, if a forty-five year sentence was proper in Medley,
resulted in death of 10-year old girl were convicted of murder and received sentences of from
40 to 60 years, while another perpetrator was allowed to plead guilty to attempted armed
robbery in return for his testimony and received a 10-year sentence). For suggested reforms in
plea bargaining practices, see Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 657-68, and infra notes 859-68 and
accompanying text.
521. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
522. See, e.g., People v. Myers, 85 111. 2d 281, 426 N.E.2d 535 (1981) (defendant placed
machete blade at victim's throat and slowly worked it in, eventually making a huge deep wound;
court viewed defendant's actions to be those of sadist; concurrent 20-year sentences for attempted
murder and armed violence); People v. Bryant, 123 I11. App. 3d 266, 462 N.E.2d 780 (1st Dist.
1984) (defendant with no prior record gunned down two men from a passing automobile without
provocation; concurrent 12-year sentences for two convictions of attempted murder); People v.
Ammons, 120 I11. App. 3d 855, 458 N.E.2d 1031 (1st Dist. 1983) (defendant entered home,
threatened to kill infant if demands were not met, beat victim repeatedly, and finally shot her
in the leg to force her to produce money; concurrent 20-year sentences); People v. Zolidis, 115
I11. App. 3d 669, 450 N.E.2d 1290 (1st Dist. 1983) (defendant with no prior record stabbed
victim 18 times; court affirmed 10-year sentence for attempted murder); People v. Moore, 115
I1l. App. 3d 266, 450 N.E.2d 855 (1st Dist. 1983) (defendant robbed victim at gunpoint
while codefendant fondled her, and then dragged her into an alley and placed a gun in her
mouth, telling her that he would shoot if she screamed; apparent sexual assault was thwarted
by arrival of police; court affirmed eight-year sentence).
523. 111 Ill. App. 3d 444, 444 N.E.2d 269 (4th Dist. 1983).
524. Id. at 446-47, 444 N.E.2d at 271 (four acts of rape, two of sodomy, and four of
fellatio).
525. Cf. People v. Sanford, 119 Ill. App. 3d 160, 163, 456 N.E.2d 333, 335 (3d Dist. 1983)
(45-year sentence for a course of sexual assault and abuse lasting over 40 minutes affirmed).
526. 118 I11. App. 3d 293, 294-95, 454 N.E.2d 1055, 1056-57 (5th Dist. 1983). For a fuller
discussion of Perruquet, see supra note 275 and notes 312-16 and accompanying text.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 34:241
what possible justification can there be for imposing concurrent eight-year
terms on a convicted murderer in People v. Surges527 for perpetrating a series
of particularly brutal sex crimes? Similar disparities emerge among cases
finding exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior based on multiple sexual
assaults in which the victims were not seriously physically harmed. No reason
other than whim or caprice could explain why the defendant in People v.
Sanford28 received a forty-five year sentence, while the defendants in People
v. Hopkins29 and People v. Best"0 received fifteen-year sentences for equally
atrocious offenses. 3'
527. 101 Ill. App. 3d 962, 971-72, 428 N.E.2d 1012, 1019-20 (1st Dist. 1981). For a more
detailed treatment of Surges, see Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 652-55.
528. 119 Ill. App. 3d 160, 163, 456 N.E.2d 333, 335 (3d Dist. 1983) (defendant committed
"brutal and degrading" series of sexual offenses over 40 minute period); see also People v.
Viens, 109 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1018-21, 441 N.E.2d 660, 662-64 (2d Dist. 1982), cert. denied
sub norn. Viens v. Illinois, 461 U.S. 917 (1983) (far less aggravated conduct than in Sanford
resulted in a 60-year sentence). For a discussion of Viens, see supra text accompanying notes
442-58.
529. 107 111. App. 3d 422, 437 N.E.2d 722 (1st Dist. 1982). In Hopkins, the defendant offered
the victim a ride in his van in a snowstorm. When she accepted, he threatened her with a large
knife, bound her hand and foot and eventually had intercourse with her three times and also
forced her to submit to several acts of deviate sexual intercourse. Id. at 424-25, 437 N.E.2d at
724-25.
530. 97 111. App. 3d 1083, 424 N.E.2d 29 (ist Dist. 1981). In Best, the defendant surprised
the victim in her apartment, where she lived with her two children. The following activities
ensued:
After the victim turned on the light, she asked the defendant what he wanted. He
approached her, pulled out a knife, put his hand over her mouth, turned off the
light, forced her into the living room, and demanded that she remove her clothes.
Defendant then raped her and forced her to commit numerous deviate sexual acts
with him, including fellatio, cunnilingus, and sodomy, all described in detail by the
victim, which need not be repeated here. Defendant placed the knife to her neck
several times and threatened to kill her if she did not submit to his demands. The
entire assault lasted one and one-half hours. Afterwards, defendant got dressed and
warned that he would kill her if she called the police.
Id. at 1084-85, 424 N.E.2d at 30-31.
531. The recent case of People v. Johnson, 109 Ill. App. 3d 511, 440 N.E.2d 992 (1st Dist.
1982), is also useful for purposes of comparison. In Johnson, the following conduct resulted
in the defendant being sentenced to concurrent 20-year terms:
[The victim] was accosted by a man as she stood by her car near her home. The man
aimed a gun at her head, threatened her and pulled her back into the car. . . . [The
victim] turned on the alarm in her car but switched it off after he threatened to kill
her. As they drove defendant asked her if her parents would pay ransom for her.
He held the gun to her head and told her to perform oral sex on him. During the
next six hours [the defendant] . . . forced her to perform fellatio on him two more
times and have sexual intercourse with him twice. He also made her get into the
trunk of her car for awhile and threatened to kill her.
Id. at 513, 440 N.E.2d at 993.
For an even more brutal episode, see People v. Leverson, 69 I11. App. 3d 726, 727-28, 731,
387 N.E.2d 931, 932-34, 936 (1st Dist. 1979). In Leverson, the defendant and his confederates
abducted the victim, tied her to the bed, beat her with a wire coat hanger for 20 minutes, and
poured cologne into the open wounds. The victim was then forced to submit to deviate sexual
acts with the defendant. The defendant was sentenced to 15 to 30 years for deviate sexual
assault.
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Comparable anomalies emerge among extended sentences based on prior
criminal records. For example, the defendant's prior armed robbery convic-
tion in People v. Nance532 resulted in a forty-five-year sentence for a non-
aggravated second offense. In contrast, the defendant in People v. Rogers, '33
who had prior convictions for both robbery and rape, received only a thirty-
year sentence for kidnapping and raping a stranded motorist.53 4 In yet another
case, an armed robber who attempted to murder his victim received only a
twenty-year sentence even though he had two prior convictions for armed
robbery.535 Allowing a single prior class X felony to support a forty-five-
year sentence for an offense that neither caused nor threatened physical harm
to anyone536 is also irreconcilable with cases like People v. Killen,5" in
which the defendant's prior class 2 and class X felony convictions were
found not to justify a thirty-year sentence for deviate sexaul assault, 38 and
People v. Carmack,539 in which three prior felony convictions were found
insufficient for a nine-year sentence for armed robbery. 54°
Finally, those cases involving exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior and
a sufficiently aggravated prior felony record to support an extended term
sentence are also decided in a hopelessly inconsistent manner. For example,
in People v. Clark,5 41 the defendant, who had a record of violent sexually-
motivated attacks on women, 42 received concurrent fifty-year sentences for
a brutal armed robbery and deviate sexual assault. 4 3 In People v. Mitchell14 4
the defendant's forty-five-year sentence for the brutal attempted murder of
a prison guard seems rather modest in light of his two prior convictions for
murder . 45 These two cases might be viewed as representing a middle ground
with respect to doubly-aggravated offenders.146 Assuming that these two
532. 100 I1. App. 3d 1117, 1125, 427 N.E.2d 630, 636 (4th Dist. 1981). For a discussion of
Nance, see supra text accompanying notes 370-79.
533. 101 Ill. App. 3d 614, 428 N.E.2d 547 (5th Dist. 1981).
534. Id. at 615, 619, 428 N.E.2d at 548, 550. Rogers is also noteworthy because a codefen-
dant with no prior record received the same sentence as Rogers. Id. at 616, 428 N.E.2d at 549.
535. People v. Worthen, 105 Ill. App. 3d 386, 391-92, 434 N.E.2d 423, 427-28 (1st Dist,
1982).
536. See Nance, 100 111. App. 3d at 1118-21, 427 N.E.2d at 635-36.
537. 106 Ill. App. 3d 65, 435 N.E.2d 789 (4th Dist. 1982).
538. Id. at 67-68, 435 N.E.2d at 790.
539. 103 11. App. 3d 1027, 432 N.E.2d 282 (3d Dist. 1982).
540. Id. at 1037-38, 432 N.E.2d at 282.
541. 102 111. App. 3d 414, 429 N.E.2d 1255 (1st Dist. 1981).
542. Id. at 418-19, 429 N.E.2d at 1258-59.
543. Id. at 416-17, 425-26, 429 N.E.2d at 1256-57, 1262-64.
544. 98 I1. App. 3d 398, 424 N.E.2d 658 (3d Dist. 1981).
545. Id. at 404, 424 N.E.2d at 663.
546. Far lengthier penalties are frequently imposed in these types of cases. See, e.g., People
v. Gholston, 124 Ill. App. 3d 873, 896, 464 N.E.2d 1179, 1196 (1st Dist. 1984) (two consecutive
60-year sentences imposed on leader of vicious gang rape); People v. Perruquet, 118 111. App.
3d 293, 454 N.E.2d 1055 (5th Dist. 1983) (defendant sentenced to two consecutive 60-year terms
for raping same victim twice within several hours); People v. DeSimone, 108 11. App. 3d
1015, 439 N.E.2d 1311 (2d Dist. 1982) (defendant received two consecutive 60-year terms for
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sentences are defensible,5 47 there can be no plausible basis for the eight-year
sentences negotiated for the armed robbery and brutalization of a family in
People v. Surges,5"" nor for the seven-year sentences imposed on a defen-
dant who played a leading role in two vicious gang rapes.14
9
E. Recommended Remedial Legislation
As the cases discussed above illustrate, the present hierarchy of natural
life, consecutive, and extended term sentences has not been applied in a
consistent manner. Defendants receiving the most severe penalties are fre-
quently indistinguishable from those receiving far less severe sanctions. This
state of affairs gives a strong cast of capriciousness to the sentences of those
punished most heavily. Just as importantly, the legislature's intent to protect
the public from repeat violent offenders by imposing lengthy prison terms55°
is not being followed.
To describe the problem is to suggest the solution. A sentencing mechanism
must be developed having three attributes. First, it must be capable of
routine and consistent application in all cases, whether they are disposed of
by trial or plea bargain. Second, it must be able to pinpoint a presumptive
sentence for all defendants within a relatively narrow range. Finally, it should
provide a method for selecting defendants who deserve lengthy periods of
incarceration. To those ends, a sentencing guideline system is proposed that
would not leave these matters entirely to the discretion of the sentencing
judge or to the relative bargaining acumen of counsel. 5 ' Both of the most
armed robbery and attempted murder).For a full discussion of Perruquet, see supra note 275
and notes 312-15 and accompanying text. For a full discussion of DeSimone, see supra notes
338-43 and accompanying text.
547. It is not at all clear that these particular sentences are defensible. Under the guidelines
proposed in this article, Clark probably would receive a lighter sentence and Mitchell a heavier
one. See infra text accompanying notes 819-68; Appendix to text, Part I, at 396-404.
548. 101 IlI. App. 3d 962, 428 N.E.2d 1012 (1st Dist. 1981). For a complete discussion of
Surges, see Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 652-55.
549. People v. Utinans, 55 Ill. App. 3d 306, 370 N.E.2d 1080 (1st Dist. 1977); People v.
Carroll, 49 Ill. App. 3d 387, 364 N.E.2d 408 (1st Dist. 1977). Michael Briseno was the defendant
in both cases. In Carroll, Briseno was shown to have been involved in an abduction and gang
rape that occurred September 23, 1971. Id. at 389-90, 364 N.E.2d at 410-11. He pled guilty
and received concurrent sentences of seven to 14 and seven to 20 years. In Utinans, Briseno
was shown to have been the ringleader and most active participant in a similar but far more
vicious and brutal abduction and gang rape that occurred October 16-17, 1971. 55 Ill. App.
3d at 310-12, 370 N.E.2d at 1083-84. Again Briseno was allowed to plead guilty to a variety
of offenses and again he received concurrent sentences of either seven to 14 or seven to 20
years. Id. at 309, 370 N.E.2d at 1083; see also People v. Utinans, 105 Ill. App. 3d 452, 434
N.E.2d 500 (Ist Dist. 1982) (vacating order of trial judge granting sentence reductions for less
culpable participant because reduction exceeded sentencing judge's authority).
550. See supra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
551. For a brief discussion of the shortcomings of the current statutory scheme, see Schuwerk,
supra note 2, at 640-42.
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frequently utilized extended term factors called for by existing law-a suf-
ficiently aggravated prior criminal record and behavior that was exceptionally
brutal or heinous-have a role to play in determining sentences under the
proposed system, assuming that they are applied pursuant to well-defined
standards 5 2 The following two subsections outline the general features of
the proposed system and explore its application to quantifying the effects
of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior. The system is set out in detail
in the Appendix.
1. General Considerations
Illinois should adopt a system of sentencing guidelines in which the
defendant's prior record of delinquency or criminal behavior is of consid-
erable importance. Rather than being used in the present haphazard manner,
a prior record should be used by a sentencing judge pursuant to a standard-
ized scoring system that takes into account the nature, circumstances, and
frequency of the earlier adjudications or convictions. 53 This "criminal history
score" would be adjusted up or down by a variety of weighted factors in
mitigation or aggravation.114 Finally, each offense would be assigned a range
of sentence lengths for each adjusted criminal history score, with the pre-
sumption that a sentence would be selected from that range absent compelling
circumstances. 55 The present system of regular term, extended term, and
consecutive sentences would be abolished, as would natural life sentences in
non-murder cases.556 Instead, defendants' eligibility for particular sentences
would initially be determined solely by their adjusted criminal history scores
and the offense(s) for which they were convicted. 5 7
Judges imposing sentences outside of the presumptive range should be
required to explain why they have done so."' Defendants' rights to appeal
552. More generally, a defendant's prior history of delinquency or criminal activity and the
defendant's propensity for brutalizing or causing physical harm to the victim appear to be the
two most important determinants of any sentence imposed. See infra notes 561-67 and 797-849
and accompanying text; Appendix to text, § 1, at 396-97; § 2a(l), (2), at 397-401.
553. See infra notes 797-849, 859-72 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, § 1, at 396-97.
554. See infra notes 850-68 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, § 2, at 397-404.
555. See infra notes 884-96 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, § 3, at 404; Chart
4, at 405.
556. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1983) (regular term sentencing); id. § 1005-8-
l(a)(2) (establishing mandatory natural life sentences for habitual criminals); id. § 1005-8-2
(extended term sentencing); id. § 1005-8-4 (concurrent and consecutive term sentencing). The
General Assembly also should consider abolishing mandatory natural life sentences for murders.
557. See infra text accompanying notes 806-83; Appendix to text, Part I, at 396-404; Chart
4, at 405.
558. This feature could not be implemented without the approval of the Illinois Supreme
Court because of its decisions in People v. Hicks, 101 Ill. 2d 366, 374, 462 N.E.2d 473, 476
(1984), and People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155, 161, 442 N.E.2d 855, 858 (1982). In both of these
cases, the court concluded that the doctrine of separation of powers precluded the General
Assembly from mandating a statement of reasons. The author has argued that these decisions
are erroneous. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 679-85. Nonetheless, they of course remain the
law of the state. See also infra text accompanying notes 884-87 (explaining Minnesota and
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their sentences would remain unchanged.5 9 Subject to certain restrictions,
however, the new system would also permit the state to appeal any sentence
that was admittedly or allegedly less than that called for by the applicable
guidelines.5 60
2. Treatment of Exceptionally Brutal or Heinous
Behavior as a Factor in Aggravation
The Act currently recognizes that one of the most important factors
aggravating a defendant's sentence is the exceptionally brutal or heinous way
in which the offense was committed.5 6' This factor must be applied with a
greater degree of consistency and sensitivity than at present. To achieve that
goal, three major considerations must be addressed. The first is defining
what constitutes exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior5 62 by describing the
hard core conduct to which it pertains and excluding that which is merely
"serious harm" within the meaning of the Act's regular term factor in
aggravation.5 63 The second major consideration is deciding the degree to
which the qualifying behavior should aggravate a sentence. 6' The third is
to defifie what circumstances, if any, should authorize a court to lessen the
full aggravating force of such behavior. 65
The proposed sentencing guidelines set out in the Appendix provide one
way of addressing these issues. '6 They define "exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty" inductively-that is, based on a review
Pennsylvania schemes that require a judicial statement explaining a departure from sentencing
guidelines).
559. See ILL. Sup. CT. R. 615(b)(4) (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IA, § 615(b)(4)
(1983)) (current rights of defendants to appeal sentence).
560. This feature also would require the approval of the Illinois Supreme Court before
implementation. See People v. Cox, 82 Il1. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980). The court in Cox
concluded that the General Assembly's purported efforts to vary the manner in which criminal
sentences were appealed and reviewed were invalid under the doctrine of separation of powers.
Id. at 275-76, 412 N.E.2d at 545. The author has argued that this decision, as the Hicks and
Davis decisions, is erroneous. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 691-94. Nonetheless, it continues
to restrict the powers of the General Assembly in this area. See infra notes 892-96 and
accompanying text (explaining why the General Assembly should consider making guideline
sentences mandatory).
561. See Pub. Act. No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(2) (1983)).
562. See Appendix to text, §§ 2a(2)(a)(l)-(4), at 400.
563. A discussion of the "other shoe"-what conduct should be deemed to cause or threaten
"serious harm'--is deferred to at this point. See infra notes 754-55 and accompanying text;
Appendix to text, § 2a(l)(a), at 397-99.
564. See Appendix to text, § 2a(2)(b), at 400-01.
565. See Appendix to text, § 2c(2), (3), at 403-04.
566. See Appendix to text, § 2a(1), (2), at 397-401; § 2c(2), (3), at 403-04. The whole topic
of sentencing is obviously an extremely emotion- and value-laden one, and the approach taken
in this article is not put forward as the only defensible one. Moreover, while the proposals
made herein are quite detailed, they are not advanced as comprehensive. Hopefully, however,
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of a number of cases finding particular behavior meeting that standard. They
then limit the circumstances and the extent to which sentences can be ag-
gravated by a finding of this type of behavior. Finally, they lessen the
aggravating effect of a finding of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
when it seems just to do so. This proposal would hopefully eliminate many
of the present unjustified sentencing disparities resulting from inconsistent
application of the exceptionally brutal or heinous factor. 67
V. REGULAR TERM PRISON SENTENCES
The Act set forth seven factors that must weigh in favor of imposing a
regular term prison sentence and may serve as reasons for imposing a longer
regular term sentence.5 6 Since the Act's passage, the General Assembly has
added three factors to that list.5 69 The General Assembly, however, avoided
turning these ten factors into a legislative straitjacket by declining to specify
the relative weight to be given the statutory factors and the manner in which
they would be balanced against mitigating factors.570 Nor was the judiciary
limited to considering those factors enumerated by the General Assembly.57'
This flexible, open-ended approach was adopted in the expectation that
judicial decisions or guidelines would produce greater specificity and con-
sistency over time.5 72 The only explicit guidance given by the legislature was
they touch on most major issues and can serve as a springboard for the efforts of others.
567. Special problems could arise in implementing a guideline system for this particular group
of aggravated felonies within the current sentencing ranges. Adopting a routinely utilized factor
to enhance sentences based on exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior most probably would
reduce the frequency with which certain crimes would be punished by minimum terms of
imprisonment or other relatively lenient sentences. Such a reduction in lenient punishment, in
turn, would cause an increase in Illinois' already burgeoning prison population. To minimize
this increase, present sentencing ranges should be adjusted downward, thus permitting somewhat
shorter sentences for less aggravated offenders to offset the longer terms imposed on more
brutal offenders. Proposals for legislative adjustments of sentencing ranges within the existing
structure of regular term, extended term, and consecutive sentences were made in Schuwerk,
supra note 2, at 735-37. Alternative proposals calling for comparable self-imposed judicial
restraints within the confines of present law also have beeen advanced. See supra text accom-
panying notes 202-03, 330-51, 504-18. The sentencing guidelines called for in this article
also would reduce both minimum and maximum sentences below current levels. See infra notes
869-75 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, Chart 4, at 405. While the guideline ap-
proach is the most comprehensive, any of these efforts would improve the present state of affairs.
568. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(l)-(7) (1983)).
569. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(8)-(10) (1983). For a discussion of these addi-
tional factors, see supra note 77.
570. No effort was made, for example, to preclude probation if one or more factors was
present. See supra notes 30, 69-92 and accompanying text. Probation was prohibited for
a variety of offenses, however, as well as for offenders with sufficiently aggravated prior
records. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
571. This is true even though the list of regular term factors in aggravation appears to be
close-ended. See infra notes 578-85 and accompanying text.
572. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34; Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 668-73.
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that, once a decision was made not to grant probation, a lesser regular term
sentence normally would be imposed. The upper portions of the regular term
ranges were reserved for more egregious combinations of aggravating fac-
tors.573
Efforts to regularize this area of sentencing have been sporadic and
ineffectual. The legislative preference for lesser regular term sentences has
gone unrecognized.5 74 No systematic effort to limit or standardize the appli-
cation of the Act's factors in aggravation has been undertaken . 75 Instead,
with a few noteworthy exceptions,5 76 appellate courts have routinely approved
the interpretation, weight, and balance that trial judges have given to those
factors. Efforts to assess the soundness of those decisions in light of the
Act's overarching sentencing concerns have seldom been attempted. 77 More-
over, newly-minted judicial factors in aggravation have been indiscriminately
endorsed on appeal even though their appropriateness under the Act is
doubtful at best. In short, the abuse of discretion standard of review has
covered a multitude of sins. An examination of the two principal aggravating
factors created by the judiciary and the three most frequently used statutory
factors shows the need for substantial reform.
A. Judicially-Created Aggravating Factors
The Act's list of regular term aggravating factors is not open-ended. 7
Notwithstanding that fact, the judiciary has created-actually perpetuated
from pre-Act case law-a number of factors used either to justify an increase
in the sentence imposed or to withhold any mitigation of the sentence that
might be indicated by other circumstances in the case. 79 The two major
573. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
574. See People v. Barney, IIl Ill. App. 3d 669, 679, 444 N.E.2d 518, 525 (Ist Dist. 1982)
("The [Act] imposes no requirement that the minimum sentence be imposed in the absence of
aggravating factors."); infra notes 819-68 and accompanying text.
575. For suggestions to standardize application of factors in aggravation, see infra notes 754-
55, 806-72 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, § 2a, at 397-402; § 2b, at 402.
576. See People v. Rosa, Ill Ill. App. 3d 384, 391-94, 444 N.E.2d 233, 239-41 (2d Dist.
1982) (22-year sentence for armed robbery reduced over a dissent to 12 years for defendant
with minimal prior record); People v. Nelson, 106 Il. App. 3d 838, 846-48, 436 N.E.2d 655,
661-62 (1st Dist. 1982) (20-year sentences for armed robbery reduced to 10 years for defendants
with minor criminal records and substantial rehabilitative potential); People v. Oravis, 81 I1.
App. 3d 717, 718-19, 402 N.E.2d 297, 298-99 (4th Dist. 1980) (six-year sentence for burglary
reduced over a dissent to four years for first-time felony offender). These cases, however, did
not propose any systematic approach to the imposition or review of sentences.
577. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 686-91.
578. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a) (1983)), provides that "The following factors shall be accorded weight in
favor of imposing a term of imprisonment or may be considered by the court as reasons to
impose a more severe [regular term] sentence ......
579. The difference between increasing a sentence because of the presence of certain factors
and not decreasing it for those same reasons is important in principle. Present law, however,
does not permit the pinpointing of what a defendant's sentence ought to be with sufficient
[Vol. 34:241
1985] ILLINOIS' DETERMINATE SENTENCING
factors of this sort are a defendant's apparent perjury at trial8 ° and a defen-
dant's apparent lack of remorse." '8
At first glance, the propriety of adding any factors to a closed, legislatively
prescribed list might seem questionable. Nevertheless, a fair reading of the
Act as a whole indicates that limited judicial augmentation of its regular
term factors in aggravation was both contemplated and authorized.582 The
Act permits the sentencing judge to consider, inter alia, any evidence or
other information offered in mitigation or aggravation.5 8 The Act also
provides that the sentencing judge's explanation of the sentence imposed is
to include "the particular evidence, information, factors, or other reasons
that led to his sentencing determination. '58 4 The section of the Act setting
out regular term sentences states that this statement of reasons may include
"any mitigating or aggravating factors specified in this Code, or the lack of
any such circumstances, as well as any other such factors as the judge shall
set forth on the record that are consistent with the purposes and principles
of sentencing set out in this Code." '585 This latter provision clearly contains
a grant of power to the judiciary to create new factors in aggravation or
mitigation and a limitation on the exercise of that power. The question thus
arises whether the judiciary's aggravating factors are consistent with the
Act's sentencing principles. It seems unlikely that they are.
precision to tell whether a particular sentence has been enhanced as a punishment for asserting
a defendant's behavior or merely not mitigated. Under the sentencing guideline approach called
for in this article, it would be possible to answer that question much more readily. See infra
notes 806-72 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, Part I, at 396-404.
580. See infra notes 586-618 and accompanying text; see also People v. Surles, 126 111. App.
3d 216, 227-28, 466 N.E.2d 1295, 1303 (1st Dist. 1984) (court affirmed 20-year sentence for
armed robbery based on perceived perjury; reviewing court viewed basing sentence on perceived
perjury as nonprejudicial); People v. Singleton, 124 Ill. App. 3d 386, 399-400, 464 N.E.2d 624,
632-33 (1st Dist. 1984) (court affirmed concurrent 25-year sentences for deviate sexual assault
and armed robbery; sentencing judge properly considered perjury committed by defendant
during trial).
581. See infra notes 619-38 and accompanying text.
582. Judicial augmentation of statutory factors was not contemplated, however, for either
the Act's extended term factors in aggravation or its provisions governing consecutive sentences.
Section 5-8-2(a) of the Act specifically prohibits imposition of extended term sentences "unless
the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5-5-3.2 were found to be pre-
sent." See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3310 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-8-2(a) (1983)). Likewise, the Act's consecutive sentencing provisions are governed
solely by the provisions of § 5-8-4. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3311-12
(codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4 (1983)).
583. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3295 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-4-1(a)(3) (1983)).
584. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3296 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-4-1(c) (1983)).
585. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-1(b) (1983) (emphasis added)).
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1. Perjurious Testimony
Since well before the passage of the Act, Illinois courts have wrestled with
the issue of what use, if any, could be made of a sentencing judge's belief
that a defendant had lied, or caused others to lie, under oath. At the time
the Act became effective, no clear position had emerged. The early case of
People v. Moriarty5 " provides a convenient, modern starting point for an
analysis of this pre-Act period. In Moriarty, the defendant had been offered
a sentence of one year to life if he pled guilty. The defendant nonetheless
elected to stand trial. He was convicted and sentenced to ten years to life.
5 87
In pronouncing sentence, the trial judge made it clear that this longer sentence
was imposed in part because the defendant had insisted on his right to trial
and in part because the judge believed that the defendant had committed
perjury.5 8s On appeal, the supreme court found that the trial judge had
sentenced the defendant "only in part for the crime for which he was
indicted." 5 89 Making no further reference to the trial judge's finding regard-
ing the defendant's perjury, the court concluded that the defendant should
not have been "punished by a heavy sentence merely because he exercises
his constitutional right to [trial]."' 9
In the wake of Moriarty, however, People v. Whitel' stated that a
defendant's purported perjury at trial was an "improper factor" upon which
to enhance his sentence.5 92 The White majority concluded that allowing
sentence enhancement on that basis would, in effect, permit punishment
without a trial and would needlessly chill the exercise of a defendant's rights
to a trial and to testify on one's own behalf. 93 White quickly attracted a
loyal following in the appellate courts, with numerous opinions concluding
that suspected perjury simply was not to be given any weight in sentencing. "'
586. 25 III. 2d 565, 185 N.E.2d 688 (1962).
587. Id. at 566, 185 N.E.2d at 688.
588. Id. at 566-67, 185 N.E.2d at 688.
589. Id. at 567, 185 N.E.2d at 689.
590. Id.
591. 130 Ill. App. 2d 775, 267 N.E.2d 129 (4th Dist. 1971).
592. Id. at 778, 267 N.E.2d at 131.
593. Id. (citing Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
594. See, e.g., People v. Greenlee, 44 Ill. App. 3d 536, 544-45, 358 N.E.2d 649, 656-57 (5th
Dist. 1976); People v. Ortiz, 22 III. App. 3d 788, 797, 317 N.E.2d 763, 769 (1st Dist. 1974);
People v. Higgins, 133 I11. App. 2d 496, 497, 268 N.E.2d 265, 266 (5th Dist. 1971).
Interestingly enough, it was universally acknowledged that the court could consider a de-
fendant's admitted perjury at trial as an aggravating factor. See, e.g., People v. Greenlee, 44
111. App. 3d 536, 544, 358 N.E.2d 649, 656-57; People v. Busch, 15 111. App. 3d 905, 908, 305
N.E.2d 372, 373 (1st Dist. 1973). Such an admission by the defendant, however, might be a
more credible indication of the defendant's rehabilitative potential than, his willingness to plead
guilty or profess remorse. See supra notes 578-93 and accompanying text and infra notes 608-18,
624-38 and accompanying text.
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The vitality of these decisions was clouded almost from the outset, how-
ever, by a parallel line of authority stemming from the Illinois Supreme
Court's ruling in People v. Jones. '95 In Jones, the defendant was one of six
persons charged with armed robbery, the other five having previously pled
guilty. 96 Jones supposedly had confessed to the crime and signed a written
statement to that effect. At trial, however, he insisted on his innocence and
denied having either confessed or signed the statement. A jury disbelieved
his testimony and convicted him of armed robbery. At sentencing, the judge
characterized Jones's testimony as "incredible" and as a "fantastic and
unbelievable story" showing that Jones was "prone to perjury."5 97 The judge
then gave Jones a substantially more severe sentence than those imposed on
his colleagues. 9
On appeal the defendant contended that the trial judge had tried, con-
victed, and sentenced him for committing perjury during the course of his
armed robbery trial, thus denying him due process of law. The supreme
court, without any reference to either Moriarty or White, rejected the
defendant's claim. 99 Stating that it did not read the trial judge's remarks as
manifesting his intention to sentence the defendant for perjury, the supreme
court concluded that it was neither possible nor desirable for the judge to
erase the defendant's testimony from his mind in determining sentence.
p
6
That testimony, the court stated, "can hardly be said to be irrelevant to
an appraisal of the defendant's character and his prospects of
rehabilitation."" 0 ' Thus, the trial judge's consideration of that testimony did
not deprive the defendant of due process of law.6 2
Consequently, at the time the Act went into effect, a court could find
persuasive authority either supporting or rejecting the notion that a judge
could properly enhance a defendant's sentence because of perceived perjury
at trial. Predictably, the appellate court districts were divided on this issue. 6 3
595. 52 111. 2d 247, 287 N.E.2d 680 (1972).
596. Id. at 248, 287 N.E.2d at 681.
597. Id. at 249, 287 N.E.2d at 681.
598. Defendant was sentenced to a term of from eight to 15 years in prison. Id. at 248,
287 N.E.2d at 680. His pleading confederates received sentences ranging from probation to
imprisonment for two to three years. Id. at 249, 287 N.E.2d at 681.
599. Id. at 249, 287 N.E.2d at 681.
600. Id. at 249-50, 287 N.E.2d at 681.
601. Id.
602. Id.
603. The first and second appellate districts allowed enhanced sentences for perceived perjury
under Jones. See People v. Jackson, 79 I11. App. 3d 698, 708, 398 N.E.2d 959, 967 (1st Dist.
1979); People v. Galati, 75 111. App. 3d 860, 864-65, 393 N.E.2d 744, 747-48 (2d Dist. 1979);
People v. Genovese, 65 Ill. App. 3d 819, 823, 382 N.E.2d 872, 875 (2d Dist. 1978), cert. denied
sub norn. Genovese v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 843 (1979); People v. Hayes, 62 Ill. App. 3d 360,
365-66, 378 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (1st Dist. 1978).
The fourth and fifth districts, following White, rejected enhanced sentences based on perceived
perjury. See People v. Meeks, 75 111. App. 3d 357, 367, 393 N.E.2d 1190, 1198 (5th Dist. 1979),
19851
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The conflict was resolved in People v. Meeks, 60 4 in which the Illinois Supreme
Court concluded that a judge could consider perceived perjury at trial in
of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Grayson.6 0 6 The
Meeks court relied principally on its own prior decision in Jones and that
of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Grayson.60 6 The
Grayson Court held that the Constitution did not prohibit a sentencing judge
from considering a defendant's apparently perjured testimony in evaluating
the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation. 60 7
Despite that venerable precedent, this particular judicial addition to the
Act's factors in aggravation does not meet the Act's requirements that it be
"consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing set out in the
Code. '60 8 Meeks, like all other cases approving this practice, failed to note
that the General Assembly specifically considered and rejected legislation
that designated as an aggravating factor the fact that "the defendant testified
untruthfully in his own behalf at trial. ' ' 609 The conventional construction
given to this type of action by the legislature, of course, is that it did not
wish that factor to be considered in aggravation. 6 10
Attention to the Act's overriding purposes only serves to confirm this
interpretation. The Act was intended to control abuses of judicial and
prosecutorial discretion in sentencing. 61 ' Allowing perceived perjury to en-
hance a defendant's sentence undermines these goals by making abuses of
discretion more difficult to police. For example, it is an obvious abuse of
discretion for a judge to enhance a defendant's sentence because the de-
fendant chose a trial rather than accept a plea bargain. 612 This limit on
judicial discretion is sapped of much of its vitality by a rule allowing a
rev'd, 81 Ill. 2d 524, 411 N.E.2d 9 (1980); People v. Cowherd, 63 Ill. App. 3d 229, 234-35,
380 N.E.2d 21, 24-25 (4th Dist. 1978). Contra People v. Nedelcoff, 87 II1. App. 3d 849, 850-53,
409 N.E.2d 316, 317-18 (5th Dist. 1980).
604. 81 111. 2d 524, 411 N.E.2d 9 (1980).
605. Id. at 536, 411 N.E.2d at 15.
606. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
607. Id. at 52-55.
608. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3309 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(b) (1983)).
609. S.B. 1I, 80th I11. Gen. Assembly, Ist 1977 Spec. Sess., 5-5-3.2(a)(7) at 46.
610. See, e.g., People v. Boreman, 401 III. 566, 571-72, 82 N.E.2d 459, 461-62 (1948), (when
determining legislative intent, it is proper to consider course of legislation), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 927 (1949); People's Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. Ames, 359 I11. 152, 158-60, 194 N.E. 260,
263 (1935) (rejection of amendment to statute should be given weight in determining legislative
intent). This principle is particularly persuasive here because S.B. 11 is the source of every
other regular term factor in aggravation. Compare S.B. 11, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st 1977
Spec. Sess., 5-5-3.2(a)(I)-(8) at 46 (contains eight factors, including defendant's perjury) with
Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-5-3.2(a)(l)-(7) (1983)) (contains seven of S.B. l l's factors, but excludes defendant's
perjury).
611. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 640-42, 668-73.
612. See, e.g., People v. Moriarty, 25 Ill. 2d 565, 569, 185 N.E.2d 688, 689 (1962). For
a discussion of People v. Moriarity, see supra notes 586-90 and accompanying text.
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defendant's perceived perjury to aggravate the sentence, because it provides
a legitimate rationale for abusive sentence aggravation in most tried cases.61 3
Similarly, it is clearly an abuse of discretion for a judge to increase a
defendant's sentence just to save the state the burden and expense of bringing
a subsequent perjury prosecution. 61 4 Once again, however, the supposedly
legitimate use of perceived perjury as an aggravating factor effectively nullifies
that prohibition.
In addition, for an at best marginal improvement in the trial judge's
perception of the defendant's character and prospects for rehabilitation, 6 5
the use of such a rationale unduly enhances.the coercive aspects of plea
bargaining. While the Act certainly did not intend to eliminate plea bar-
gaining or the sentencing concessions typically attendant thereto, it did wish
to minimize the importance of a willingness to plead on the sentence ulti-
mately imposed. 61 6 The "perjured testimony" rationale, however, is at odds
with that philosophy, because it provides a virtually reversal-proof basis for
routinely enhancing non-pleading offenders' sentences, and hence the cred-
ibility of a prosecutor's representation that he or she will seek and obtain
such greater punishments if no plea is forthcoming.
For all of these reasons, then, allowing increases in regular term sentences
due to a defendant's perceived perjury is erroneous and should be discon-
tinued. The guideline system proposed herein will provide a meaningful way
of assuring that appropriate limitations on both prosecutorial and judicial
sentencing discretion are honored. 61 7 Under the proposal, the only effect of
613. The perception of perjury is a possibility in every case where the defendant testifies. In
a broader form-including suborned perjury-the perception of perjury is a possibility in every
case where a defendant presents witnesses on his or her behalf.
614. The United States Supreme Court in Grayson seeemed to accept the defendant's argument
that increasing a defendant's sentence for that reason without a conviction for perjury would
violate defendant's right to due process of law. 438 U.S. at 53.
615. The majority in Grayson acknowledged the force of the argument that most defendants
faced with serious charges would be sorely tempted to lie under "the psychological pressures ...
of the dock." Id. at 52. Thus, finding that a defendant yielded to that temptation on a par-
ticular occasion does not appear to mark him as appreciably less amenable to rehabilitation
than other men. As the dissent in Grayson noted:
Indeed, without doubting the sincerity or trial judges one may doubt whether the
single incident of a defendant's trial testimony could ever alter the assessment of
rehabilitative prospects so drastically as to justify a perceptibly greater sentence. A
sentencing judge has before him a presentence report, compiled by trained personnel,
that is designed to paint as complete as a picture of the defendant's life and character
as is possible. If the defendant's suspected perjury is consistent with the evaluation
of the report, its impact on the rehabilitative assessment must be minimal. If, on
the other hand, it suggests such a markedly different character that different sentenc-
ing treatment seems appropriate, the defendant is effectively being punished for per-
jury without even the barest rudiments of due process.
Id. at 56 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
616. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 640-42.
617. See infra notes 806-72 and accompanying text.
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a defendant's perceived perjury would be to negate specific factors in miti-
gation that might otherwise have reduced a defendant's sentence.
68 s
2. Lack of Remorse
In addition to using perjured testimony to increase a defendant's sentence,
courts have used a defendant's purported lack of remorse to enhance a
regular term sentence. Cases of this kind fall into three broad categories. In
the first group, the defendant's mere assertion of a right to trial is seen as
evidence of the requisite unrepentant spirit. 619 In this category of cases,
courts contrast the supposedly remorseful mental state of one who pleads
guilty to the prodigal defendant in the case at bar who has had the audacity
to insist that the state prove its case at trial. 620 The second category consists
of cases in which a defendant has compounded an assertion of innocence at
trial with a continued assertion of innocence at sentencing.6 1' In these cases,
courts observe that the defendant has failed to take even the first step to
rehabilitation and thus merits no mercy from the court. 62 The final category
is comprised of cases in which the defendant expresses remorse but the trial
judge does not believe it. 623
It does not seem troubling in the abstract that a defendant's lack of
remorse should be considered in imposing sentence. Indeed, a number of
the Act's factors in mitigation are premised on the notion that a sentencing
judge should endeavor to assess an offender's remorse. 624 Nonetheless, there
618. See infra note 637; Appendix to text, § 2b, at 402.
619. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 100 Ill. App. 3d 244, 250-51, 426 N.E.2d 586, 590-91
(defendant's lack of remorse was a proper consideration in assessing defendant's rehabilitative
capacity); People v. Starnes, 88 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 1148-49, 411 N.E.2d 125, 130 (defendant's
lack of veracity in court and his demeanor at trial were indicative of his lack of remorse,
a proper indication of defendant's rehabilitative capacity).
620. See cases cited supra note 619.
621. See, e.g., People v. Watson, 107 II1. App. 3d 691, 438 N.E.2d 453 (3d Dist. 1982) (trial
court properly considered defendant's lack of remorse at sentencing in imposing 15-year sentence
for sexual assault); People v. Oravis, 81 111. App. 3d 717, 718-19, 402 N.E.2d 297, 298-99 (4th
Dist. 1980) (sentencing judge properly considered defendant's lack of remorse and unwillingness
to make restitution in determining sentence); cf. People v. Tessier, 123 111. App. 3d 984, 989-
90, 463 N.E.2d 1006, 1010-11 (5th Dist. 1984) (six-year sentence for burglary affirmed where
defendant would not cooperate with the court or his probation officer; defendant had no prior
record).
622. See, e.g., People v. Watson, 107 111. App. 3d at 696-97, 438 N.E.2d at 456-57; People
v. Oravis, 81 Ill. App. 3d at 719-20, 402 N.E.2d at 298-99 (court reduced sentence on appeal
for other reasons; one judge dissented).
623. See, e.g., People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 490, 431 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1982) (the
trial court found the killing to be premeditated although defendant claimed that he would not
have killed the victim if he was not on drugs), rev'g, 85 Ill. App. 3d 215, 407 N.E.2d 196 (2d
Dist. 1980); People v. McGee, 121 II1. App. 3d 1086, 1090-91, 460 N.E.2d 843, 846-47 (2d
remorse and claimed he turned himself in to police and cooperated in apprehension and pro-
secution of others).
624. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 II1. Laws 3264, 3301-02 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.1(a)(3), (6)-(10) (1983)).
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are serious problems with the manner in which this judicially-created aggra-
vating factor has been applied. First, a disturbing tendency exists to equate
remorse with a defendant's decision to plead guilty rather than insist on a
trial. Such an approach is objectionable for many of the same reasons raised
above against the perjurious testimony rationale for sentence enhancement. 625
For those reasons alone it should be sharply limited if not abolished.
Moreover, there does not appear to be any offsetting advantage to allowing
lack of remorse to enhance a sentence. It is frequently suggested that a
pleading defendant is entitled to some consideration because the acknowl-
edgement of guilt is the first step to rehabilitation. 626 This suggestion, how-
ever, is almost always no more than a pious fiction, an apologia for bargained
sentences that usually fail to comport with more important factors bearing
on an appropriate punishment for the defendant. 627 Moreover, both prose-
cution and defense counsel acknowledge that a defendant's decision to accept
a plea bargain is usually made in light of the defendant's perceptions
regarding the lenity of the "deal" offered by the prosecution, the strength
of the evidence against the defendant, the gullibility of humankind, and the
likely consequences of a prison term. 628 These considerations would seem to
weigh far more heavily in a defendant's decision to avoid trial than would
genuine remorse. It simply cannot be said that only the most culpable
defendants insist on trials. Thus, to punish defendants more severely for
having done so is, at the very least, unjustified.
Similarly, a distinction cannot be made persuasively between the remorse
shown by those defendants who testify on their own behalf and that of
625. See supra notes 608-18 and accompanying text. As with the "perjured testimony"
factor, reliance on a defendant's "lack of remorse" at best facilitates the improper practice of
imposing a harsher sentence on the defendant for exercising his or her right to trial, and at
worst insulates such a practice from review. Moreover, consideration of lack of remorse
accentuates the discrepancy between sentences imposed pursuant to plea bargains as opposed
to sentences imposed after trials, even though the Act sought to minimize such discrepancies.
See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 640-42.
626. See People v. King, 102 I11. App. 3d 257, 260, 430 N.E.2d 292, 294 (3d Dist. 1981).
627. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 651-57. In some cases, of course, it is not a fiction that
the acknowledgement of guilt is the first step to rehabilitation. See, e.g., People v. Huffman, 78
Ill. App. 3d 525, 527-29, 397 N.E.2d 526, 528-30 (4th Dist. 1979); People v. Thomas, 76 I11.
App. 3d 969, 973-76, 395 N.E.2d 601, 603-06 (5th Dist. 1979); People v. Knowles, 70 Ill. App.
3d 30, 32-34, 388 N.E.2d 261, 263-64 (4th Dist. 1979). Unfortunately, when such occurs it
is not always recognized or rewarded. See People v. Roper, 98 Ill. App. 3d 834, 840, 424
N.E.2d 963, 968 (3d Dist. 1981) (defendant's lack of a prior criminal record and universally
acknowledged rehabilitation insufficient to override trial judge's decision to impose six-year
sentence for robbery); People v. Guthrie, 79 111. App. 3d 403, 405-06, 398 N.E.2d 406, 407-08
(4th Dist. 1979) (on remand court reimposed sentence of six to 18 years that had been vacated
as possibly being excessive despite fact that the state "[did] not dispute [that] substantial rehabilita-
tion had taken place").
628. See Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in the Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179,
1286-87, 1295-96, 1311-13 (1975).
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defendants who offer some other form of defense. Defendants' decisions to
testify or not are almost never a product of virtue, except perhaps that of
their counsel. 62 9 Rather, those decisions are usually just tactical assessments
in which defendants balance their credibility against both the harm likely to
accrue if they do not take the stand6a0 and the damaging information that
might get into evidence if they do. 631 Testifying on one's own behalf is, in
short, a very poor way to separate the saved from the damned.
It seems even more questionable to differentiate between defendants on a
lack-of-remorse rationale on the basis of whether or not they continue to
629. The obligation of criminal counsel to present a defense that is known or believed to be
false has been hotly debated. There is general agreement that a lawyer may not knowingly
present perjured testimony whether or not the witness is a client. See, e.g., State v. Lowery,
111 Ariz. 26, 523 P.2d 54 (1974); In re Jones, 5 Cal. 3d 390, 487 P.2d 1016, 96 Cal. Rptr.
448 (1971). There is disagreement, however, concerning the measures to be taken if a client
testifies falsely. See, e.g., Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1031 (1975) (generally taking the view that our adversary system is not sufficiently
concerned with discovering the truth and that perjury never should be countenanced); Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966) (generally taking the position that, at least in criminal cases, an
attorney should counsel a client against perjury, but if such efforts are unsuccessful, he should
put the client on the stand and argue the credibility of the defendant's testimony to the jury);
Lefstein, The Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinking the Defense Lawyer's
Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665 (1978) (attorney should advise client at the outset of their
relationship that an expressed intention to commit perjury will not be treated as a confidential
communication, and that the attorney will either withdraw or disclose the perjury, should it
occur). A number of cases support a rule that reasonable remedial measures must be taken
even if such measures require disclosure of confidential information. See, e.g., People v. Lewis,
75 Ill. App. 3d 560, 565-66, 393 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (5th Dist. 1979); In re Carroll, 244 S.W.2d
474 (Ky. 1951). These decisions assume that a client's intention to commit perjury is not
protected by an evidentiary privilege or by the lawyer's personal obligation to preserve confi-
dences.
One court has indicated that the lawyer need not disclose the perjury, but must immediately
withdraw from the represenatation. See In re A, 276 Or. 225, 554 P.2d 479 (1979). Another
court has held that a lawyer must withdraw from representation when perjury has been
committed, but declined to resolve the question whether the lawyer has an additional obligation
to disclose the true facts to the court. Committee on Professional Ethics v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d
298 (Iowa 1976). In a few cases, courts have stated that a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel may limit both the obligation to disclose perjury and
the obligation to withdraw. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978); State v. Robinson,
290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976). But see People v. Lewis, 75 11. App. 3d 560, 565-66 393
N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (5th Dist. 1979).
630. It is generally recognized that juries are reluctant to afford the presumption of innocence
to defendants who exercise their constitutional right not to take the stand on their own behalf,
regardless of how the jury is instructed. See Freedman, Perjury: The Lawyer's Trilemma, I
LITIGATION 26, 28 (1975).
631. Aside from any inherent improbabilities in defendant's version of events, the principal
problem will be the disclosure of defendant's criminal record to the jury for impeachment
purposes. If the defendant had given an incriminating statement to the police, which had been
suppressed, the statement also would be available for impeachment purposes. See Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
1985] ILLINOIS' DETERMINATE SENTENCING
assert their innocence at sentencing. 632 Putting aside the possibility that
defendants who assert their innocence may actually be so, those who had
maintained their innocence earlier would be expected to adhere to that
position at sentencing. Defendants, of course, can avoid this dilemma by
choosing not to speak on their own behalf at sentencing or by expressing a
contrition that they may not feel. Favoring these defendants over those who
maintain their innocence to the bitter end, however, is probably a case of
visiting lighter punishments on the prudent rather than on the penitent. 63 a
In short, the potential exists for a good deal of mischief in allowing courts
to treat a defendant's purported lack of remorse as a significant consideration
in sentencing. A defendant's remorse is difficult to determine in the best of
circumstances. Moreover, as presently administered, a defendant's purported
lack of remorse seems to serve primarily as a convenient rationale for
allowing judges to engage in otherwise prohibited sentencing practices. There-
fore, the use of that factor should be either reformed or abandoned as
inconsistent with the Act.
Under a sentencing guideline system, however, it would be possible to give
a meaningful and consistent treatment to the concept of lack of remorse.
As proposed herein, a defendant's presumptive sentence would be based on
a criminal history score. This score is initially calculated on the basis of a
defendant's prior juvenile and adult record and any factors in mitigation or
aggravation of the instant offense. 64 Thereafter, however, that score (and
632. See cases cited supra note 621. Taking an assertion of innocence directly into account
at sentencing has been prohibited on the theory that the practice would unduly chill a defendant's
exercise of the right of appeal or prospects of post-conviction relief. See People v. Speed, 129
111. App. 3d 348, 349-50, 472 N.E.2d 572, 573 (2d Dist. 1984); People v. Griffiths, 112 I11.
App. 3d 322, 331, 445 N.E.2d 521, 529 (4th Dist. 1983); People v. Sherman, 52 I11. App. 3d
857, 859, 368 N.E.2d 205, 207 (3d Dist. 1977). Allowing a judge to use an assertion of innocence
at sentencing as a sign of lack of remorse, however, clearly permits the supposedly prohibited
result to be reached indirectly.
633. Justice Simon of the Illinois Supreme Court made the following statement concerning
defendants who maintain their innocence at sentencing:
The trial judge took account of the defendant's refusal to admit his guilt in sentencing
the defendant to 20 years in prison for armed robbery. We do not require attorneys
seeking reinstatement after disbarment to admit their guilt of the crimes that were
the basis for their disbarment. . . . This rule is based on the view that "[slimple
fairness and fundamental justice demand that the person who believes he is innocent
though convicted should not be required to confess guilt to a criminal act he honestly
believes he did not commit." (In re Hiss (1975), 368 Mass. 447, 458, 333 N.E.2d
429, 437.) Otherwise, honest persons, professing their innocence, may receive greater
punishment than perjurers who admit to a crime that they did not commit. The same
principles apply in the case of a criminal defendant who is compelled to confess at
a sentencing hearing. If anything we should take even greater precautions in this
situation to avoid jeopardizing the defendant's right to avoid self-incrimination.
People v. Johnson, 94 I11. 2d 555, 557, 449 N.E.2d 858, 859 (1983) (Simon, J., dissenting
from denial of defendant's petition for leave to appeal).
634. See infra notes 806-49 and accompanying text.
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hence the defendant's presumptive sentence) can be decreased by up to two
points based on a variety of mitigating factors in a defendant's personal
background. 635 Many of those factors take a defendant's remorse or reha-
bilitation into account, either directly or indirectly. 63 6 Consequently, a finding
of lack of remorse by the sentencing judge could be translated into the
judge's refusal to reduce the defendant's guideline sentence by the attribut-
able amounts. 617 This would assure that a defendant's lack of contrition was
given weight but that it was not utilized impermissibly to punish the de-
fendant for insisting on a trial. 638 This approach seems to be a sensible
accommodation of the competing interests involved.
B. Statutory Factors In Aggravation
The Act's most commonly used regular term aggravating factors are (1)
that the defendant received compensation for committing the offense; (2)
that the defendant's conduct caused or threatened serious harm; and (3) that
the defendant had a prior history of delinquency or criminal activity. 639 In
635. See infra notes 850-58 and accompanying text.
636. See infra notes 855-57 and accompanying text.
637. The defendant's lack of remorse has been incorporated into the proposed sentencing
guidelines in this manner, as has perceived perjury. See Appendix to text, § 2b, at 402.
638. See People v. Moriarty, 25 Ill. 2d 565, 185 N.E.2d 688 (1962).
639. One of the aggravating factors enumerated in the Act permits consideration of general
deterrence. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Il1. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(7) (1983)). As argued above, however, many decisions apparently have
misapplied the deterrence rationale to serve as a reason for imposing consecutive sentences, see
supra note 269, or an extended term sentence, see supra note 83. It also has been utilized
improperly to deny probation. See cases cited supra note 60. As argued above, a general
deterrence rationale rarely should play a decisive role in selecting an individual sentence. See
supra note 269.
The Act also contained regular term aggravating factors directed to abuse of office or
position. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(4), (5) (1983)). Although these factors might have been widely used in
official bribery or corruption cases, such use of the factors may have been forestalled by People
v. Warwick, 123 Ill. App. 3d 692, 697-98, 463 N.E.2d 206, 209-10 (3d Dist. 1984). In Warwick,
the court concluded that these regular term factors could not be applied to aggravate the
sentences imposed in such cases. The court reasoned that because abuse of office or position
was an an essential feature of such crimes, aggravating factors based on those same consider-
ations could not be utilized to routinely enhance the sentences imposed on those committing
them. Id.
The Warwick decision probably is correct as a matter of law, see People v. Conover, 84 II1.
2d 400, 419 N.E.2d 906 (1981), but it poses a problem for sentencing within this narrow class
of crimes. Abuses of office or position, along with white-collar crimes, probably are among
the few offenses in which a general deterrence rationale should be a significant sentencing
consideration. If so, that rationale, along with the inherent nature of such offenses, might
make regular term prison sentences appropriate more frequently. The General Assembly could
approach this problem either by increasing the class of those offenses, by explicitly making the
abuse of office or position factors applicable to such crimes, or by making those offenses
nonprobationable. If the latter course is taken, it is recommended that periodic imprisonment
remain available for exceptionally mitigated cases. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-7-1 to
1005-7-8 (1983).
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construing these factors, the judiciary has only occasionally shown a real
interest in attempting to fashion a coherent, rational sentencing system.
Instead, its principal aim has been to give those factors a broad enough
reading to sustain whatever sentence was imposed by the trial judge. More-
over, when a sensible approach to a given factor has arisen, 640 all efforts to
generalize that approach have been steadfastly resisted.
1. Compensation for Committing the Offense
The Act provided that the receipt of compensation for committing an
offense can aggravate the sentence to be imposed. 64" The legislative history
of the Act indicates that the intended targets of this provision were persons
who committed crimes for hire-contract killers, "torches," and the like.6 2
The literal application of the language was broad enough, however, to include
any crime in which the perpetrator received anything of value. Predictably
enough, a number of trial courts followed a literal interpretation and sup-
ported aggravated sentences imposed on persons convicted of theft, 643
burglary, 64 " robbery, 645 and armed robbery 646 on the ground that they had
received compensation for committing the offense.
In an all too rare act of judicial self-restraint, the supreme court finally
put this matter right in People v. Conover.64 7 The Conover court relied
principally on its decision in People v. Brownell,6"" which held that the
General Assembly had not intended to allow the murder of an eye witness
to be a capital crime when the crime to which the victim was an eye witness
was his own murder. 6"9 The Conover court concluded that the most reason-
able interpretation of the compensation provision was that it referred to
offenses one was hired to commit. 60 The General Assembly, the court noted,
640. See, e.g., People v. Conover, 84 IIl. 2d 400, 404, 419 N.E.2d 906, 908 (1981) (interpreting
defendant's receipt of compensation for committing an offense as an aggravating factor).
641. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Il. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(2) (1983)).
642. The legislative history of § 5-5-3.2(a)(2) is not extensive. The explanation of S.B.II,
in which the provision originated, mentions its existence but does not explain its purpose. Class
X Analysis, supra note 48, at 32. The provision, however, appears to have been based on a
factor in aggravation contained in Illinois' capital punishment statute related to murders for
hire. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b)(5) (1977) (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 9-(b)(5) (1983)).
643. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 85 Ill. App. 3d 1200, 413 N.E.2d 1389 (3d Dist. 1980).
644. See, e.g., People v. Conover, 83 11. App. 3d 87, 87, 403 N.E.2d 708, 709 (3d Dist.
1980), rev'd, 84 Il. 2d 400, 419 N.E.2d 906 (1981).
645. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 98 Ill. App. 3d 852, 859-60, 424 N.E.2d 985, 991-92 (3d
Dist. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2276 (1982).
646. Cf. People v. Tolliver, 98 Ill. App. 3d 116, 117, 424 N.E.2d 44, 45 (3d Dist. 1981)
(permissible to consider amount of proceeds in determining sentence).
647. 84 Ill. 2d 400, 419 N.E.2d 906 (1981).
648. 79 I1. 2d 508, 404 N.E.2d 181 (1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 59 (1980).
649. Id. at 526, 404 N.E.2d at 190.
650. 84 Il. 2d at 402, 419 N.E.2d at 908-09.
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was well aware that the receipt of compensation was implicit in most
burglaries and thefts. Thus, the Conover court concluded, it made sense to
assume that the legislature had already incorporated that factor into the
range of penalties it had established for those crimes. 651 Drawing an analogy
to Brownell,652 the court held that the provision in question applied only to
defendants who received renumeration to commit a crime other than the
proceeds from the crime itself. 653
The reasoning of the Conover court is both sensible and far reaching in
its implications. The supreme court's position is, apparently, that an aggra-
vating circumstance implicit in the offense itself should not further aggravate
the sentence. If followed to its logical conclusion, this position would rein
in the routine application of other factors in aggravation to a host of crimes.
By and large, however, the appellate courts have not given such a broad
reading to Conover. Although a few courts have relied on its rationale to
reduce or vacate sentences, 65 4 the more common reaction by far has been to
dismiss that aspect of Conover as "an unfortunately vague piece of dic-
tum. ''655
2. Defendant's Conduct Caused or Threatened Serious Harm
Perhaps the most inconsistently applied regular term factor in aggravation
is that the defendant caused or threatened serious harm. While deceptively
simple in its phrasing, this factor creates several major definitional problems.
For example, must a defendant have personally caused or threatened serious
harm or does it suffice that a defendant participated in a crime in which an
accomplice caused or threatened serious harm? What is the meaning of
651. Id. at 405, 419 N.E.2d at 909.
652. Id. at 404, 419 N.E.2d at 908.
653. Id. at 405, 419 N.E.2d at 909.
654. See, e.g., People v. Teague, 101 Ill. App. 3d 993, 996, 428 N.E.2d 1113, 1116 (3d Dist.
1981) (appellate court vacated sentence based in part on compensation rationale); People v.
Hunt, 100 Ill. App. 3d 553, 557-58, 426 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (3d Dist. 1981) (appellate court
vacated sentence based in part on compensation rationale); People v. Davis, 121 Ill. App. 3d
916, 922-23, 460 N.E.2d 471, 474-75 (lst Dist. 1984) (defendant's 50-year extended term sentence
for attempted murder reduced to 30 years premised upon Conover rationale).
655. People v. Barney, Ill Ill. App. 3d 669, 679, 444 N.E.2d 518, 524 (1st Dist. 1982). One
commentator recently concluded that there has been widespread resistance to Conover by
appellate courts, in part because its intended reach is not clear. See Hartmann, Factors in
Aggravation and Mitigation: A Trap for the Sentencing Judge?, 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 357, 369-
70 (1984). That commentator appears to be correct in her assessment, because Barney, along
with numerous other cases, did not find Conover to bar the imposition of lengthy sentences
based on a serious harm rationale for unexceptional versions of various crimes. See infra notes
698-710 and accompanying text; see also People v. Griffin, 117 Il. App. 3d 177, 185-86, 453
N.E.2d 55, 60-61 (5th Dist. 1983) (pointing loaded revolver at victim and demanding money
was found sufficient to trigger serious harm rationale even though gun was never fired; defendant
received 25-year term).
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"serious harm"? Is only physical injury within its scope, or are injuries to
society at large or psychological damage to the victim also covered? How
serious is "serious," especially in the context of offenses such as aggravated
battery, rape, attempted murder, and murder, which always cause severe
trauma or death to the victim? Is the concept of serious harm limited to
some adverse consequences beyond those normally implicit in the offense
itself? Finally, what is meant by threatening serious harm? Is a word or
menacing gesture sufficient, or must something have occurred akin to an
attempt to inflict such harm?
Besides these definitional issues, problems of quantification also have
arisen. What effect should a finding of serious harm have on an offender's
sentence? And how is one to distinguish serious harm from its more aggra-
vated counterpart, exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, indicative of
wanton cruelty? Each of these questions is discussed below.
a. The Requirement of Personal Conduct
No case has expressly decided whether a defendant must have personally
committed the serious harm that was used to aggravate the defendant's
sentence. Rather, courts seem to have adopted a de facto rule requiring that
aggravation on a serious harm rationale be based on the defendant's personal
conduct. 6 6 Given the language and purposes of the Act, this construction is
appropriate. The statutory language referring to the defendant's conduct is
most readily construed as requiring personal action on the part of the
defendant. 65 7 Moreover, when the General Assembly wished to subject both
active and passive offenders to the possibility of a given sanction, it used
the phrase "the offense was accompanied by" the requisite aggravating
conduct. 6 s Finally, a construction requiring a defendant's personal action is
consistent with Illinois's historical preference for sentences tailored to the
individual circumstances and conduct of each defendant. 659
It is not clear, however, that a defendant's personal conduct will continue
to be required for aggravation based on serious harm. The problem lies with
656. Occasionally, a person actually engaging in exceptionally brutal behavior will be punished
with an extended term sentence, while passive accomplices of that offender will receive longer-
than-minimum regular term sentences, most probably on a serious harm rationale. See, e.g.,
People v. Campbell, 126 I11. App. 3d 1028, 1033, 1056-58, 467 N.E.2d 1112, 1116, 1133-34 (2d
Dist. 1984) (defendant received 60-year sentence for armed robbery in which he shotgunned
unresisting victim and left him permanently disabled); People v. Tyler, 128 Ill. App. 3d 1080,
1083, 1102-03, 471 N.E.2d 968, 972-73, 984-85 (2d Dist. 1984) (Campbell's two passive con-
federates in the foregoing crime given sentences of 20 years for armed robbery; court stressed
injury to victim).
657. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(1) (1983)).
658. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3309 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.2(b)(2), 1005-8-1(a)(l)(b) (1983)).
659. See supra notes 465-67 and accompanying text.
19851
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
the supreme court's decision in People v. Sangster."' The Sangster court
concluded that a defendant's personal action was not required by the Act's
language that "the defendant [had to have] inflicted severe bodily injury' 661
before receiving a consecutive sentence. 662 Although the Sangster decision is
erroneous, 66 it obviously could serve as persuasive authority for construing
the similar language of the serious harm provision.
b. Problems in Definition and Application
Even if Sangster's error is not extended, however, application of the
serious harm factor remains gravely flawed. Despite innumerable cases find-
ing that a defendant's conduct caused or threatened serious harm, there
nonetheless is uncertainty and inconsistency in both the interpretation and
application of that language. Three major categories of difficulties have
arisen. The first is a failure to define what is meant by "serious harm."
The second is a failure to pinpoint what is meant by a "threat" of serious
harm. The third is a failure to quantify the effect to be given to actual or
threatened serious harm.
1. Definitional Issues.-One question in defining "serious harm" is whether
it is limited to physical harm to the victim or whether it can be extended
to other serious harmful consequences of criminal conduct. The appellate
courts have divided on this issue. Two districts have concluded that the serious
harm aggravating factor parallels the mitigating factor that states that "the
defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious physical
harm to another.""" Consequently, these courts have held that serious harm
is limited to physical injury.' Other courts, however, have viewed the ag-
gravating phrase as clearly and unambiguously embracing not only physical
injuries, but serious societal or psychological harm as well.' The latter courts
have used the serious harm rationale to increase sentences imposed on per-
sons whose crimes, while not causing physical harm, were perceived as ex-
ceptionally aggravated in other respects. 6 7
660. 91 I11. 2d 260, 437 N.E.2d 625 (1982).
661. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 II1. Laws 3264, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-8-4(a) (1983)).
662. 91 111. 2d at 264-66, 437 N.E.2d at 627-28.
663. See supra notes 323-29 and accompanying text.
664. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 I11. Laws 3264, 3300 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.1(a)(1) (1983)).
665. See, e.g., People v. Warwick, 123 111. App. 3d 692, 695-98, 463 N.E.2d 206, 208-10
(3d Dist. 1984); People v. Andrews, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1109, 1112-13, 435 N.E.2d 706, 708 (5th
Dist. 1982).
666. See, e.g., People v. Bergman, 121 Ill. App. 3d 100, 111-12, 458 N.E.2d 1370, 1379-80
(2d Dist. 1984); People v. Atencia, 113 II1. App. 3d 247, 254-55, 446 N.E.2d 1243, 1247-48
(Ist Dist.), cert. denied sub nom. Atencia v. Illinois, 104 S. Ct. 283 (1983); People v. Burton,
102 Ill. App. 3d 148, 153-54, 429 N.E.2d 543, 547-48 (4th Dist. 1981); People v. Childers,
83 Ill. App. 3d 358, 360, 403 N.E.2d 1295, 1296 (3d Dist. 1980).
667. See, e.g., People v. Bergman, 121 111. App. 3d 100, 110-12, 458 N.E.2d 1370, 1378-80
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It seems more likely that serious harm should include more than physical
injury. The Act refers to "physical" harm or injury in several other sections
of the statute. 668 Under normal rules of statutory construction, the absence
of that word from the Act's aggravating factor should be treated as evidence
of an intent to give a broader scope to that factor. 669 There is no reason to
depart from those rules of construction.
A broad interpretation of serious harm is also consistent with cases such
as People v. Burton,6"' which concluded that serious harm encompasses
psychological damage as well as physical injuries. In Burton, the defendant
was convicted of two counts of aggravated incest with his two stepdaughters.
The record revealed that the defendant had abused the children repeatedly
since they were five and six years old. 671 The trial judge found the victims
to be "very frightened, very insecure and, obviously, damaged children. '672
Concluding that the defendant had inflicted "severe psychological trauma
on the victims, . . . which may well be carried with them throughout their
lives," ' 61 3 the judge imposed concurrent six-year sentences. 674 This inclusion
of psychological trauma as a form of serious harm was, sensibly enough,
affirmed by the appellate court. 67 1
But the fact that a wide range of adverse consequences may be treated as
serious harm for purposes of this aggravating factor does not resolve how
to treat such consequences where they are not distinguishable from those
normally inherent in the offense itself. On the one hand, the logic of Conover
dictates that sentences may not be routinely enhanced because of conduct
implicit in the offense itself.676 On the other hand, it is unlikely that the
(2d Dist. 1984) (court affirmed first offender's 25-year sentence for after conviction for delivery
of a pound of cocaine; dissent would have reduced sentence to 12 years); People v. Atencia,
113 Ill. App. 247, 254-55, 446 N.E.2d 1243, 1247-48 (1st Dist.), cert. denied sub nom. Atencia
v. Illinois, 104 S. Ct. 283 (1983) (18-year sentence imposed on first offender for delivery of 2000
grams of cocaine); People v. Burton, 102 Ill. App. 3d 148, 153-55, 429 N.E.2d 543, 547-48
(4th Dist. 1981) (convicted child molester sentenced to prison, based in large part on psycho-
logical harm his repeated acts of abuse had caused the two very young victims); People v.
Childers, 83 Ill. App. 3d 358, 359-62, 403 N.E.2d at 1295-97 (3d Dist. 1980) (defendant received
18-year sentence for delivery of cocaine based in part on harm of drug use to society; defendant
had two prior convictions for similar offenses).
668. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3300, 3311 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.1(a)(1), (2), 1005-8-4(a) (1983)).
669. Cf. Western Nat'l Bank v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350-51, 167 N.E.2d 169,
174 (1960) (judge may not add words to a statute to change its meaning); People ex rel. Stocke
v. 11 Slot Machines, 80 Ill. App. 3d 109, 115, 399 N.E.2d 305, 309 (5th Dist. 1979) (court is
not permitted to add words to a statute to change its meaning, even if such a reading seems
desirable as a matter of policy).
670. 102 Ill. App. 3d 148, 429 N.E.2d 543 (4th Dist. 1981).
671. Id. at 149, 429 N.E.2d at 545.
672. Id. at 153, 429 N.E.2d at 547.
673. Id.
674. Id. at 150, 429 N.E.2d at 544.
675. Id. at 153-55, 429 N.E.2d at 547-48.
676. See supra notes 640-55 and accompanying text.
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General Assembly intended to limit the aggravating effect of serious harm
to the crimes in which it is least likely to arise. 617 This dilemma has been
resolved by requiring that the aggravating serious harm differ from the harm
implicit in the crime itself.
Efforts to apply Conover to intrinsically dangerous or harmful offenses
have resulted in some rather strange judicial pronouncements. In People v.
Carmack," ' for example, the court solemnly stated that a threat of serious
harm is not necessarily implicit in an armed robbery.6 79 Likewise, in People
v. Johnson," 0° the court determined that "the threat of serious harm is not
inherent in the offense of rape." ' 68' Similar statements have been made
regarding attempted murder, 68 2 murder, 683 and voluntary manslaughter, 68 4
although it is difficult to imagine any harm more serious than death.
In context, however, many of these statements are defensible as sensible
efforts to apply Conover's analytical framework to these exceptionally ag-
gravated crimes. As the Johnson court noted, for example: "There are wide
variances in the risk of harm to victims of sexual attacks . . . It is illogical
to argue that the legislature intended to prevent a trial court from recognizing
these differences and from imposing sentences accordingly. ' 685 Thus, the
Johnson court's analysis was consistent with Conover in requiring a finding
of harm beyond that implicit in the offense itself before allowing sentence
enhancement on a serious harm rationale.
In fact, it seems fair to say that in cases involving actual physical harm
to a particular victim, Conover has been sensibly applied both as a limitation
on and an authorization for sentence aggravation on a serious harm basis.
677. But see People v. Warwick, 123 Ill. App. 3d 692, 695-98, 463 N.E.2d 206, 208-10 (2d
Dist. 1984); supra note 639.
678. 103 111. App. 3d 1027, 432 N.E.2d 282 (3d Dist. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 875
(1984).
679. Id. at 1037, 432 N.E.2d at 289; see People v. Reynolds, 105 Ill. App. 3d 698, 705,
434 N.E.2d 776, 781 (3d Dist. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1176 (1983); People v. Robinson,
89 111. App. 3d 211, 215, 411 N.E.2d 589, 591 (3d Dist. 1980).
680. 107 Ill. App. 3d 156, 437 N.E.2d 436 (3d Dist. 1982).
681. Id. at 161, 437 N.E.2d at 440.
682. See, e.g., People v. Childs, 101 II. App. 3d 374, 378-79, 428 N.E.2d 185, 188-89 (3d
Dist. 1981); cf. People v. Hasty, 120 Ill. App. 3d 173, 175-76, 457 N.E.2d 1039, 1041-42 (5th
Dist. 1983) (30-year sentence for attempted murder based in part on serious harm rationale
affirmed for defendant who repeatedly shot victim).
683. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 109 I11. App. 3d 352, 363, 440 N.E.2d 432, 440 (5th Dist.
1982); People v. Andrews, 105 111. App. 3d 1109, 1112-13, 435 N.E.2d 706, 708 (5th Dist.
1982).
684. See, e.g., People v. Evans, 87 Ill. 2d 77, 87, 429 N.E.2d 520, 525 (1981); cf. People
v. Pitt, 106 III. App. 3d 117, 120-21, 435 N.E.2d 801, 804 (5th Dist. 1982) (when defendant
was convicted of both armed violence and voluntary manslaughter, the fact that he caused the
death of an individual could be used as a form of serious harm to enhance his sentence for
armed violence, even though it would have been improper to use as a form of serious harm in
connection with voluntary manslaughter).
685. 107 111. App. 3d 156, 161, 437 N.E.2d 436, 440 (3d Dist. 1982).
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For example, People v. Martin,686 upheld the enhanced sentences of defend-
ants who gave their victim a prolonged beating, apparently for sheer sport,
before he died. 6 7 That separate act of cruelty was found to constitute serious
harm distinct from the murder itself and, thus, a proper basis for sentence
enhancement. 6 s Likewise, gang rapes consistently result in higher-than-min-
imum sentences even for first-time offenders, the serious harm involved
being the repeated sexual assaults made possible by group activity.
68 9 If
gratuitous physical abuse is also present in a gang rape, even longer sentences
are imposed on the perpetrators. 690 Cases in which the victim suffered some
unusually severe physical harm, such as permanent paralysis or disfigurement,
also normally result in longer sentences under a Conover rationale. 69
2. Threatened Serious Harm.-A tacit consensus has developed in actual
serious harm cases limiting sentence enhancement to situations in which the
harm differed from that implicit in the offense itself.692 In the realm of
686. 112 Ill. App. 3d 486, 445 N.E.2d 795 (1st Dist. 1983).
687. Id. at 502, 445 N.E.2d at 808.
688. Id. at 502, 445 N.E.2d at 808 (sentence of 30 years rather than minimum of 20 years
for offender with no prior record); see also People v. Puente, 98 I11. App. 3d 936, 949, 424
N.E.2d 775, 785 (1st Dist. 1981) (15-year sentence for armed robbery and attempted murder
imposed on first offender affirmed where victim was stabbed three times in throat without
provocation).
689. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 104 Ill. App. 3d 386, 396, 432 N.E.2d 1020, 1027-28
(1st Dist. 1982) (10-year sentence for 17-year old first offender who played major role in gang
rape, rather than six-year minimum); People v. Hasting, 72 Il. App. 3d 816, 818-20, 826, 390
N.E.2d 1273, 1276-77, 1281 (1st Dist. 1979) (four defendants committed vicious gang rape;
defendant Hasting, whose only prior record was one misdemeanor conviction but who per-
petrated a number of the more vicious aspects of criminal episode, received concurrent sentences
of nine to 27 years).
690. See, e.g., People v. Requena, 105 I11. App. 3d 831, 838, 435 N.E.2d 125, 130 (1st Dist.
1982) (three defendants maced and beat victim, forced her to submit to numerous acts of
fellatio and rape; major participants sentenced to concurrent term of 15 and 20 years; minor
participant sentenced to 10 years; none had prior records), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204 (1983);
People v. Dotson, 99 I11. App. 3d 117, 119, 125, 424 N.E.2d 1319, 1321, 1326 (1st Dist. 1981)
(defendant abducted victim from parking lot, raped her, attempted to carve his name on her
body with a broken beer bottle, and threw her out of car in isolated area; court affirmed two
concurrent sentences of 25 to 50 years, despite no record of violent crimes); People v. Leverson,
69 I11. App. 3d 726, 727-28, 731, 387 N.E.2d 931, 933, 936 (lst Dist. 1979) (defendant and
confederate abducted victim; codefendant tied her to bed, beat her severely with coat hanger,
poured cologne in wounds and ordered her to have sex with defendant, which she did; court
affirmed defendant's concurrent 15 to 30 year sentences for aggravated kidnapping and deviate
sexual assault, despite his lack of a prior record).
691. See, e.g., People v. Baylor, 111 I1l. App. 3d 286, 290-91, 443 N.E.2d 1137, 1139-40
(2d Dist. 1982) (30-year maximum regular term sentence for attempted murder affirmed for
first offender; shotgun blast severely wounded victim); People v. Kulpa, 102 II1. App. 3d 571,
575-76, 430 N.E.2d 164, 166-67 (1st Dist. 1981) (defendant's eight-year extended term sentence
for aggravated battery affirmed where victim was stabbed 26 times); People v. Miller, 101 I11.
App. 3d 1029, 1032, 1041-42, 428 N.E.2d 1038, 1041, 1047-48 (1st Dist. 1981) (defendant's 60-
year sentence for attempted murder affirmed where the eight to 10 bullets that defendant and
confederate fired into victim left him permanently paralyzed).
692. The problem of quantifying enhancements to sentences based on the serious harm
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threatened harm, however, that qualification is frequently ignored. Instead,
defendants will be found to have threatened serious harm within the meaning
of the Act for engaging in conduct that is a staple ingredient of the offense.
The precise meaning of the term "threaten" has never been settled. Some
cases have interpreted the term literally to include verbal threats to take
some action that, if carried out, would result in serious harm. 693 A second
group of cases has found a threat of serious harm in the manner in which
the offense was committed, even though there had been no overt effort to
cause serious harm.694 Finally, other cases have equated "threat" with
"attempt ' 695 by finding a threat of serious harm when a defendant con-
rationale is presented by many of the cases discussed supra notes 519-49, 678-91 and accompa-
nying text. The conclusion that those cases correctly applied Conover to authorize some enhance-
ment of a defendant's sentence should not be taken as an endorsement of the particular in-
crease utilized in a specific case.
There has been some uncertainty over whether defendants may have their sentence enhanced
by certain harm-usually distinct crimes-that arose in connection with the offenses but for
which the defendants either have not been charged or for which they were charged but acquitted.
The rule that has emerged is that uncharged conduct can be used for enhancement but conduct
which has resulted in an acquittal cannot. Compare People v. Martin, 112 Ill. App. 3d 486,
502-03, 445 N.E.2d 795, 808 (lst Dist. 1983) (murder sentences may be enhanced for the
gratuitous savage beating inflicted on victim), and People v. Ely, 107 Ill. App. 3d 102, 107-08,
437 N.E.2d 353, 356-57 (4th Dist. 1982) (armed robbery sentence may be enhanced for the
sexual assault of one victim, although the defendant was not charged for the sexual assault)
with People v. Cross, 100 Ill. App. 3d 83, 91-92, 426 N.E.2d 623, 630 (3d Dist. 1981) (when
defendant has been acquitted of murder, it is improper to consider the death of a victim of an
unrelated battery in sentencing a defendant for arson), and People v. Cain, 70 Il. App. 3d 1,
7-8, 388 N.E.2d 54, 59 (1st Dist. 1979) (where defendant was convicted of armed robbery but
acquitted of murder, it would be improper to increase the defendant's sentence for the death
of the victim).
Under Conover, a particular consequence of a defendant's criminal conduct might allow
enhancement of the sentences imposed for some offenses, but not others. See, e.g., People v.
Lampton, 108 11. App. 3d 41, 47, 438 N.E.2d 915, 919 (3d Dist. 1982) (fact that defendant
shot victim once may be used to enhance his sentence for armed violence based on aggravated
battery, even if it could not have been used for the aggravated battery itself); People v. Pitt,
106 11. App. 3d 117, 120-21, 435 N.E.2d 801, 804 (5th Dist. 1982) (defendant was convicted
of both armed violence and voluntary manslaughter; the death of the victim could be used as
a form of serious harm to enhance his sentence for armed violence, but would have been an
improper consideration to enhance the sentence for voluntary manslaugher); People v. Bone,
103 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1070, 432 N.E.2d 329, 332 (3d Dist. 1982) (the degree of harm the
defendant caused the victim of his armed robbery-namely, his death-is a proper consideration
in sentencing the defendant for armed robbery); cf. People v. Godinez, 91 Il1. 2d 47, 57-58,
434 N.E.2d 1121, 1127 (1982) (Simon, J., concurring) (defendant who committed multiple
unrelated crimes on a single day may have sentence for each enhanced because of the presence
of the others).
693. See, e.g., People v. Cihlar, 106 Ill. App. 3d 824, 825-26, 436 N.E.2d 1041, 1052 (1st
Dist. 1982); People v. Patten, 105 Ill. App. 3d 892, 893, 435 N.E.2d 171, 172 (Ist Dist. 1982).
694. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 109 Ill. App. 3d 352, 353, 442 N.E.2d 432, 434 (5th Dist.
1982); People v. Smith, 105 11. App. 3d 639, 642-43, 433 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Dist. 1982);
People v. Glass, 98 11. App. 3d 641, 644, 424 N.E.2d 936, 938 (3d Dist. 1981).
695. "A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he does
any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4 (1983).
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sciously, but unsuccessfully, endeavored to cause serious physical injury
other than that necessarily implicit in the offense itself.696
These interpretations, of course, are not mutually exclusive and all of
them are at least superficially plausible. In light of Conover and the Act's
broader purposes of fairness and proportionality in sentencing, however, not
all of them are a proper basis for sentence enhancement. Instead, sentence
enhancement based on a threatened serious harm rationale should be limited
to those defendants whose conduct has clearly set them apart from others
who have committed the same offenses. 697 The conduct involved should be
both atypical of the underlying offense-to meet the requirements of Con-
over-and either intended or likely to create a significant risk of serious
harm apart from that involved in the offense itself. Under this interpretation,
verbal threats should seldom result in any enhancement of a defendant's
sentence; a more dangerous manner of committing an offense should usually
not result in more than a very modest increase in the sentence, and overt
attempts to cause serious physical harm should usually result in a substan-
tial sentence increase.
Verbal threats of serious harm are a regrettably commonplace and de-
plorable aspect of a variety of crimes, particularly sex offenses, home
invasion, and armed robbery. 69 While the temptation to enhance the sen-
tences of such offenders is understandable, routine sentence enhancement
based on their conduct would not be consistent with Conover. The use or
threat of force is an element of all these offenses. 699 The General Assembly,
therefore, must have realized the role that threats commonly played in these
crimes and should be deemed to have taken them into account in setting
severe minimum penalties for these offenses. 700
Moreover, it would generally be inconsistent with the Act's broader pur-
poses to allow verbal threats to distinguish between offenders in sentencing.
In an extreme case, for example, when the verbal threats were employed as
696. See People v. Bone, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 432 N.E.2d 329, 332 (3d Dist. 1982); People
v. Calderon, 101 Ill. App. 3d 469, 470, 471, 428 N.E.2d 571, 572-73, 578 (1st Dist. 1981).
697. Courts have not always limited the enhancement of sentences to instances involving
atypical criminal conduct. For example, in People v. Spinks, 80 I1. App. 3d 1096, 400 N.E.2d
634 (3d Dist. 1980), the court imposed concurrent six-year sentences for two burglaries where
the defendant's only prior conviction was for forgery. Id. Despite the fact that the two crimes
were entirely commonplace, the court reasoned that "burglary is a very serious offense with
the potential for serious physical harm," and that unless the defendant could disprove that he
intended such harm, the enhancement of his sentence was proper. Id. at 1100, 400 N.E.2d at
636. This approach is clearly interdicted by Conover.
698. See, e.g., People v. Cihlar, 106 Ill. App. 3d 824, 825-26, 436 N.E.2d 1041, 1042 (1st
Dist. 1982) (defendant entered victim's home, threatened her with death, had intercourse with
her against her will; convicted of rape, home invasion and burglary); People v. Patten, 105 I1.
App. 3d 892, 893, 435 N.E.2d 171, 172 (ist Dist. 1982) (defendant and companion forced
victim into a car, threatened her with death, and took her to apartment and raped her; convicted
of rape, deviate sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping).
699. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (1983) (rape); id. § 11-3 (deviate sexual assault);
id. § 12-11 (home invasion); id. § 18-2 (armed robbery).
700. Rape, deviate sexual assault, home invasion, and armed robbery are class X felonies,
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gratuitous psychological torture, 0' verbal threats may amount to actual
serious harm. In most cases, however, the use of verbal threats to coerce a
victim's compliance may be equated with a resort to minimal force, which
merits no additional punishment. Compared to physical conduct, verbal
threats are an uncertain guide to a defendant's amenability to rehabilitation.
Thus, their presence normally should not play a significant role in selecting
the sentence to be imposed. 70 2
Threats of serious harm have also been found in a number of cases in
which the offense was committed in a manner that the sentencing judge
believed was more dangerous than that generally employed. Frequently,
however, the threats posed in these cases seem ephemeral. For example, the
murder committed in People v. Hughes °3 was apparently found to have
threatened serious harm over and above that implicit in all murders because
the defendant fired two shots at his victim rather than one.7 0 Likewise, other
courts have found threats of serious harm when a defendant merely cocked
a weapon 705 and when a defendant armed himself with a shotgun rather than
a pistol, 7°6 although the weapons were not fired in either case nor were the
victims otherwise threatened with harm. Accosting a victim in her home has
also been held to constitute a threat of serious harm.70 7
A number of the sentences imposed in these cases appear lenient given all
the other circumstances.708 Nonetheless, they should have been affirmed on
a harmless error rationale rather than on their merits. It simply does not
seem appropriate to add a substantial amount of time to a defendant's
sentence due to such a subtle parsing of the crime. A defendant's decision
to carry a more dangerous weapon, for example, is at most marginally
relevant to the defendant's culpability, character, and amenability to reha-
bilitation, as long as the weapon is not discharged. Like purely verbal threats,
this type of "threatened serious harm" is a form of minimal force that is a
necessary element of the offense and hence not an appropriate basis for
sentence enhancement under Conover.70 9 Consequently, it should not result
and thus carry mandatory minimum prison sentences of six years. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§
11-1, 11-3, 12-11, 18-2, 1005-5-3(c)(2)(c), 1005-8-1(a)(3) (1983).
701. See cases cited supra note 420 and supra text accompanying notes 440-41.
702. In many cases verbal threats do not result in an enhanced sentence, and the defendants
instead receive concurrent minimum sentences. See, e.g., People v. Cihlar, 106 I1. App. 3d
824, 436 N.E.2d 1041 (1st Dist. 1982); People v. Patten, 105 I1. App. 3d 892, 435 N.E.2d 171
(1st Dist. 1982). For further discussion of Cihlar and Patten, see supra note 698.
703. 109 Ill. App. 3d 352, 440 N.E.2d 432 (5th Dist. 1982).
704. Id. at 363, 440 N.E.2d at 440.
705. See People v. Glass, 98 Ill. App. 3d 641, 644, 424 N.E.2d 936, 938, (3d Dist. 1981).
706. See People v. Smith, 105 11. App. 3d 639, 642-43, 433 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Dist. 1982).
707. Id.
708. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 109 Ill. App. 3d 352, 353, 442 N.E.2d 432, 434 (5th Dist.
1982) (defendant's sentence was only four years above the statutory minimum for murder).
709. For a discussion of Conover, see supra notes 647-53 and accompanying text.
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in more than a very minimal increase in the sentence otherwise appropriate. 10
The final class of threatened serious harm cases consists of those in which
a defendant made an unsuccessful attempt to cause actual serious harm."
In such a case, an enhanced sentence is clearly appropriate under Conover
because neither the behavior involved nor the harm threatened is implicit in
the offense itself. The Act's general sentencing principles also support sen-
tence aggravation in these cases. Because the threat was more than mere
bluff or posturing, it becomes a far clearer and more significant indicum of
the defendant's character and rehabilitative potential than the other two
types of threatened serious harm. As a consequence, an unsuccessful attempt
to cause serious harm should normally result in a significant enhancement
of the defendant's sentence. 71 2
3. The Judicial Treatment of Threatened and Actual Serious Harm.-If
sentencing practices were operating in a manner consistent with the Act,
there would be a hierarchy, more or less, in the degree of sentence enhance-
ment based on the type of a defendant's threatened or actual serious harm.
No such grading of serious harm cases, however, is evident. Instead, the
cases are hopelessly jumbled, with many offenders receiving substantially
increased sentences due to apparently innocuous aggravating aspects of their
crimes, while their colleagues who committed far more aggravated versions
of the same crimes received only minimal enhancements.
Although many cases involving only verbal threats of serious harm did
not result in sentence enhancements, 713 a number of courts have relied on
verbal threats to lengthen regular term sentences714 or to impose extended
term sentences.7"5 Those "threatened serious harm" cases predicated on a
710. The proposed sentencing guidelines adopt that position. See Appendix to text, § 2a(l)(a)(2),
at 397-99; § 2a(l)(b)(I), at 399.
711. See, e.g., People v. Calderon, 101 111. App. 3d 469, 470, 471, 428 N.E.2d 571, 572-73,
578 (lst Dist. 1981) (defendant, who had no prior record, properly sentenced to nine-year
minimum when he exchanged shots with victim).
712. Occasionally there will be mitigating circumstances that offset the defendant's unsuc-
cessful attempt to cause serious harm. For example, in People v. Calderon, 101 Il. App. 3d
469, 479, 428 N.E.2d 571, 572 (1st Dist. 1981), the victim initiated an exchange of gunfire with
the defendant as the defendant attempted to make his escape. Although the defendant's
willingness to return that fire was held against him, the three-year increase in his sentence
almost certainly would have been greater had he initiated or provoked that exchange. The
proposed sentencing guidelines provide for such a contingency. See Appendix to text,
§ 2a(2)(a)(l)-(4), (c), at 400-01; § 2c(2), (3), at 403-04.
713. See, e.g., People v. Cihlar, 106 II1. App. 3d 824, 436 N.E.2d 1041 (1st Dist. 1982);
People v. Patten, 105 I11. App. 3d 1041, 435 N.E.2d 171 (1st Dist. 1982).
714. See, e.g., People v. Garza, 125 111. App. 3d 182, 184-85, 465 N.E.2d 595, 597 (1st
Dist. 1984) (defendant struck victim, threatened her with death; concurrent eight-year sentences
for rape and home invasion affirmed); People v. Best, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1087-88, 424
N.E.2d 29, 30-31 (1st Dist. 1981) (defendant who threatened to kill victim unless she complied
with his demand received concurrent sentences of 15 years for various sex offenses).
715. See, e.g., People v. Viens, 109 I11. App. 3d 1017, 1027-29, 441 N.E.2d 660, 668-69 (2d
Dist. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 917 (1983); supra text accompanying notes 442-58. Although
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supposedly dangerous manner of committing the offense also are plagued
by inconsistency. Many of these cases appear to involve quite modest sentence
enhancements. 16 Many other courts, however, have imposed substantial
regular term sentences on offenders based on the manner of committing the
offense, even though no significant enhancement seemed warranted. 7 7
For example, in People v. Reynolds,"' the trial court imposed a twenty-
year sentence for armed robbery based in part on the presence of threatened
serious harm.719 The crime in question appeared to be a garden-variety armed
robbery in which no resistance was offered, no shots were fired, and no
verbal threats of harm were made.720 The appelate court, however, summarily
rejected the defendant's argument that Conover would not permit enhance-
ment of his sentence on a threatened serious harm rationale. The Reynolds
court did not explain what facts, if any, made the harm threatened in this
armed robbery more egregious than that implicit in any other.'
The use of a minimally threatening nuance of an offense as a basis for
sentence enhancement may have been reined in by the supreme court in
People v. Reid."' Reid had been convicted of attempted armed robbery for
brandishing a walking stick in an effort to get his victim to surrender her
purse.72 3 The incident had ended happily when the obviously unintimidated
victim exclaimed, "You are not going to hit me," and the defendant oblig-
ingly turned and walked away.724 Although the prosecution had requested
only a seven-year sentence,"' the trial judge imposed a ten-year term, based
in part on his conclusion that the defendant's "effort at intimidation" had
threatened serious harm." 6
the court characterized Viens as a case of actual psychological harm, it is difficult to discern
any significantly more egregious harm suffered by the victim in Viens than suffered by many
victims in other cases involving unfulfilled verbal threats of serious harm.
716. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 115 I1. App. 3d 266, 271, 450 N.E.2d 855, 857 (1st Dist.
1983) (defendant robbed victim at gunpoint, forced her into alley, put gun in her mouth and
told her he would kill her if she screamed; apparent intended sexual assault interrupted by
arrival of police; I I-year sentence for armed robbery affirmed).
717. See, e.g., People v. Glass, 98 Il. App. 3d 641, 642-43, 424 N.E.2d 936, 937-38 (3d
Dist. 1981) (defendant's 16-year sentence for armed robbery affirmed, based in part on
defendant's pointing loaded gun at victim); People v. Spinks, 80 IIl. App. 3d 1096, 1099, 400
N.E.2d 634, 636 (3d Dist. 1980) (six-year sentence for uneventful burglary affirmed on theory
that all burglaries had "potential for serious physical harm").
718. 105 II. App. 3d 698, 434 N.E.2d 776 (3d Dist. 1982).
719. Id. at 705, 434 N.E.2d at 781.
720. Id. at 701, 434 N.E.2d at 777-78.
721. Id. at 705, 434 N.E.2d at 781. The court, however, vacated the defendant's sentence
on other grounds. Id. at 705, 434 N.E.2d at 780-81.
722. 94 Il1. 2d 88, 445 N.E.2d 329 (1983). The appellate court had affirmed Reid's sentence
summarily by a rule 23 order, and therefore, is not reported. References to the appellate court
decision are drawn from the supreme court's discussion of that unreported opinion.
723. Id. at 89, 445 N.E.2d at 329.
724. Id.
725. Id.
726. Id. at 90, 445 N.E.2d at 329-30.
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The appellate court accepted the defendant's argument that, under Con-
over, it would have been inappropriate for the trial judge to enhance the
sentence based on threatened serious harm. 727 Nonetheless, the appellate
court affirmed the sentence, concluding that the trial court had either given
no weight to that factor or else so little weight that reversal was not
warranted. 72 8 On further appeal, the supreme court concluded that the trial
judge's comments "[did] not show that [he] considered the threat of harm
an aggravating factor" and that the defendant's sentence was justified for
other reasons. 729
By implication, the supreme court agreed with the appellate court that an
enhancement of Reid's sentence on a threat of harm rationale would have
been erroneous on the facts of the case. Both Conover and the Act's broader
concerns for consistency and proportionality in sentencing support that result.
Reid's menacing gesture, terminated at the first sign of resistance, was a
minimal threat of force. It would be improper to have such conduct play a
significant role in the sentence selected.730 Hopefully, the Reid opinion will
auger a broader and more thoughtful application of Conover to threatened
harm cases than has developed to date.7 1'
Those threatened serious harm cases involving attempts to inflict actual
harm also exhibit inconsistent approaches to sentence enhancement. There
is a tendency to treat these threats as more serious matters for sentencing
purposes.732 Nonetheless, numerous cases can be found in which attempted
727. Id. at 90-91, 445 N.E.2d at 330.
728. Id.
729. Id. The supreme court alluded to the defendant's prior criminal record of two burglary
convictions and the trial judge's belief that the defendant had perjured himself at trial. Id.
The court's decision to affirm Reid's sentence is troubling for three reasons. First, it appears
virtually certain that the trial judge relied to some extent on a ground the appellate court found
improper. See supra text accompanying note 726. The reliance on an improper ground seems
particularly likely when the sentence imposed exceeded that recommended by the prosecution.
Second, the use of a perjured testimony rationale to support a lengthier sentence, while not
presently forbidden under Illinois law, should be prohibited. See supra notes 608-18 and
accompanying text. Finally, substantial mitigating factors that tended to offset the defendant's
prior record seemed not to have been given any appreciable weight. 94 I11. 2d at 90-91, 445
N.E.2d at 329-30.
730. See supra notes 698-702 and accompanying text.
731. See supra notes 692-721 and accompanying text.
732. See, e.g., People v. Primmer, 111 I11. App. 3d 1046, 1048, 1053-54, 444 N.E.2d 829,
831, 834 (4th Dist. 1983) (defendant's 15-year sentence for attempted murder affirmed where
defendant fired shotgun through window of neighbor's house, even though no injury resulted);
People v. Rosa, Ill Ill. App. 3d 384, 386, 394-95, 444 N.E.2d 233, 236, 240-41 (2d Dist. 1982)
(22-year sentence for armed robbery imposed on defendants with minimal prior records reduced
to 12 years; defendants had engaged in high-speed chase in effort to elude capture; dissenting
judge would have affirmed sentence on that basis); People v. Roper, 98 I11. App. 3d 834, 839-
41, 424 N.E.2d 963, 965-68 (3d Dist. 1981) (six-year sentence for robbery imposed on defendant
with no prior record and other compelling mitigating factors in his background affirmed;
defendant had been armed with a pistol that he had pointed at victim and attempted to fire).
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serious harm had little to no effect on the sentence imposed. 33 Because this
type of threatened serious harm seems particularly blameworthy, some sig-
nificant enhancement will hopefully occur in those cases as a matter of
course.1
4
With respect to those cases which the defendant actually inflicted harm-
whether societal, psychological, or physical 35-sentences tend to be signifi-
cantly enhanced with great regularity.73 6 Nonetheless, two problem areas
remain. First, the proper effect that various types and degrees of serious
harm should have on an offender's sentence has not been addressed. Second
efforts have not been undertaken to standardize the imposition of regular
and extended term sentences by developing principled distinctions between
conduct that causes or threatens serious harm and that which is exceptionally
brutal or heinous. Resolution of these problems is necessary to a fair and
proportional sentencing system.
No systematic attempt to grade serious harm has ever been made, nor is
one in the offing. The supreme court effectively disabled that undertaking
by making it clear that judges need not "recite and assign a value to each
fact presented in evidence at the sentencing hearing." 73' As the supreme court
almost certainly intended, this pronouncement has been read as eliminating
not only the need to weigh each fact but also the need to weigh any fact,
however significant it might have been. Without a weighting requirement,
however, it is impossible to rely on a case-by-case process to develop a "com-
mon law of sentencing," as the Act intended would occur.' 38 The only alter-
native to that approach, explicit sentencing guidelines, is highly unlikely
without action by the General Assembly.' 39
733. See, e.g., People v. Calderon, 101 Ill. App. 3d 469, 478-79, 428 N.E.2d 571, 577-78
(lst Dist. 1981) (nine-year sentence for armed robbery imposed on defendant with no prior
criminal record affirmed because defendant had exchanged gunfire with victim on a residential
street; no one injured; sentence probably would have been higher had victim not initiated
exchanges); People v. Jackson, 100 II1. App. 3d 1064, 1065, 1070, 427 N.E.2d 994, 995, 998
(1st Dist. 1981) (defendant's Il -year sentence for armed robbery affirmed where defendant had
two prior convictions for robbery, and confederate fired shots at police in attempting to avoid
apprehension; no one actually wounded); People v. Grant, 70 Ill. App. 3d 268, 274-75, 387
N.E.2d 1026, 1028-31 (1st Dist. 1979) (defendant's indeterminate sentence of five to 15 years for
armed robbery affirmed as against the contention that he should receive minimum term of four
years to four years and a day, where defendant had fired two shots at victim to prevent her
from following him; no one actually harmed).
734. The proposed sentencing guidelines adopt such an approach. See Appendix to text, §
2a(l)(a)(3), at 397-99; § 2a(l)(b)(2)-(4), at 399.
735. As argued above, societal, psychological, or physical harm should be considered as
serious harm in an appropriate case. See supra notes 664-77 and accompanying text. The
proposed sentencing guidelines would implement that practice. See Appendix to text, § 2a(l)(a)(l)-
(9), at 397-99.
736. See, e.g., cases discussed supra notes 679-91 and accompanying text.
737. People v. Meeks, 81 II1. 2d 524, 534, 411 N.E.2d 9, 14 (1980).
738. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text; Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 668-73.
739. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 713-14 & nn. 504-05.
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As might be expected, then, sentence disparities in cases involving actual
serious harm are utterly irreconcilable. Even if one controls for pertinent
sentencing variables, it is not difficult to find a wide range of sentences
imposed for societal harm, 740 psychological harm,
74
' and physical harm. 742
The present judicial attitudes towards these disparities seem to range from
tolerance to outright approval. 743 The situation, therefore, seems unlikely to
change of its own accord.
Efforts to classify conduct as serious harm on the one hand or as excep-
tionally brutal of heinous behavior on the other, also are hopelessly incon-
sistent. Because the two phrases are not mutually exclusive, without a further
elaboration and clarification of what conduct comprises each category, that
situation cannot be expected to change. Moreover, even if behavior could
somehow be pigeon-holed into one category or the other, it is unlikely that
classification would improve the situation unless the Act's failure to specify
the sentencing effect of either type of behavior is also addressed.
7
4
As a result of these related problems of interpretation and application,
this area has become particularly rife with arbitrary and capricious sentencing
740. See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 667.
741. See, e.g., cases discussed supra notes 420, 422 and supra notes 698-702 and accom-
panying text; see also People v. Moore, 115 Ill. App. 3d 266, 271, 450 N.E.2d 855, 857 (1st
Dist. 1983) (defendant robbed victim at gunpoint while codefendant fondled her; then forced
her into alley and put gun in her mouth, telling her he would shoot if she screamed; apparent
sexual assault thwarted by arrival of police; 11-year sentence for armed robbery imposed on
first offender affirmed); People v. Viens, 109 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1018-19, 1029, 441 N.E.2d
660, 662-63, 669 (2d Dist. 1982) (60-year sentence for armed violence imposed on defendant
who kidnapped victim as part of bizarre plot to free a friend from jail; sentence based in large
part on supposed psychological harm to victim), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 917 (1983).
742. For a representative cross section of cases involving physical injury to the victim and
resulting in regular term sentences, see cases discussed supra notes 522, 531, 533-35, 537-39,
549 and accompanying text and infra notes 745-53 and accompanying text.
743. The supreme court certainly seems to see diversity as a virtue in imposing sentences.
See, e.g., People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 490-93, 431 N.E.2d 344, 348-51 (1981) (court
stressed complexity of tasks facing sentencing court and wide range of factors court should
consider in imposing punishment, thereby suggesting that different defendants cannot be
compared for sentencing purposes); People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d 882,
884 (1977) (court stressed how each sentence must be based upon "the particular circumstances
of each individual case" and upon "many factors" which the sentencing judge has a superior
opportunity to consider, thus implying that there is no ready basis for comparing different
offenders for sentencing purposes). For a criticism of this perspective and a proposed alternative,
see Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 686-91.
744. A court remains free not to impose an extended term prison sentence even when it finds
an offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior. See supra notes 85-
91 and accompanying text. In fact the Act makes certain offenses, such as voluntary man-
slaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and aggravated battery probationable, even though they
could involve "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty." See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-2, 9-3, 12-4 (1983). This freedom not to extend sentences for reasons
of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior has been exercised rather frequently. See supra
notes 522-49. In addition, a finding of serious harm has no specific consequences in terms of
sentence enhancement, with probation remaining available despite the presence of such conduct.
See supra text accompanying note 570.
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decisions.745 For example, in People v. Rayford, '" the defendant robbed a
gas station attendant at gunpoint and then shot the unresisting attendant
at point-blank range after he had surrendered the money on hand.7 47 The
defendant was convicted of attempted murder, armed violence, and armed
robbery.7"8 Rayford's conduct, which seems to fit comfortably under the
rubric of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty, could have subjected him to an extended term of thirty to sixty years
if so viewed.74 9 The court, however, declined to invoke that provision. In-
stead, it proceeded mainly on a serious harm rationale and imposed concur-
rent sentences of twelve years for attempted murder and ten years for the
remaining offenses.750
In contrast to Rayford are several cases involving similar gratuitous acts
of violence, and defendants apparently no less amenable to rehabilitation,
in which the courts took a very different view of the defendant's conduct. 5 '
To take just one example, in People v. Jones,752 the defendant discharged a
firearm with the apparent intent of merely frightening his prospective robbery
victims. Nevertheless, his conduct was found to be exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior sufficient to support concurrent extended term sentences
of forty and sixty years, even though no injury resulted. 7 3 A rational
sentencing system simply would not allow such arbitrary and entirely discre-
tionary assessments to have so substantial an effect on offenders' sentences.
745. A number of cases illustrating these inconsistencies are collected and discussed supra
notes 522-49 and accompanying text.
746. 104 I1. App. 3d 124, 432 N.E.2d 1041 (5th Dist. 1982).
747. Id. at 126, 432 N.E.2d at 1043.
748. Id. at 125, 432 N.E.2d at 1041.
749. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3310 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-8-2(a)(2) (1983)).
750. 104 III. App. 3d at 126, 127, 432 N.E.2d at 1041, 1043. The defendant's armed violence
conviction was vacated on appeal because it was based on the same physical act as the attempted
murder conviction, but otherwise the propriety of these sentences was affirmed. Id. at 126, 432
N.E.2d at 1042.
751. See, e.g., People v. McGee, 121 III. App. 3d 1086, 1091, 460 N.E.2d 843, 846-47 (2d
Dist. 1984) (40-year sentence for attempted murder affirmed where defendant shot unarmed
victim because of previous quarrel); People v. Perez, 115 111. App. 3d 446, 453, 450 N.E.2d
870, 875 (1st Dist. 1983) (court affirmed consecutive sentences of 35 and 15 years for execution-
style murder and attempted murder); People v. Childs, 101 111. App. 3d 374, 375, 387-79, 428
N.E.2d 185, 186, 188-89 (3d Dist. 1981) (court affirmed consecutive 15-year sentences for two
acts of attempted murder).
On the other hand, Rayford is not alone in its relatively lenient approach to crimes of this
type. See People v. Bryant, 123 Ill. App. 3d 266, 268, 276-77, 462 N.E.2d 780, 782, 787-88
(Ist Dist. 1984) (12-year sentence for double attempted murder affirmed where defendant had
no prior record, even though one victim suffered severe permanent injury); People v. Zolidis,
115 Ill. App. 3d 669, 670, 677-78, 450 N.E.2d 1290, 1292, 1297-98 (1st Dist. 1983) (10-year
sentence for attempted murder affirmed even though defendant had no prior record; victim
stabbed 18 times and severely injured); People v. Castro, 114 Ill. App. 3d 984, 991-92, 449
N.E.2d 886, 891-92 (lst Dist. 1983) (15-year sentence for attempted murder affirmed where
defendant shot at rival gang member in crowded restaurant and wounded bystander).
752. 73 111. App. 3d 99, 391 N.E.2d 767 (4th Dist. 1979).
753. Id. at 106-07, 391 N.E.2d at 769-70. Jones is discussed in more detail supra notes 427-36
and accompanying text.
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c. Proposed Remedial Measures
The fact that a defendant committed an offense in a manner involving
actual or threatened serious harm should often be a significant factor in
deciding what sentence should be imposed. To regularize the use of the
serious harm factor, however, two measures are necessary. First, the type
of conduct that the phrase is intended to embrace should be more precisely
defined. That process should not only make clear what conduct is included,
but also what conduct is excluded, whether as too trivial to warrant en-
hancement or as so severe as to constitute exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. 75 4 Second, the effect of a serious harm
finding on an offender's sentence should be spelled out in greater detail.
Essentially, the proposed sentencing guidelines set out in the Appendix
adopt a broad definition of serious harm that is based on a review of the
conduct that courts have placed within that category." 5 Thus, serious harm
would include both psychological and societal harm as well as physical harm.
Threats of serious harm may also result in sentence enhancement, but only
to a more limited extent than would actual harm. The proposal first limits
a finding of serious harm to those situations in which the defendant was
personally responsible for the behavior in question, and that behavior was
not a common feature of the crime and was not exceptionally brutal or
heinous. The provision then lists examples of conduct constituting serious
harm and specifies the range of aggravation allowable as a result. Hope-
fully, adoption of the proposed system will ensure that defendants threaten-
ing or causing serious harm are both appropriately and consistently punished
for doing so.
3. A History of Prior Delinquency or Criminal Activity
A defendant's "history of prior delinquency or criminal activity ' 75 6 is, in
all likelihood, the Act's single most important aggravating factor. The
significance of this factor is exemplified by its status as the sole factor upon
which a judge must make a finding of record before accepting a plea
bargain. 7 7 This factor is so important because a prior record provides a
754. The latter inquiry has been treated in the proposed sentencing guidelines, Appendix
to text, § 2a(2)(a), at 399-400.
755. See supra notes 664-75 and accompanying text. For the proposed sentencing guidelines
treatment of "serious harm," see Appendix to text, § 2a(l), at 397-99.
756. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(3) (1983)).
757. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3300-01 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 (1983)). The perception that criminal history is the most important
factor in sentencing is bolstered by cases overturning sentences that had been based on
convictions that were later reversed or vacated. See, e.g., People v. Coty, 105 I1. App. 3d 398,
434 N.E.2d 432 (1st Dist. 1982); People v. Fischer, 100 Ill. App. 3d 195, 426 N.E.2d 965 (1st
Dist. 1981). This has been done even when the reviewing court believed the sentence imposed
may have been warranted. See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 96 Il1. App. 3d 291, 419 N.E.2d
1262 (3d Dist. 1981); People v. Beyak, 72 Ill. App. 3d 690, 391 N.E.2d 96 (1st Dist. 1979).
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highly relevant and probative insight into the defendant's criminal propen-
sities and amenability to rehabilitation. It also has the added virtue of being
a somewhat objective measure of these tendencies. 758 Thus, a defendant's
criminal history is an exceptionally valuable way to begin to bring some
sense of order and proportionality out of current sentencing practices. 5 9
Cases interpreting the use of criminal history as an aggravating factor,
however, have not focused on its utility in fashioning a fairer and more
rational sentencing system. Instead, their virtually exclusive concern has been
with issues regarding the proper definition of "a history of prior delinquency
or criminal activity" under the Act. No efforts have been undertaken to
quantify the effects of any given prior record on a defendant's sentence.
Indeed, the judicial tendency has been to deny that any quantification is
appropriate.
Two broad issues have been raised concerning the interpretation of this
aggravating factor. The first is whether a prior history of delinquency or
criminal activity is limited to those acts occurring before the instant crime
was committed or whether it includes all crimes committed before sentence
is imposed. The second issue is whether anything short of a conviction may
constitute criminal activity. Each of these issues is discussed below. 760
758. The use of the defendant's prior record is only "somewhat" objective because of
distortions in both the number and nature of the convictions arising from the plea bargaining
process. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 645-51.
759. The proposed sentencing guidelines place great weight on this factor. See Appendix to
text, § 1, at 396-97; Chart 4, at 405. The presence of either exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior, or serious harm are other factors that are very significant. See infra notes 850-52
and accompanying text; Appendix to text, § 2a(l), (2), at 397-401; Chart 4, at 405.
760. A number of cases have arisen in which a defendant's sentence has been enhanced based
on a "history of prior delinquency or criminal activity" that consisted either exclusively or
primarily of adjudications of delinquency. See, e.g., People v. Doris, 110 11. App. 3d 660,
667, 442 N.E.2d 951, 957 (4th Dist. 1982) (five-year sentence for burglary affirmed where
defendant was adjudicated a delinquent on four different counts of burglary and had convictions
of felony theft and attempted burglary); People v. Tate, 106 Il1. App. 3d 774, 779, 436 N.E.2d
272, 276 (4th Dist. 1982) (sentences of five and 20 years for aggravated battery and home
invasion upheld where defendant had several adjudication of delinquency for burglary); People
v. Bryant, 79 I1. App. 3d 501, 504, 398 N.E.2d 941, 945 (3d Dist. 1979) (five-year sentence
for burglary affirmed, in part because of defendant's extensive juvenile record). While such
enhancements are clearly permitted under the Act, the question arises whether such acts of
delinquency should weigh as heavily with the sentencing court as would the comparable felonies
committed by an adult.
This article takes the position that sentence enhancements based on acts of delinquency
should take the youth and immaturity of many juvenile offenders into consideration by weighting
acts of delinquency less heavily than comparable felonies committed by adults. See infra text
accompanying notes 819-26. Admittedly, juveniles are entitled to the special solicitude available
under the Juvenile Court Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-1 to 708-4 (1983). Nonetheless,
when an offender with a serious juvenile record has shown that rehabilitative efforts have
failed, it is entirely consistent with public policy to allow prior acts of delinquency to aggravate
a regular term sentence.
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a. The Meaning of "Prior"
There is a divergence of opinion as to whether a defendant's acts of
delinquency or criminal activity that occurred after commission of the instant
crime but before sentencing may be considered as a "prior history" for
sentencing purposes. 6 ' For two reasons, the better rule would be to permit
consideration of all properly established 762 acts of delinquency or criminal
activity occurring prior to sentencing.
763
First, the rate of progress of criminal cases through the judicial system is
due to a variety of factors, not the least of which is the defendant's attitude
toward the speedy resolution of the case.7 6 Consequently, a rule allowing
consideration of only pre-offense criminal activities for sentencing purposes
would encourage an adroit defendant to advance the progress of the case
concerning the more recent crime and to delay disposition of the case
concerning the earlier offense. Even if convictions eventually resulted in both
cases, a defendant who succeeded in being sentenced first on the later crime
would be able to artificially prevent both of his or her sentences from being
enhanced by a "prior" history of criminal activity.
There is a second reason why post-crime, presentence offenses should be
available for sentence enhancement. These more recent crimes are an even
761. Compare People v. Owen, 102 111. 2d 88, 110-12, 464 N.E.2d 261, 271-72 (1984) (court
properly received evidence of defendant's post-offense attempts to escape custody and to assist
another inmate to do so), and People v. Bankhead, 123 I11. App. 3d 137, 138-39, 462 N.E.2d
899, 900-01 (4th Dist. 1984) (sentence for felony theft may be enhanced due to fact that
defendant subsequently was convicted for burglary) with People v. Kline, 92 I11. 2d 490, 493,
442 N.E.2d 154, 162 (1982) (sentencing judge refused to consider other convictions for offenses
committed in interim between the offense and conviction at bar to enhance defendant's sentence
for murder; supreme court affirmed).
762. The "properly established" qualifier is the result of a procedure followed in numerous
cases where other alleged victims of the defendant testified at the sentencing hearing concerning
other crimes the defendant supposedly committed, the court then considering those matters to
determine the sentence. This practice has been approved repeatedly by the supreme court. See,
e.g., People v. Owens, 102 Ill. 2d 88, 464 N.E.2d 261 (1984) (death penalty case); People v.
La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1982) (natural life sentence). This article, however,
recommends that this practice be sharply curtailed and subjected to additional constraints. See
infra notes 783-88 and accompanying text.
763. This was the rule prior to passage of the Act. See People v. Dukett, 56 Ill. 2d 432,
452, 308 N.E.2d 590, 601, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965 (1974); People v. Eisner, 27 Ill. App. 3d
957, 960-61, 327 N.E.2d 592, 594-95 (4th Dist. 1975).
764. Statutory provisions guarantee a trial within 120 days if the accused is in custody, and
160 days if the accused is at large on bail or recognizance. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-
5(a), (b) (1983). It is an open secret, however, that the average time elapsing from arrest to
disposition in major metropolitan jurisdictions, specifically Cook County, far exceeds those
figures, despite the fact that the discharge of defendants for failure to meet the statutory
timetables is a rare occurrence. There are two reasons why such discharges are a rarity. First,
defendants who are at large on bail must demand trial before the 160-day period begins to run.
Id. § 103-5(b). Few do so. Second, both the 120-day and 160-day periods are tolled by
continuances of the proceedings that are either sought or agreed to by the defendant. See id.
§§ 103-5(a), (b), 114-4. Such continuances are a very common occurrence.
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more reliable indicator of the defendant's criminal propensities and amen-
ability to rehabilitation than older offenses would be. Thus, the use of post-
crime, presentence criminal activity for sentence enhancement is particularly
appropriate. For both of these reasons, then, a construction of the Act
precluding their consideration should not be adopted.
b. The Meaning of "Criminal Activity"
The principal issue regarding the phrase "criminal activity" has been
whether it embraces any conduct short of an actual criminal conviction. A
strong case can be made for the proposition that it does. In several places
the Act requires conviction of particular offenses before certain sentences
can be imposed. 65 Consequently, the fact that the criminal history aggra-
vating factor does not explicitly require convictions indicates that some lesser
quantum of proof of a defendant's prior criminal activity should suffice. 766
Crossing that hurdle, however, does not dispose of what particular indicia
of criminal conduct should be considered "criminal activity" for sentence
enhancement. Many pre-Act cases recognized that a sentence should not be
increased on the basis of activities that the defendant was only suspected of
committing.7 67 Because one of the Act's principal purposes was to see that
defendants were treated fairly at sentencing, both procedurally and substan-
tively 7 68 the General Assembly's use of the more inclusive phrase "criminal
activity" should not be construed as intending to diminish the protections
extended to defendants by those earlier cases.
These precepts set the framework for analyzing the four general categories
of events or activities that have been included within the phrase "criminal
activity:" (1) arrests or charges not resulting in conviction; (2) offenses for
which the defendant's probation or parole was revoked; (3) testimony of
other crimes with which the defendant had not been charged; and (4)
acknowledged other crimes, typically illicit drug use, usually introduced by
the defendant in an effort to mitigate the sentence. The correctness of
utilizing each of these categories as a form of criminal activity is taken up
below.
765. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3298, 3298-99, 3311 (codified
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3(c)(2), 1005-5-3(c)(6), 1005-5-3.2(b)(1), 1005-8-4(a) (1983)).
766. The supreme court has taken this position in a number of cases. See, e.g., People v.
La Pointe, 88 II1. 2d 482, 498-99, 431 N.E.2d 344, 354 (1982); People v. Meeks, 81 111. 2d 524,
530-31, 411 N.E.2d 9, 14 (1980).
767. See, e.g., People v. Crews, 38 I11. 2d 331, 335-36, 231 N.E.2d 451, 454-55 (1967) (defen-
dant's murder sentence vacated because based in part on report of other serious miscon-
duct on defendant's part that he denied committing, and author of report did not testify; court
imposed obligation on sentencing judge to determine accuracy of such allegations and to avoid
being prejudiced by inflamatory but unreliable information in imposing sentence); People v.
Ramsey, 24 I11. App. 3d 1038, 1041, 322 N.E.2d 547, 549 (2d Dist. 1975) (described sentencing
as "affectling] substantial rights of a criminal accused to whom the fundamental rights of
due process are extended" and vacated sentence based in part on ex parte investigation of
defendant by sentencing judge).
768. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 640-42, 668-73.
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1. Mere Arrests or Charges.-Prior to the Act's passage, numerous cases
held that arrests or charges not resulting in convictions could be used to
deny an offender probation769 but not to increase a prison sentence. 770 Many
post-Act cases have confirmed these earlier opinions, insofar as they preclude
the use of arrests or charges to enhance prison terms.7 7 ' These newer decisions
are sound. Arrests or charges alone are not sufficiently reliable to serve as
a basis for sentence enhancement under the Act.
Unfortunately, several post-Act cases also have perpetuated the notion
that mere arrests can serve as a valid basis for denying probation. 772 These
cases have been decided erroneously. The pre-Act authorities on which they
are based involved statutes under which probation was either not available
773
or, if available, was not the preferred disposition.7 7 4 The Act's elevation of
probation to a preferred status 775 vitiates the underpinnings of those author-
ities. Probation is no longer a matter of judicial grace in Illinois; something
more than unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct should be required
before probation is withheld. 77
6
2. Criminal Activity Resulting in Parole or Probation Revocation.-But
what of a more substantially documented history of criminal activity, such
as a defendant's prior probation revocation for an alleged rape? 77 Assuming
that the defendant is later before the court on yet another charge, would it
769. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 36 Ill. App. 3d 476, 477, 344 N.E.2d 50, 52 (3d Dist. 1976);
People v. Young, 30 Il. App. 3d 176, 177, 332 N.E.2d 173, 174 (5th Dist. 1975); People v.
Taylor, 13 111. App. 3d 974, 975, 301 N.E.2d 319, 320 (4th Dist. 1973).
770. See, e.g., People v. Riley, 376 Ill. 364, 367, 33 N.E.2d 872, 874, cert. denied, 313 U.S.
586 (1941); People v. Gaines, 21 Ill. App. 3d 839, 846, 316 N.E.2d 14, 20 (lst Dist. 1974);
People v. Jackson, 95 Il1. App. 2d 193, 200, 238 N.E.2d 196, 199 (1st Dist. 1968).
771. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 100 Ill. App. 3d 901, 909, 427 N.E.2d 229, 234-35 (1st Dist.
1981) (by implication); People v. Jones, 86 11. App. 3d 253, 261, 408 N.E.2d 79, 86 (5th Dist.
1980); People v. Kennedy, 66 I1. App. 3d 35, 39, 383 N.E.2d 255, 258 (4th Dist. 1978).
772. See, e.g., People v. Tiess, 97 I11. App. 3d 45, 51-52, 421 N.E.2d 1059, 1063-64 (2d
Dist. 1981) (dicta) (sentence was viewed as justified by convictions alone); People v. Fritz, 77
Ill. App. 3d I, 6, 395 N.E.2d 736, 739 (2d Dist. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 84 Ill. 2d 72,
417 N.E.2d 612 (1981). Contra People v. Kennedy, 66 Ill. App. 3d 35, 39-40, 383 N.E.2d 255,
257-58 (4th Dist. 1978).
773. See People v. Brown, 392 Il1. 519, 522-23, 64 N.E.2d 739, 741 (1946); People v. Denning,
372 Ill. 549, 552, 25 N.E.2d 6, 7 (1939); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 785 (1939).
774. See People v. Waud, 69 Ill. 2d 588, 594-95, 373 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1977); People ex rel.
Ward v. Moran, 54 Il. 2d 552, 556, 301 N.E.2d 300, 302 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-6-1(a) (1975).
775. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
776. Rare cases arise in which a defendant acknowledges commission of crimes for which
the defendant has not been prosecuted. See, e.g., People v. Makes, 103 Il. App. 3d 232, 234-
35, 241, 431 N.E.2d 20, 22, 26-27 (2d Dist. 1981). It would seem to be proper to take such
acknowledged criminal activity into account. For a more detailed treatment of this subject, see
infra notes 789-96 and accompanying text.
777. Cf. People v. Devine, 101 Ill. App. 3d 158, 165-66, 427 N.E.2d 1277, 1283 (3d Dist.
1981) (in imposing current sentences for deviate sexual assault and indecent liberties with a
child, court may consider not only defendant's prior robbery conviction but also the fact that
defendant's probation for that offense was revoked for an alleged rape).
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be proper under the Act for the sentencing judge to include the rape in the
defendant's history of criminal activity? The better policy would be to allow
sentence enhancement on the basis of the alleged rape.778
Before probation could be revoked for the commission of an offense, the
state is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant has committed an offense. 779 This proceeding has many of the
attributes of a criminal trial, including the defendant's rights to counsel and
to call or cross-examine witnesses. 70 In such circumstances, a finding at the
revocation hearing that the defendant committed an offense should become
part of the defendant's criminal history for the purposes of sentencing in
future cases. The reliability of that finding is the same as that of any fact
determined in a civil case. Moreover, allowing a defendant's sentence to be
affected by a fact established by a preponderance of the evidence is consistent
with the Act, which uses that same standard of proof for all other aggravating
factors in noncapital cases.78' The defendant, having had a full and fair
opportunity to refute the charge at the revocation hearing, should not be
deemed unfairly treated if the charge is later used for sentence enhance-
ment.
7 2
3. Evidence of Other Crimes at Sentencing Hearings.-Quite a different
situation is presented, however, by the prevalent and approved practice of
allowing testimony of a defendant's other uncharged crimes to be introduced
778. It would be error, however, to view the defendant as "convicted" of rape for purposes
of utilizing any of the Act's sentencing provisions based on prior convictions. See supra note
765 and accompanying text.
779. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-4(c) (1983).
780. See id.
781. The presence of factors in aggravation need only be found by a preponderance of the
evidence. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 101 Ill. App. 3d 64, 74, 427 N.E.2d 820, 829 (lst Dist.
1981). The factors in aggravation necessary to trigger the death penalty, however, must be
found to be present beyond a reasonable doubt. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(0 (1983).
782. See People v. Devine, 101 I1. App. 3d 158, 165-66, 427 N.E.2d 1277, 1283 (3d Dist. 1981).
The discussion of probation revocation hearings raises the question whether sentencing
guidelines developed for initial sentences following conviction should be applied to sentences
imposed upon revocation of probation. Comparable guidelines developed for use in Pennsylvania
specifically exclude the latter type of sentences from their scope. 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 303-
I(f) (Shephard's 1982).
Notwithstanding the Pennsylvania position, however, it seems that sentencing guidelines
should apply to sentences imposed upon revocation of probation. It is not entirely clear,
however, the exact manner in which the guidelines should apply. Initially, it seems clear that
the starting point for determining what sentence to impose should be the guideline sentence for
incarceration that was the alternative to probation at the time of the initial sentencing, as "[tihe
sentence given [upon revocation of probation] must be imposed on the basis of the crime for
which [the] defendant was convicted" rather than on the basis of the crime for which parole
is being revoked. People v. Hoga, 109 Ill. App. 3d 258, 264, 440 N.E.2d 411, 415 (5th Dist.
1982); People v. Strickland, 24 Ill. App. 3d 560, 562-63, 321 N.E.2d 309, 311 (4th Dist. 1974).
The question remains, however, whether that original criminal history score should be adjusted
upward in any way by virtue of the established violation of probation. Three possible adjustments
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at a sentencing hearing." 3 The use of this testimony as evidence of "criminal
activity" should usually be disallowed because of fundamental unfairness to
the defendant. 74 Courts have condoned sentence enhancement based on
testimony of other crimes on the theory that the presence of a witness whom
the defendant may cross-examine makes such testimony a sufficiently reliable
way to establish the underlying criminal behavior. 785 This view, however,
does not give due consideration to all of the interests involved. An accused
should not be forced to refute these additional charges on a piecemeal basis.
Typically, the allegations of other crimes are entirely collateral to the issues
raised in the defendant's trial and, as such, they are difficult if not impossible
to rebut in the context of a sentencing hearing. 716 Unlike criminal activity
suggest themselves. The first would be to eliminate any reduction originally made in the
defendant's criminal history score based on the defendant's apparent but now discredited
amenability to rehabilitation. See infra notes 855-58 and accompanying text. The second would
be an upward adjustment (either one or two scoring points under the guidelines) for the violation
of probation itself. See infra notes 853-54 and accompanying text. The third would be a further
upward adjustment based on the nature of the activity forming the basis of the defendant's
probation violation.
Of these three possible adjustments, only the first two seem supported by existing decisions,
although arguably the third should be as well. The law appears to be well settled that a sentence
imposed after the revocation of probation "may not be supported by testimony of the acts
leading to revocation except as those acts reflect on defendant's potential for rehabilitation."
People v. Hoga, 109 Ill. App. 3d 258, 264, 440 N.E.2d 411, 415 (5th Dist. 1982). It is difficult
to believe, however, that sentencing judges are not in fact directly influenced by the nature of
the defendant's subsequent violation in their selection of an appropriate sentence, irrespective
of what the law may require; and it is not clear why they shouldn't be so influenced. Surely it
is fairer to allow a defendant's sentence to be affected by a finding of "criminal activity"
made in a probation revocation hearing on the original charge than it is to permit such matters
to be raised in a sentencing hearing as is presently done. See infra notes 783-88 and accompanying
text; Appendix to text, § Id, at 397.
783. See, e.g., People v. La Pointe, 88 111. 2d 482, 497, 431 N.E.2d 344, 346-47 (1981)
(testimony that defendant had participated in an unrelated burglary and had attempted to have
drugs smuggled to him while in jail awaiting trial); People v. Alexander, 118 Ill. App. 3d 33,
37-38, 454 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1st Dist. 1983) (evidence of other armed robbery supposedly
committed by defendant); People v. Perez, 101 I11. App. 3d 64, 67, 427 N.E.2d 820, 824 (1st
Dist. 1981) (two women testified that defendant raped them some years prior to the offense at
bar).
784. Normally, of course, allegations of other criminal activity would be the subject of
separate trials in which the state would be required to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Allowing such matters to be established and used at sentencing for a different
offense circumvents both of those safeguards. Moreover, it does so in a setting which is most
likely to be prejudicial to the defendant-soon after a determination that the defendant is guilty
of another crime. This, of course, heightens the likelihood that the defendant's supposed "other
victims" will be believed.
785. See, e.g., People v. Hoga, 109 II1. App. 3d 258, 264, 440 N.E.2d 411, 415 (5th Dist.
1982) (if such evidence is "relevant to a determination of a proper sentence, if it appears
trustworthy and if defendant is afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, it is
admissible").
786. Occasionally, however, the "other crimes" will be closely related to the crimes for which
sentence is then being imposed. See People v. Woods, 122 Ill. App. 3d 176, 179, 460 N.E.2d
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established through convictions or revocation hearings, evidence of other
crimes presented at the sentencing hearing has never been tested in an
adversary setting in which it was the principal focus and in which the
defendant had a full and fair opportunity to refute it.787 Protecting the rights
of defendants at sentencing would seem to require that such an opportunity
have been extended before allegations of criminal conduct can rise to the
level of criminal activity for sentencing purposes.
7
1
4. Defendants' Admitted Criminal Activity.-The final type of conduct
that has been labelled criminal activity without a conviction differs from the
other three because its reliability is not at issue. Rather, this conduct-most
typically the protracted use of illicit drugs-is openly acknowledged by the
defendant who offers it as a mitigating factor. 78 9 The question then arises
as to whether the use of illegal drugs, which literally falls within the ambit
of the statute as a factor in aggravation, should nonetheless not be treated as
"criminal activity."
880, 883 (1st Dist. 1984) (court may consider that defendant tried to put out contract against
complaining witness in rape case after he was apprehended); People v. Ely, 107 I11. App. 3d
102, 105, 437 N.E.2d 353, 356 (4th Dist. 1982) (proper to consider that defendant sexually
assaulted one victim of armed robbery, even though defendant was not charged with a crime
growing out of that conduct).
Confronting a defendant with allegations of misconduct directly related to the case at bar is
less prejudicial to the defendant and highly probative of his or her rehabilitative potential.
Consequently, the proposed sentencing guidelines would allow the use of such conduct to
aggravate a defendant's sentence as a form of serious harm or as a form of exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior. See Appendix to text, § 2a(l)(a)(l)-(8), at 397-400; § 2a(2)(a)(l)-(4),
at 400.
787. The fact that the complaining witness is available for cross-examination is frequently
of little value to a defendant. The defendant will have no real opportunity to effectively
investigate the circumstances of the alleged other offense. The defendant will be severely
hampered in uncovering possible defects in the witness' perception or recollection. Also, the
defendant will be hindered in exposing possible bias on the part of the witness, not an unrealistic
possibility in cases where the witness was a former cellmate or alleged confederate of the
defendant. Finally, the defendant will be deprived of any opportunity to present an effective
defense being left, at best, with his or her own naked denial of events-a denial unlikely to be
persuasive in the context in which it is being made.
788. One possible alternative to outright abolition of the informal use of other offenses at
sentencing would be to devise a procedure by which the defendant could plea bargain to permit
such use in return for a guarantee that the defendant could not be prosecuted for those crimes.
Such a procedure is currently followed in a number of states. The Texas procedure provides in
pertinent part:
Sec. 12.45 Admission of Unadjudicated Offense (a) A person may, with the consent
of the attorney for the state, admit during the sentencing hearing his guilt of one or
more unadjudicated offenses and request the court to take each into account in
determining sentence for the offense or offenses of which he stands adjudged
guilty .... (c) If a court lawfully takes into account an admitted offense, prosecu-
tion is barred for that offense.
TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.45 (Vernon Supp. 1985). The use of this procedure is fairly
widespread in Texas.
789. See, e.g., People v. La Pointe, 88 I1. 2d 482, 490, 431 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1981)
(defendant offered extensive use of illicit drugs in mitigation); People v. Hammock, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 34, 40-41, 385 N.E.2d 796, 801-02 (5th Dist. 1979) (history of both alcohol and drug
abuse offered in mitigation).
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Since the Act's passage, the courts have been hopelessly inconsistent in
treating this issue. At one extreme are cases in which the court viewed the
defendant's confessed drug use as a mitigating circumstance of considerable
weight."' At the other extreme is People v. La Pointe,79  in which the
supreme court affirmed a finding that the defendant's acknowledged and
extensive drug abuse was sufficient to establish a significant history of prior
criminal activity that made any leniency in sentencing inappropriate.7 92 Ar-
rayed between those positions are cases concluding that, while illegal drug use
should not be viewed as criminal activity, it also should not necessarily
entitle the defendant to any significant mitigation of a sentence for a repulsive
crime.
793
While illicit drug use falls within the literal definition of criminal activity,
the proper approach to its treatment as a factor in aggravation is not entirely
clear. Prior to the effective date of the Act, histories of either drug or
alcohol abuse were frequently given considerable weight in mitigation of the
sentence to be imposed.7 9 4 There is no evidence that the General Assembly
intended to alter this treatment of alcohol and drug dependency in sentencing
through its creation of prior criminal activity as an aggravating factor. No
case has suggested otherwise. 795 Perhaps in tacit recognition of that fact, the
790. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 110 I11. App. 3d 286, 290, 442 N.E.2d 294, 296-97 (2d Dist.
1982) (defendant received only maximum regular term sentence for felony theft, despite having
prior record of convictions for 10 thefts, four burglaries and one attempted murder, because
"defendant admits to a long and extensive history of drug abuse."); People v. Kosanovich, 69
I11. App. 3d 748, 751-52, 387 N.E.2d 1061, 1063-64 (1st Dist. 1979) (vacating indeterminate 10
to 15 year sentence for armed robbery as excessive, where defendant was heroin addict and
mentally unstable); People v. Hammock, 68 111. App. 3d 34, 43, 385 N.E.2d 796, 803 (5th Dist.
1979) (reduced indeterminate sentence of six to 18 years for voluntary manslaughter to three
to nine years because trial judge had abused his discretion in treating defendant's history of
drug abuse as a form of criminal activity).
791. 88 I11. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1982).
792. Id. at 493, 431 N.E.2d at 349.
793. See People v. Hoyer, 100 Ill. App. 3d 418, 422-23, 426 N.E.2d 1139, 1141-42 (2d Dist.
1981) (25-year sentence imposed on defendant for armed robbery affirmed, despite claim by
defendant that he had been under influence of LSD at time of crime; defendant had killed
victim, but was not charged with that crime); People v. Bartik, 94 I11. App. 3d 696, 701-02,
418 N.E.2d 1108, 1112-13 (2d Dist. 1981) (refusing to further reduce defendant's natural life
sentence for brutal murder, despite defendant's long-time abuse of alcohol and drugs; state had
sought death penalty but jury had not found the absence of sufficient mitigating circumstances
to preclude its imposition).
794. See, e.g., People v. Walcher, 42 I11. 2d 159, 166, 246 N.E.2d 256, 260-61 (1969)
(sentence of death for murder reduced to indeterminate term of 40 to 65 years; defendant was
alcoholic); People v. Crews, 42 III. 2d 60, 66, 244 N.E.2d 593, 595-96 (1969) (death sentence
for murder reduced to indeterminate term of 20 to 35 years; defendant had no prior record
and was abusing amphetamines at time of crime).
795. Cases that have mitigated sentences on the basis of drug use or drug addiction have
not alluded to the presence of the aggravating factor of prior criminal activity as affecting
prior law in any way.
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overwhelming majority of post-Act cases have continued this sympathetic-
to-neutral treatment of drug abuse.796
Consequently, La Pointe's inclusion of drug use as a form of criminal
activity meriting sentence aggravation draws no support from the Act itself.
Moreover, La Pointe's approach seems inconsistent with the Act's broader
sentencing objectives. Imposing a more severe sentence merely because of
the defendant's drug abuse could very well have anomalous consequences,
such as punishing a murderer whose crime was induced by drugs more
severely than a completely cold-blooded killer. Hopefully the La Pointe
perspective on this matter will not gain currency.
c. Quantifying the Aggravating Effect
The Act required that a defendant's prior history of delinquency or
criminal activity be given weight in favor of a regular term prison sentence
rather than probation,7 97 and it permitted such a history to justify imposing
a longer regular term sentence.7 98 The Act did not, however, explicitly
quantify the effect that any given criminal or delinquent act should have on
an offender's sentence. While both the supreme court and the Criminal
Sentencing Commission (CSC) are authorized to promulgate guidelines on
that subject,7 99 neither has elected to do so.
As might be expected in the absence of such guidelines, no discernible
pattern of weighing histories of delinquency or criminal activity has emerged.
Indeed, no real attention has been paid to the issue. Instead, with rare
exceptions,"' appellate courts have viewed any such history as sufficient to
justify whatever sentence the trial court imposed.90' The Act's preference for
796. See cases cited supra notes 790, 793.
797. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 111. Laws 3264, 3301 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(3) (1983)). -
798. See id. A sufficiently aggravated prior criminal history also may serve as a reason to
impose an extended term sentence. See Pub. Act. No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3301-
02 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(1) (1983).
799. See Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3302, 3315 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-4.2, 1005-10-2(6) (1983)).
800. See, e.g., People v. Frey, 126 Ill. App. 3d 484, 487-89, 467 N.E.2d 302, 304-05 (5th
Dist. 1984) (imposition of ll-year sentence for burglary based on single prior conviction for
burglary vacated as abuse of discretion); People v. Hobbs, 90 Ill. App. 3d 587, 589-90, 413
N.E.2d 454, 456-57 (4th Dist. 1980) (six-year sentence imposed for stealing five bottles of
whiskey reversed as abuse of discretion, despite defendant's lengthy prior record of minor
offenses).
801. See, e.g., People v. Brooks, 124 Il1. App. 3d 222, 228, 463 N.E.2d 1326, 1331 (3d
Dist. 1984) (24-year sentence for garden variety armed robbery summarily affirmed without
discussion of prior record); People v. Baker, 114 Ill. App. 3d 803, 812, 448 N.E.2d 631, 637-
38 (2d Dist. 1983) (14-year sentence for burglary affirmed based on defendant's "lengthy history
of delinquency and criminal activity" which included one prior burglary conviction); People v.
Robinson, 68 Ill. App. 3d 687, 693, 386 N.E.2d 165, 170 (4th Dist. 1980) (10 to 30 year sentence
for armed robbery based on otherwise unaggravated retaking of gambling losses to which
defendant believed himself entitled affirmed, based on prior convictions for arson and misde-
meanor theft).
[Vol. 34:241
19851 ILLINOIS' DETERMINATE SENTENCING
shorter regular term sentences 0 2 and its broader considerations of consist-
ency, fairness, and proportionality803 have apparently gone unnoticed.
Some degree of standardization of this aggravating factor is clearly desir-
able. While it should not be of controlling importance in every case, s°4 a
great deal of undue sentencing disparity would probably be eliminated if a
weighting system were devised that suggested the proper effect of various
criminal histories on the minimal sentence for which the offender is eligible.
Guideline "grids" have already been developed in Minnesota and Pennsyl-
vania.80 5 A grid for Illinois is proposed in the Appendix. The principal
considerations pertinent to its construction are outlined in the next section.
VI. A PROPOSED SENTENCING GUIDELINE SYSTEM
A. General Characteristics
In structuring a fair, proportional sentencing guideline system, four steps
are necessary, each of which in turn generates a myriad of complexities.
802. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. There are a large number of cases in
which defendants with either no prior records or only very minor records have received sentences
well above the statutory minimum. Some of these cases can be explained in part as involving
exceptionally aggravated versions of the offenses charged. See cases discussed supra notes 665-
69 and accompanying text. Others involve crimes accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior. See cases discussed supra note 497 and accompanying text. Still other cases involve
defendants whose first serious conviction implicates them in a large number of crimes. See,
e.g., People v. Dawson, 116 I11. App. 3d 672, 675-76, 452 N.E.2d 385, 387 (4th Dist. 1983)
(defendant, an adult, headed a juvenile burglary ring, and was convicted of three counts of
residential burglary, four counts of burglary, and two counts of felony theft growing out of
his first serious brush with the law).
Many cases, however, appear entirely innocuous. See, e.g., People v. Cortes, 123 Ill. App.
3d 816, 822, 463 N.E.2d 885, 889 (lst Dist. 1984) (15-year sentences for delivery of heroin
affirmed; one prior misdemeanor conviction; defendant sentenced in absentia); People v.
Brownstein, 105 I11. App. 3d 459, 466, 434 N.E.2d 505, 510 (lst Dist. 1982) (sentences well
above minima for possession of cocaine, codeine, and marijuana affirmed; defendant had no
prior record).
803. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 686-91. There are many cases in which a defendant's
aggravated prior record has resulted in a longer regular term sentence as the Act intended.
See, e.g, People v. Jenkins, 128 I11. App. 3d 853, 858, 471 N.E.2d 647, 649-51 (1st Dist. 1984)
(concurrent 20-year sentences for rape, deviate sexual assault and a variety of other crimes
affirmed where defendant had severely abused victim and also had "numerous arrests and
several convictions for violent crimes beginning in 1959"); People v. Alexander, 127 Ill. App.
3d 1007, 1008-09, 1018-19, 470 N.E.2d 1071, 1073-74, 1979-80 (1st Dist. 1984) (concurrent
sentences of 30 years for rape and 15 years for indecent liberties with a child affirmed where
defendant had repeatedly sexually assaulted 13-year-old stepdaughter; defendant's prior record
included multiple convictions for robbery, burglary and theft). Even more aggravated records,
however, have resulted in only regular term sentences. See, e.g., People v. Akins, 128 Ill. App.
3d 1009, 1016, 471 N.E.2d 1003, 1007-08 (4th Dist. 1984) (25-year sentence for unaggravated
armed robbery affirmed where defendant had prior convictions for attempted theft, robbery,
aggravated battery and murder); see supra notes 364-89, 532-40 and accompanying text.
804. For the factors in mitigation and aggravation that would alter the effect of a defendant's
prior record, see Appendix to text, § 2, at 397-404, and infra notes 850-68 and accompanying text.
805. See MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app. (West Supp. 1984); 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 303.1-303.9 (Shephard's 1982).
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First, all existing offenses must be classified according to their severity.
Thereafter, numbered values must be assigned to adjudications of delin-
quency and criminal convictions. The sum of these values would comprise
a defendant's initial criminal history score. Next, adjustments to that initial
score due to factors in mitigation or aggravation, or perhaps as an accom-
modation to plea bargaining, must be made. Finally, presumptive types and
lengths of sentences for each combination of crime and adjusted criminal
history score must be constructed.
Apart from these issues related to sentence severity, the proposed system
also must address the limits to be placed on judicial discretion. Questions
to be answered include whether the proposed ranges should be mandatory
or presumptive, what conditions should be met before a sentencing judge
may depart from the appropriate range, and what checks should be imposed
on the appellate review of sentencing decisions. The guidelines proposed here
take the position that judicial discretion should be built into the guideline
system so that it remains flexible, as long as satisfactory assurances of
accountability can be obtained. Even with that additional flexibility, the
guidelines' scores and ranges should provide a sentencing system that is
much more consistent and fair than current sentencing practices.
B. Characteristics Relating to Sentence Length
1. Offense Classification
Prior to its adoption of a sentencing guideline system, Pennsylvania had
a misdemeanor and felony classification system similar to that of Illinois.
80 6
In order to create a more satisfactory basis of offense classification for
sentencing purposes, Pennsylvania broke down its felony classes into a
considerably larger number of categories. 07 A number of offenses that had
been treated very similarly for sentencing purposes were classified quite
differently under the sentencing guidelines eventually adopted. 808
Illinois should reclassify its felonies in a similar fashion. When the current
misdemeanor and felony classification system was enacted in 1972 as part
of the Code, the General Assembly deliberately avoided a systematic ex-
amination of the grading and relative severity of offenses. 809 Likewise, the
drafters of the Act deliberately side-stepped this task.810 Since the Act's
806. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 106 (Purdon Supp. 1974-1982).
807. See 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 303.8 (Shepard's 1982) (creating a total of 10 offense
classification categories out of three felony classes).
808. For example, different felonies, all classified as class 2, received offense gravity scores
on a l0 point scale of 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. See id.
809. See McAnany, Merritt & Tromanhauser, Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time": An Analysis
of the Impact of the Justice Model, 52 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 621, 661 & n.224 (1976).
810. The Act's only change in this regard was the creation of class X offenses. See Pub. Act
No. 80-1099, § I, 1977 II1. Laws 3264, 3265 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 10-2,
11-1, 11-3, 12-4.1, 18-2, 20-1.1, 30-1, 33A-1, 33A-2, 33A-3 (1983); id. ch. 56-1/2, §§ 1401, 1405).
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passage, there have been a variety of piecemeal changes in felony
classifications"' but no comprehensive review. To enact a comprehensive
guideline system, a careful ranking of criminal offenses must be undertaken.
Although a comprehensive reclassification of all criminal offenses is be-
yond the scope of this article, it is possible to illustrate some of the problems
arising under Illinois' present classification system. First, based on the
number of cases in which courts have been troubled by the sentences they
are required to impose, certain drug offenses,8 2 residential burglary," 3 armed
robbery,81 4 and armed violence"1 5 seem to be too severely classified. Aggra-
vated assault, on the other hand, may be classified too leniently because
judges seem to impose longer prison sentences more frequently for that
811. See supra notes 116, 117, 500.
812. For cases involving judicial efforts to avoid imposing severe sentences for drug offenses,
see People ex rel. Daley v. Schreier, 92 Ill. 2d 271, 275, 442 N.E.2d 185, 187 (1982) (overturning
grant of new trial by judge who originally found defendants guilty of class X felony in mistaken
belief that he could impose sentence for lesser class 2 felony); People ex rel. Daley v. Limperis,
86 Il. 2d 459, 466, 427 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1981) (criticizing trial court for imposing probation
on defendant unjustifiably found guilty of class 2 felony rather that class X felony, but
upholding sentence as a form of unappealable error; parties had stipulated to amount of drug
involved and that amount made offense a class X felony).
813. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 19-3(a) (1983). For cases reluctantly deferring to the
legislature's setting mandatory four-year minimum sentences for this offense, see People v.
Berry, 123 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1047, 463 N.E.2d 1044, 1048-49 (4th Dist. 1984); People v.
Gomer, 120 Ill. App. 3d 545, 547-49, 458 N.E.2d 565, 566-68 (3d Dist. 1984).
814. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 18-2(a), 1005-5-3(c)(2)(c) (1983). In one case, for example,
an appellate court reduced an armed robbery conviction to robbery because it was dissatisfied
with the imposition of a class X sentence. See People v. Coleman, 78 Ill. App. 3d 989, 992-
94, 398 N.E.2d 185, 186-88 (3d Dist. 1979) (appellate court reduced conviction to robbery
because of dissatisfaction with imposing class X penalty). It should be noted that there appears
to be a widespread reluctance to impose severe penalties even on recidivist armed robbers. See
supra note 376 and accompanying text.
815. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 33A-1, 33A-2 (1983). The Act's armed violence provisions
have been a persistent source of sentencing anomalies, although many of them have been
corrected by an activist supreme court. Those provisions convert "any felony" committed while
armed with a category I weapon (a firearm or other particularly dangerous weapon) into a
class X felony. Pub. Act No. 80-1099, § 3, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264, 3268 (codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 33A (1983)).
One area in which those provisions were particularly disruptive of efforts to achieve an
orderly grading of offenses and proportionate imposition of sentences was homicides. See
People v. Fernetti, 117 Ill. App. 3d 44, 452 N.E.2d 790 (3d Dist. 1983) (a charge of armed
violence used to supplement involuntary manslaughter), rev'd, 104 Ill. 2d 19, 470 N.E.2d 501
(1984); People v. Pitt, 106 Ill. App. 3d 117, 435 N.E.2d 801 (5th Dist. 1982) (a charge of
armed violence used to supplement voluntary manslaughter). This practice gave broad discretion
to prosecutors to convert most homicides into at least class X felonies. Fortunately, it appears
to have been ended by the supreme court's recent decisions in People v. Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d 502,
506-13, 455 N.E.2d 48, 49-52 (1983), which held that the "any felony" referred to in the armed
violence statute did not include voluntary manslaughter, and People v. Fernetti, 104 IIl. 2d 19,
23-24, 470 N.E.2d 501, 502-03 (1984), which reached the same conclusion with respect to
involuntary manslaughter. In the meantime, however, a considerable number of prosecutions
and convictions had occurred under the pre-Alejos precedent. Apparently, the number of such
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offense than for other offenses of the same felony class.8 16 Finally, the
severity of various offenses involving breaches of public duty or public
trust"1 7 probably should be increased as well.""
A more rational ranking of offenses is certainly needed. Nevertheless, even
under Illinois' present offense classifications, a consistent weighting of crimes
will result in greater fairness and consistency in sentencing. The next section
discusses the principal concerns in devising such a system.
2. Scoring Prior Delinquency or Criminal Activity
In fashioning the principles for scoring a defendant's prior delinquency
or criminal activity, three important issues must be addressed. First, should
adjudication of delinquency be treated as severely as prior criminal convic-
tions? Second, how should prior crimes growing out of the same transaction
or occurrence be scored? Finally, how much weight should be given to prior
misdemeanor or felony convictions? Each of these questions is discussed
below.
cases is no greater only because of instances of jury lenity. See People v. Sims, 124 111. App.
3d 739, 742-45, 464 N.E.2d 1252, 1255-56 (1st Dist. 1984) (defendant convicted of voluntary
manslaughter but acquitted of armed violence based on voluntary manslaughter).
Yet, the supreme court's decisions in Alejos and Fernetti did not reach the pervasive and
capricious use of the armed violence statute to greatly increase the severity of otherwise
unexceptional crimes. See, e.g., People v. Lenoir, 125 Ill. App. 3d 260, 266-67, 465 N.E.2d
1027, 1031-32 (4th Dist. 1984) (defendant's drug possession offenses allowed to serve as predicate
crimes for armed violence because, when awakened from bed and arrested, there was a gun on
the nightstand beside him); People v. Paden, 123 Ill. App. 3d 514, 516-20, 462 N.E.2d 989,
991-94 (2d Dist. 1984) (defendant's conviction for attempted armed robbery allowed to serve
as predicate offense for armed violence, over contention that General Assembly's policy of
punishing such attempts less severely than the completed crime would be thwarted by such an
approach). As to the Paden issue, however, the supreme court has recently acted to cure some
such abuses by its decision in People v. Del Percio, 105 Ill. 2d 372, 475 N.E.2d 528 (1985).
In Del Percio, the supreme court concluded that once an offense has been enhanced by the
presence of a category I weapon, that offense could not also serve as a predicate offense for
an armed violence charge. Id. at 377, 475 N.E.2d at 530-31. Thus, cases such as Paden are
no longer good law.
In view of these sorts of anomalies, the sentencing guidelines proposed in the appendix to
this article abolish the present automatic upgrading of all offenses to class X felonies if
committed while armed with a category I weapon. Instead, the use of a category I weapon is
a factor in aggravation in sentencing, with the weight given to the factor dependant upon a
variety of other circumstances. See Appendix to text, § 2a(l)(a)(2), (3), at 398; § 2a(l)(b)(I),
(5), at 399.
816. See 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290 (from 90 to 13076 of all persons
sentenced to prison for aggravated battery in the 1978-82 period received extended terms). Il-
linois' aggravated battery statute is codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-2 (1983).
817. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33-1(d), (3) (1983) (receipt and solicitation of bribes
by public officials); id. § 33-3 (official misconduct).
818. Such an approach is necessary to accommodate People v. Warwick, 123 Il. App. 3d
692, 696-98, 463 N.E.2d 206, 209-10 (2d Dist. 1984), which concluded that the Act's regular
term factors in aggravation that are most directly applicable to such offenses, may not be used
to routinely enhance sentences for those crimes. See supra note 639.
ILLINOIS' DETERMINATE SENTENCING
a. Prior Delinquency
Minnesota and Pennsylvania have taken very different positions on weigh-
ing an adult offender's prior adjudications of delinquency. Minnesota gives
substantially less weight to criminal activity resulting in delinquency adju-
dications than to comparable activities undertaken by adults. Minnesota's
sentencing guidelines score only those delinquency adjudications based on
felonies committed after the juvenile attained the age of sixteen. s19 Those
guidelines also sharply limit the effect that a history of delinquency can have
on a defendant's criminal history score by weighing countable adjudications
only one-half as heavily as their adult felony counterparts.8 20 Moreover,
Minnesota's system places a maximum weight on a defendant's juvenile
record equivalent to that of one adult felony conviction. 2' Pennsylvania, on
the other hand, has treated delinquency adjudications based on felonies very
much like adult felony convictions. Pennsylvania's sentencing guidelines score
all felony-based delinquency adjudications made on or after the defendant
attained the age of fourteen the same as their adult felony counterparts,
without any special ceiling.8 22
Both of these systems somewhat miss the mark. The Minnesota approach
is designed to avoid magnifying the adverse consequences of youthful indis-
cretions on adult offenders. Nevertheless, given the range of maturity and
commitment to criminality that juveniles can exhibit, 823 as well as the breadth
of conduct that can be embraced by a finding of delinquency,8 24 a greater
degree of flexibility seems desirable. The Pennsylvania approach, however,
seems to go too far in the other direction by treating most delinquents as if
they were hardened criminals.
The best approach involves features of both the Minnesota and Pennsyl-
vania guidelines. More specifically, Minnesota's half-weight scoring system
should be adopted in combination with the no-maximum feature of the
Pennsylvania law. This would allow sufficiently aggravated juvenile records
to have a significant impact on adult sentencing decisions, while isolated
minor acts of delinquency would not have a great influence. As a further
819. See MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app., § 11. B.4.c (West Supp. 1984).
820. See id. § II. B.4.
821. See id.
822. See 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 303.7(b)(ii) (Shepard's 1982).
823. See, e.g., People v. Doris, 110 Ill. App. 3d 660, 667, 442 N.E.2d 951, 957 (4th Dist.
1982) (defendant had four separate adjudications of delinquency for burglary); People v.
Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 383, 385 N.E.2d 848, 850 (4th Dist. 1979) (defendant, while still
a juvenile, convicted of cold-blooded double murder and suspected of committing other hom-
icides).
824. Until recently, any act that would constitute criminal offenses if committed by adults
could be treated instead as merely an act of delinquency. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-2,
702-7 (1981). In recent years, this discretion has been restricted somewhat by the General
Assembly. See id. ch. 37, § 702-7(6)(a) (West. Supp. 1984-85) (requiring that juveniles over the
age of 15 accused of committing murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault or armed robbery
with a firearm be tried as an adult).
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protection against undue sentence enhancement stemming from crimes com-
mitted by very young offenders, only those delinquency adjudication inci-
dents occurring on or after a juvenile attained the age of fifteen would be
scored. 2 This age limit splits the difference between the Pennsylvania and
Minnesota standards. Fifteen is also the age at which certain offenders are
automatically tried as adults under Illinois' Juvenile Court Act.126 Thus, a
cut-off at age fifteen is consistent with the General Assembly's judgment
that juveniles attaining that age are properly held to a greater measure of
responsibility for their actions.
b. Crimes Arising from a Single Transaction or Occurrence
Differences in the charging or plea bargaining policies of prosecutors in
connection with a prior criminal episode could generate substantial disparities
in the criminal history scores of offenders whose prior criminal activities
were quite similar. Therefore, a sentencing guideline system must resolve the
issues of which prior convictions should be merged for scoring purposes and
how the merged convictions should be weighed. Minnesota'a sentencing
guideline system treats as a single felony all prior felony convictions that
grew out of a single course of conduct in which only one victim was
involved.8 27 In cases involving multiple victims a maximum of two prior
felonies may be scored.8 28 Pennsylvania has addressed this issue by providing
that convictions for all offenses "arising out of the same criminal transac-
tion" be scored as a single conviction for the most serious offense involved. 29
The approach advocated for Illinois is to assign such multiple crimes a
score for the most serious prior felony conviction resulting from a single
transaction or occurrence, or from a single indictment or information,
whichever is more beneficial to the defendant. 38 A higher criminal history
score could attach, however, if a defendant's prior record included either
a conviction for murder or attempted murder, or a sentence83 ' for two or
more crimes growing out of a single transaction or occurrence, if each prior
crime and the current one involved the actual or attempted infliction of death
825. See Appendix to text, § lb, at 396.
826. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(6)(a) (1983).
827. See MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app., § II. B.1.a (West Supp. 1984).
828. See id. § Ii. B.I.b.
829. See 240 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 303.7(a) (Shepard's 1982).
830. Giving the defendant the benefit of the bargain is designed to discourage efforts to
manipulate a defendant's future criminal history score by the choice of offenses to be placed
in a particular indictment or information. It also serves certain administrative purposes.
831. The requirement that the defendant have been sentenced for both crimes is necessary
to prohibit a double enhancement for two offenses based on the same act, for example,
attempted murder and armed violence based on that attempted murder. Under existing law, a
defendant can only be sentenced for one of those crimes. See People v. Donaldson, 91 Ill. 2d
164, 170, 435 N.E.2d 477, 479-80 (1982).
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or serious bodily harm by the defendant. 3 ' This exception would single out
for rapidly escalating punishments those offenders who have shown a marked
propensity for life-threatening behavior."'
The merger rule proposed here is somewhat broader than similar rules
adopted elsewhere. For sentencing purposes, all of a defendant's criminal
conduct on a prior occasion should normally be counted as only one prior
conviction because the principal purpose of a criminal history score is to
assess recidivistic tendencies . 3 4 Committing multiple crimes within a single
criminal episode is only marginally relevant to a defendant's possible recid-
ivism.,35
The proposed system will also be easy to administer. In most cases, all
charges against a particular defendant growing out of the same prior trans-
action or occurrence will be tried together. Thus, it will be easy under the
proposal to determine what weight should be given to the prior convictions. 3 6
Moreover, the proposed merger rule will tend to minimize the effects of
idiosyncratic prosecutorial charging practices. By scoring all offenses growing
out of a single transaction or occurrence as a single offense, any exceptional
multiplication of charges or charging instruments by the prosecutor will be
discounted at sentencing.
832. See Appendix to text, § Ic, at 397. Two or more crimes arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence would include two or more distinct crimes involving one victim, see
People v. Myers, 85 Ill. 2d 281, 288-89, 426 N.E.2d 535, 537-38 (1981), or involving multiple
victims, People v. Bryant, 123 Ill. App. 3d 266, 268, 462 N.E.2d 780, 782 (lst Dist. 1984)
(double attempted murder); People v. Smrekar, 68 11. App. 3d 379, 383, 385 N.E.2d 848, 850
(4th Dist. 1979) (double murder).
833. An illustrative case for this scoring system would be the principal defendant in the
brutal armed robbery and sexual assaults in People v. Surges, 101 Il. App. 3d 962, 428 N.E.2d
1012 (1st Dist. 1981). The defendant, Banks, received a series of concurrent eight-year sentences
for his crimes, despite a prior conviction for an unrelated murder. Id. at 971-72, 428 N.E.2d
at 1019. Under the guidelines proposed herein, that prior murder conviction, normally worth
six scoring points (Appendix to text, chart 4) would be doubled to 12 scoring points because
of the violent nature of that defendant's present crimes. Even if the defendant's score were not
enhanced further, the normal sentence for him would be in the range of approximately 33 to
37 years. See Appendix to text, Chart 4, at 405. If the exceptionally brutal or heinous nature
of the present offenses also was considered, as they should be, that score would increase to
the range of 15 to 18 points. See Appendix to text, § 2a(2)(c), at 401. Sentences for class X
felons having such scores range from 45 to 60 years. See Appendix to text, Chart 4, at 405.
834. As already noted, a defendant's criminal history score would be adjustable to permit
consideration of a number of factors in aggravation of the offense. See Appendix to text, §
2a(l)-(3), at 397-402. As explained below, a number of other factors in either aggravation or
mitigation also would affect that score. See infra notes 850-58 and accompanying text; Appendix
to text, § 2a(3), at 401-02; § 2b, c at, 402-04. Plea bargaining practices also could affect the
sentence selected. See infra notes 860-66 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, § 2d, at 404.
835. Such a propensity for multiple crimes in a single episode is relevant under other fac-
tors. See Appendix to text, § 2a(l)(a)(1), (7), at 398; § 2a(2)(a)(3)(e), at 400.
836. There is some question whether this procedure will be sufficient to protect a defendant
who engaged in a large number of crimes in a relatively short period, but not as part of a
single transaction or occurrence. It arguably would be unfair to a defendant to include each
such crime in the criminal history score, because all of them reflect the criminal tendencies at
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c. Weighing Convictions
Prior felony and misdemeanor convictions can be weighted in several
different ways. Minnesota sentencing guidelines, for example, score misde-
meanors as either one-quarter or one-half of a point, up to a one-point
maximum. 3 7 All felony convictions, regardless of grade or type, are scored
as one point each. 3 Once a defendant's criminal history score reaches six
points, including all points earned from juvenile adjudications and misde-
meanor or felony convictions, no further increases in guideline sentences
occur 839
Pennsylvania's sentencing guidelines are more complicated. In essence,
misdemeanors are scored at one-half or one whole point to a maximum of
two points.8 n Prior felony convictions are scored at one to three points
depending upon their severity.8 4' An overall criminal history score is then
compiled that cannot exceed six points.142
Illinois should adopt a system similar to the Pennsylvania model. The
limit that both Pennsylvania and Minnesota place on the number of criminal
history points scored for prior misdemeanor convictions is clearly desirable
and, in all probability, is in keeping with current Illinois sentencing practices
as well.143 Pennsylvania's assignment of different scores for various types of
felonies is preferable to the unitary weight system used in Minnesota. While
the Minnesota approach has the virtue of simplicity, given the wide range
of conduct embraced within the felony designation, that simplicity has been
achieved at the expense of a desirable degree of discrimination.
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania guidelines should be modified in several
respects for adoption in Illinois. The first broad area of concern is aug-
menting a defendant's criminal history score through the accumulation of
minor offenses. The Pennsylvania system gives too much weight to prior
misdemeanor convictions and sets too high a ceiling on their contribution
to a defendant's criminal history score. A history of minor, nonviolent
criminal activity-even a fairly extensive one-normally should not be the
roughly the same point in time, and thus overstate his recidivistic tendencies.
While not precluding such considerations in sentencing, these guidelines recommend that such
cases be viewed as possible exceptions to the general scoring rule rather than incorporated into
the rule itself. As proposed, this guideline already goes beyond existing law by generally scoring
multiple prior crimes only once, even if there is a change in the nature of the criminal objective.
Any further lenity should be a matter of case-by-case determinations supported by full expla-
nations. See infra notes 884-96 and accompanying text.
837. See MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app., § II. B.3 (West Supp. 1984).
838. See id. § II. B.I.
839. See id. § IV (Sentencing Guidelines Grid).
840. See 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 303.7(a), 303.7(b)()(i) (Shepard's 1982).
841. See id. § 303.7(b)(2).
842. See id. § 303.7(h).
843. See, e.g., People v. Hobbs, 90 11. App. 3d 587, 589-90, 413 N.E.2d 454, 456-57 (4th
Dist. 1980) (defendant's six-year extended term sentence for stealing five bottles of whiskey
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decisive factor in imposing a prison sentence. '" A better balance has been
struck by Minnesota's system, which scores most prior misdemeanor con-
victions as the equivalent of one-fourth of a prior felony conviction, with
higher scores assigned to prior misdemeanor convictions that involve viol-
ence or other potentially dangerous conduct.145 In Illinois, a number of minor
nonviolent felonies might also be assigned a scoring ceiling on the same
rationale.8 46
The second major area of concern is the modification of Pennsylvania's
system of scoring felonies for use in Illinois. Two modifications, both
necessitated by a need for a greater degree of discrimination between major
and minor felonies, are in order. A wider range of scoring values should be
adopted for various felony classes, and the total range of criminal history
scores should be increased two to three times. More concretely, subject to




Classification C B A 4 3 2 1 X M
Scoring
Weight 1 2 3 4 6
or or
V/ 1
The maximum allowable criminal history score would be twelve for all
offenses except for class 1 felonies, which would go as high as fifteen, and
class M and X felonies, which would go as high as eighteen. 848 The higher
vacated with directions not to impose sentence in excess of three years, despite the fact that he
had an "extensive record" and "a history of constant antisocial conduct"); People v. Odom,
82 I11. App. 3d 853, 854-56, 403 N.E.2d 297, 298-99 (4th Dist. 1980) (maximum 364-day sentence
for criminal damage to property vacated as excessive, despite fact that defendant had 23 prior
misdemeanor and traffic convictions, at least nine of which involved physical violence); cf.
People v. Smith, 110 II1. App. 3d 286, 289-90, 442 N.E.2d 294, 296-97 (2d Dist. 1982) (three-
year sentence for theft of one bottle of whiskey affirmed where defendant's prior criminal
record included 18 prior convictions, including four for burglary, one for robbery and another
for attempted murder).
844. The proposed guidelines take this approach. See Appendix to text § la(2), at 396; Chart
4, at 405; § la(2), at 396.
845. See MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app., § 11. B.3 (West Supp. 1984). Among Illinois misde-
meanors that might be deemed more aggravated for scoring purposes are battery, the various
class A misdemeanor weapons offenses, and mob action. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 12-3,
24, 25-1 (1983).
846. Among the nonassaultive minor felonies are otherwise unaggravated thefts of goods or
services, other than thefts of weapons, which are punishable as felonies because of prior theft
convictions. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 16-1, 16-5, 164-10 (1983).
847. See infra notes 850-58 and accompanying text.
848. See Appendix to text, Chart 4, at 405.
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range for those more serious crimes permits even longer sentences for
offenders whose manner of committing the crime and exceptionally aggra-
vated prior records make such sanctions appropriate.149
3. Mitigation And Aggravation
The third step in determining a presumptive sentence is to adjust the
defendant's criminal history score according to factors presented by the case
at bar. Typically, two broad categories of such considerations will arise. The
first category consists of a variety of individual factors that mitigate or
aggravate the current conviction. The second category consists of systemic
factors, such as whether the case was disposed of by trial or plea.
a. Individualized Factors
Under the proposed guidelines, a defendant's criminal history score could
be affected by the manner in which the offense was committed and a variety
of factors in the defendant's background. For example, if the offense for
which the defendant is currently being sentenced involved exceptionally brutal
or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or actions causing or
threatening serious harm, from one to six points would be added to the
defendant's score.8"' Most other regular term factors in aggravation, 5 '
however, appear to be less important in determining the type or length of a
defendant's sentence. Consequently, these lesser aggravating factors are re-
tained under the proposed sentencing guidelines, but they are weighted such
that their presence would add no more than one point to the defendant's
criminal history score.85 2 In addition, Illinois should follow Minnesota 53 in
allowing an increase in the criminal history score if the defendant committed
the current crime while on probation or parole for another offense.81 4
849. Allowing different maximum scores for varying classes of felonies is a unique feature
of the proposed system. It is designed to serve two purposes. First, it allows exceptionally harsh
punishments for those whose prior criminal record or propensity for committing particularly
reprehensible or brutal crimes mark them as a clear danger to society. Second, it will prevent
prisons from becoming clogged by less dangerous offenders whose recidivist tendencies otherwise
would subject them to rather lengthy periods of incarceration.
850. See Appendix to text, § 2a(l)(b), at 399; § 2a(2)(c), at 401; § 2c(2), (3), at 403-04.
851. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(4)-(8) (1983).
852. See Appendix to text, § 2a(3)(b), at 401-02. Some factors in aggravation are of lesser
importance because, like general deterrence, they presumably apply to all sentences and,
therefore, do not serve as a useful basis for distinguishing between offenders. Others, like those
involving abuse of trust, office, or position, have been rendered less important by judicial
decisions concluding that these factors may not be applied to the offenses that they were
designed to aggravate. See supra note 639.
853. MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app., § 11. B.2 (West Supp. 1984).
854. See Appendix to text, § 2a(3)(a)(l), (2), at 401. For a discussion of the effect that
the nature of a probation violation should have on any new sentence imposed for the probated
offense, see supra note 782; Appendix to text, § Id, at 397.
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By the same token, a defendant's criminal history score should be adjusted
downward if sufficient mitigating circumstances exist.855 The Act's present
list of mitigating factors seems comprehensive and generally unobjectionable
in principle. 85 6 The mitigating effect of these factors on a defendant's criminal
history score, however, should be sharply limited. In particular, the proposed
guidelines provide that no more than two scoring points should be deducted
from a defendant's criminal history score, with one point being the normal
mitigating deduction. 85 7
Although this proposed rule may seem harsh, it would not be so in practice.
Under the proposed sentencing guidelines, reducing a criminal history score
by one or two points would make most minor offenders eligible for either
probation or periodic imprisonment, and would substantially reduce the
presumptive prison sentences of the remaining offenders. 88 Greater conces-
sions would be inappropriate, especially for major offenses. For example, if
an offender with a lengthy criminal record is convicted of rape, the fact that
his role in the rape was relatively minor should not be nearly as important
a consideration at sentencing as his demonstrated inability to avoid serious
criminal activity.
b. Systemic Factors
The final possible adjustment to a defendant's criminal history score would
be due to systemic factors. The principal concern is the impact, if any, that
plea bargaining should have on a defendant's presumptive sentence. In that
regard, the proposal endorses the position taken in other states that sen-
tencing guidelines should be used to measure the appropriateness of all
sentences, not merely those imposed after trial. 5 9 Without that coverage, the
proposed reforms would reach only a small fraction of all sentencing deci-
sions.86 Moreover, application of the guidelines to bargained-for sentences
should serve to rationalize any bargain struck and to control potentially
abusive or overreaching tactics in bargained cases.86' Finally, as a matter of
These guidelines also add one or more points to an offender's score for the commission
of an offense while at large on bond while awaiting trial or pending appeal. See Appendix
to text, § 2a(3)(a)(3), at 401; cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app., § II. B.2 (West Supp. 1984).
855. See Appendix to text, § 2c, at 402-04; see also infra notes 860-66 and accompanying
text (regarding the availability of sentencing concessions due to plea bargaining).
856. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.1(a)(l)-(12) (1983). Minnesota, however, has
excluded factors similar to certain of these mitigating factors on the grounds that they embody
a class bias in favor of wealthier or middle class defendants. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. ch.
244 app., § II. D.l.c (West Supp. 1984) (occupation, employment history, or employment status);
id. § II. D.l.d (educational attainment, living arrangements, or marital status).
857. See Appendix to text, § 2c(l), at 402.
858. See Appendix to text, Chart 4, at 405.
859. See MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app, §§ II. C, 11. D.l.e (West Supp. 1984); 204 PA.
ADMIN. CODE § 303.1(a), (d) (Shepards 1982).
860. Most offenses are disposed of by plea bargain. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 643-45.
861. This is so because the defendant's rap sheet and a general knowledge of the manner in
which the offense was committed would permit a fairly close calculation of what the defendant's
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principle, sentencing is and should be a judicial act, a sanction imposed by
a neutral decision maker rather than an adversary.
This conclusion, however, does not resolve whether a defendant's accept-
ance of a plea bargain should be allowed to affect the defendant's criminal
history score.8 62 A strong argument can be made for barring sentencing
concessions in plea-bargained cases. Pennsylvania's sentencing guidelines
make no provisions for any concessions due to plea bargaining, 63 and
Minnesota's sentencing guidelines appear to prohibit any reduction of sen-
tence due to plea bargaining. s64 Nonetheless, the guidelines proposed for
Illinois take the position that limited concessions should be allowed in
bargained cases.
Largely pragmatic reasons support endorsing sentencing concessions in
return for guilty pleas under the proposed sentencing guideline system. It is
likely that any efforts to abolish such trade-offs will only force those
concessions into a different and more uncontrollable form: clandestine bar-
gains as to charge. 6 ' Consequently, instead of attempting to eradicate sen-
tencing concessions, their validity should be acknowledged while their impact
is controlled by instituting a limitation of a two-point reduction in the
criminal history score of a plea bargaining defendant.8 66 This two-point limit
likely sentence would be upon conviction. This fact alone would have a strong tendency to
push offers into a fairly narrow range. It also would tend to mitigate the in terrorem nature
of any threatened enhanced penalties should the defendant elect to stand trial.
862. It should be stressed that this proposal does not promise or guarantee such a concession
in return for a plea of guilty. Rather, it sets an outer limit on the concessions that can be
obtained in return for a plea of guilty, absent extraordinary circumstances. This distinction is
important because any system that offered a defendant a fixed discount from the sentence in
return for a guilty plea would in all likelihood be unconstitutional. See Corbitt v. New Jersey,
439 U.S. 212 (1978).
In Corbitt, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory natural life sentence
for defendants convicted of murder in the first degree who had pleaded not guilty, despite
the fact that defendants who plead nolo contendere to a charge of first degree murder could,
at the discretion of the trial judge, receive a lesser sentence than natural life. Id. at 226. The
majority was careful to distinguish this scheme from one offering a fixed discount to defen-
dants who pled guilty, strongly suggesting that a system providing for a fixed discount could
fail to pass constitutional muster. Id. at 224 n.14. Four justices writing separately also in-
dicated that a fixed discount scheme would be unconstitutional. Id. at 226-28 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 232-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
863. See 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 303.1(a) (Shepard's 1982) (making guidelines applicable
"in determining the appropriate sentence for felonies and misdemeanors," but not mentioning
plea bargains as such).
864. See MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app., § II. D.I.e (West Supp. 1984) (sentences are not
to vary due to the defendant's "exercise of constitutional rights . . . during the adjudication
process").
865. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 645-51.
866. This author's earlier article also proposed a number of reforms that were designed to
keep bargained-for sentences tolerably close to those that would have been imposed after a full
trial. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 661-68. When those limitations are translated into the
proposed sentencing grid system, they correspond rather closely to a maximum plea bargaining
concession of two criminal history scoring points. See id. at 664-65; Appendix to text, Chart
4, at 405.
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would be enforced by treating as an out-of-guideline sentence any bargained-
for sentence that is less severe than the presumptive sentencing range available
for an offender with an adjusted criminal history score two points lower
than that of the defendant. 67
Creation of presumptive sentencing ranges based on a defendant's current
offense and adjusted criminal history score does not denigrate other impor-
tant factors in sentencing. Rather, this approach is designed to start all
sentencing decisions involving roughly comparable offenders in approxi-
mately the same place.8 6 Thereafter, the factual variants and systemic con-
siderations presented by each case would be permitted to affect that initial
score to varying degrees. Consequently, this approach leaves considerable
flexibility to adjust a defendant's sentence to the equities and exigencies
presented by the particular case.
4. Establishing Sentencing Guideline Ranges
The fourth major task in establishing a sentence guideline system is
determining the presumptive type and length of sentences for each combi-
867. See infra notes 884-96 and accompanying text.
868. There are at least three special problems involving the use of criminal history scores as
a method to identify supposedly comparable offenders. The first involves a defendant who
already has had a prior crime utilized to increase the grade of the current offense. For instance,
Pennsylvania has taken the position that the offense should not be counted in a defendant's
criminal history score. See 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 303.7(0 (Shepard's 1982). Given Illinois'
traditional opposition to such double enhancement, that policy probably should be followed
here as well. See, e.g., People v. Haron, 85 IIl. 2d 261, 278, 422 N.E.2d 627, 634 (1981)
(presence of weapon cannot be used to enhance misdemeanor to felony and then again to
enhance that felony to armed violence).
Second, cases will arise in which a defendant's first substantial brush with the law reveals
that he or she has been involved in extensive criminal activity. See, e.g., People v. Dawson,
116 11. App. 3d 672, 675-76, 452 N.E.2d 385, 387 (4th Dist. 1983) (first serious conviction
included three counts of residential burglary, three counts of burglary, and two counts of felony
theft); People v. Einstein, 106 I11. App. 3d 526, 535, 435 N.E.2d 1257, 1264 (1st Dist. 1982)
(first serious conviction involved 147 counts of forgery and theft committed over extended
period of time). The guidelines address that issue by permitting such conduct to be treated as
forms of serious harm. See Appendix to text, § 2c(2), (3), at 403-04. In addition, many cases
could be disposed of by plea bargains in which the defendants agreed to let some offenses be
taken into account in sentencing them for the crimes to which they were pleading guilty. See
supra note 788. The remainder, however, probably should be disposed of by out-of-guideline
sentences. See infra notes 884-96 and accompanying text.
Finally, the issue of whether sentencing guidelines should go beyond the existence of prior
offenses and take the circumstances of their commission into consideration as well must be
considered. The supreme court has approved this practice. See People v. Owens, 102 111. 2d
88, 111-12, 464 N.E.2d 261, 271-72 (1984). Nonetheless, it is recommended that such a practice
not be followed. First, factors in mitigation or aggravation of the earlier offense presumably
were taken into account in punishing the defendant for the prior crime. If such factors are
again present, they should affect the sentence for the current offense, and the circumstances
surrounding the prior crime should not be considered. Additionally, such inquiries would
immensely complicate administration of the sentencing guideline system by injecting a host of
collateral issues into the sentencing decision. Finally, such inquiries into the circumstances of
prior crimes are of only marginal relevance to a score which is primarily a measure of recidivism.
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nation of offense and criminal history score. These determinations are, of
course, highly value-laden and subjective. Debates over who merits incar-
ceration and for how long are both heated and intractable and are likely to
remain so. Whatever philosophical perspective one brings to those issues,
however, also would profit from greater attention to pragmatic considera-
tions. As Illinois has recently rediscovered, the resources of its correctional
system are both finite and taxed to the breaking point.8 69 If the state is to
give the public adequate protection from criminals in such an environment,
it simply must do a better job of selecting who goes to prison and for how
long.
Restraint and consistency are the two most important features of a sen-
tencing system capable of achieving those results. Restraint in choosing both
who is incarcerated and for how long, even in particularly aggravated cases, is
necessary if the system is to function at all. Consistency is needed to provide
fairness to defendants and to assure a full measure of protection for the
public.
The proposed guideline system would make a significant change in current
sentencing practices. Present sentencing practices subject a few of the more
aggravated offenders-and a few not-so-aggravated ones-to exceptionally
severe penalties, while many equally culpable offenders escape with minor
sanctions. Under the proposal, however, while maximum penalties for most
offenders would be somewhat below those currently available, the presence
of aggravating factors would result in increased sentences far more routinely
than at present.8 70 The basic premise underlying the new approach is that
both specific and general deterrence will be increased by a sentencing scheme
that consistently, albeit modestly, penalizes the conduct sought most to be
deterred-recidivism, brutality, and crimes involving the most serious harm
to the public.
The sentencing grid set out in the Appendix is proposed with the goals of
fairness, public protection, and deterrence in mind. The grid is based on
existing felony classes, although additional modifications will be needed to
redress certain anomalies arising under the present offense classification
scheme. 7 ' In addition to a presumptive sentence length, the grid gives the
presumptive type of disposition and any alternative dispositions available for
each combination of felony class and adjusted criminal history score.7
When no alternative is given, the presumptive sentence is imprisonment.
This sentencing guideline schedule, like any other, will undoubtedly gen-
erate endless debates about whether it is too lenient or too severe. No useful
purpose would be served in pursuing those value-laden issues at any length
869. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 720-22.
870. See supra notes 806-66 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, Part I, at 396-404;
Chart 4, at 405.
871. See supra notes 806-18 and accompanying text.
872. See Appendix to text, Chart 4, at 405.
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here.8 73 The pragmatic consequences of the proposed guideline system, how-
ever, should be examined carefully. Before this (or any other) guideline
system is implemented, mathematical projections to determine its probable
effects should be undertaken. Such a study should compare the actual
sanctions imposed on a statistically significant cross-section of inmates re-
ceiving both incarcerative and nonincarcerative sentences with their theoret-
ical sentences under the proposed guidelines, so that their likely impact on
the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) can be determined.87 4
While that impact should not be treated as a matter of overriding impor-
tance, it certainly should be a very significant consideration, especially at
the present time. For example, a relatively minor adjustment in guideline
sentences for certain types of offenses could result in a significant reduction
in the total man-years of sentences to be served in Illinois prisons without
any appreciable sacrifice in sentencing fairness or public protection.8 75 Such
an adjustment should certainly be made, but a mathematical model of the
proposed system is needed to illustrate any such possible improvements.
Finally, any guidelines adopted should be used to effectuate an orderly
reduction in the population of Illinois prisons. This goal, although not an
essential component of a sentencing guideline system, would be accomplished
by giving a limited number of inmates the opportunity to apply for release
dates or executive clemency if their sentences are more severe than sentences
they would have received under the proposed guidelines. In essence, if such
an inmate were able to show that, with all disputed factors in aggravation
or mitigation resolved against him, 76 he received (or stood to serve) a more
severe sentence than that authorized under the guidelines, he would receive
873. For a somewhat dated compendium of the literature in this field, see Schuwerk, supra
note 2, at 636 & nn. 25-26.
874. The DOC has a fairly sophisticated data base for its own inmates which could provide
a useful starting point for this research. Data on probationers, however, probably would have
to be generated through hand searches of court files.
875. For example, a substantial portion of the DOC's inmate population consists of armed
robbers. See Table 3 in 1982 STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, supra note 290 (1218 inmates with
determinate sentences for armed robbery admitted in 1980, with 1130 more in 1981 and 1028
more in 1982). Moreover, in each of the five years from 1978 to 1982, about a third of all
armed robbers received the minimum sentence allowed by law. See Table 13 in 1982 STATISTICAL
PRESENTATION, supra note 290. In fact, there appears to be a widespread reluctance to punish
even repeat offenders as harshly as the law allows, absent some additional aggravating conduct
on the offender's part. See supra text accompanying note 376. Were this general perception
given effect by converting armed robbery from a class X felony to a nonprobationable class I
felony, it would reduce the minimum term for such offenders by two years and their minimum
time served by one year. See Appendix to text, Chart 4, at 405. Those reductions could have
a significant impact on the DOC's overall population. On the other hand, repeat offenders or
those committing aggravated versions of such crimes consistently would receive longer sentences.
See Appendix to text, Chart 4, at 405.
876. Presumably, however, disputes concerning the existence of factors in aggravation and
mitigation would be resolved in accordance with the definitions given those factors in the
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a release date or would have his petition for executive clemency favorably
reported to the Governor.87
Under the Act, a comparable procedure for inmates serving indeterminate
sentences with a minimum term of twenty years or less has already been
implemented. 78 Consequently, this proposal would be limited to those in-
mates serving indeterminate sentences who were excluded from the Act's
release date program. Likewise, in the interest of efficiency, the only inmates
serving determinate sentences who would be eligible for consideration under
this proposal would be those whose sentences were at least six years and
twice the minimum term that was available.8 79
Thus, the inmates eligible for this program would include those who, by
virtue of the sentences they received, have been singled out as among the
more hardened and despicable offenders. Despite that fact, there are three
reasons why such inmates deserve the consideration this recommendation of-
fers them. First, the fact that these inmates received harsh sentences does
not mean those sentences were appropriate. If a severe sentence were
undeserved, there is no reason for compounding that injustice by denying
even the possibility of relief. On the other hand, because a presumptive
guideline sentence would be lengthened by aggravating circumstances, inmates
who deserved their harsh sentences would obtain little, if any, relief.
Second, a release date or recommendation for clemency based on the
proposed guidelines would be far more defensible and accurate than one
based on the Act's earlier release date program. 8 0 The proposed guidelines
sentencing guidelines. For example, if an offender has been found to have engaged in excep-
tionally brutal or heinous behavior by the sentencing judge but it was clear that the defendant's
behavior would not have been found to be of that character under the proposed guidelines,
the defendant would be entitled to a release date or clemency recommendation based on
behavior being a form of serious harm. If the trial judge's characterization of the defendant's
behavior was not clearly erroneous, however, the judge's determination would be utilized.
Similarly, no conduct properly classified as a form of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
under the guidelines would be treated as a form of serious harm merely because the discretionary
bases for doing so were shown to be present. See Appendix to text, § 2c(3), at 403-04.
877. Inmates serving determinate sentences can not lawfully be released prior to the expiration
of their full sentences less good conduct credits absent executive clemency. See Lane v.
Sklodowski, 97 Ill. 2d 311, 317-20, 454 N.E.2d 322, 324-26 (1983) (invalidating administrative
early release program that awarded additional good-time to inmates above that allowed by the
Act).
878. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-2(a)(5), 1003-3-2.1 (1983).
879. Inmates serving relatively unenhanced determinate sentences are excluded for two rea-
sons. First many would be released without regard to the program in a relatively short period
of time. Thus examination of their cases would be largely futile. Second, a substantial portion
of such sentences probably would be justified under the guidelines.
Inmates sentenced to death also would be excluded under this proposal. Such inmates can
be expected to file clemency petitions as a matter of course as the date for execution draws
near, and that occasion is the most appropriate time to evaluate their situations.
880. Release dates set under current law are based in large part on present sentencing practices
and are subject to the same vagueness and uncertainties. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-2.1
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present largely objective criteria for determining if a release date or clemency
recommendation would be proper,"'1 and subjective criteria would be resolved
against the defendant. Thus, only the most obvious and egregious disparities
would result in a release date or clemency recommendation.
Finally, reviewing the sentences of those inmates who were sentenced most
harshly makes a great deal of sense from the standpoint of the DOC. The
early release of those offenders frees up the resources that the DOC would
otherwise spend on their care and custody, with the greatest potential benefit
to the DOC occurring in the class of cases targeted by this proposal-inmates
whose sentences could be reduced by the greatest amount. Moreover, inmates
subject to lengthy sentences that cannot be redticed significantly through
good behavior8 2 are a notorious source of disciplinary problems in prisons.8 3
By giving a sense of hope to this segment of the prison population, such an
early release program could greatly aid the DOC in its efforts to manage
and control inmate behavior.
(1983) (basing release date on current sentencing practices, current statutory factors in mitiga-
tion and aggravation, and the intent of the court in imposing sentence, among other things).
881. See supra notes 819-58 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, Part I, at 396-404;
Chart 4, at 405.
882. Sentences of natural life are not subject to good conduct credits at all. See ILL. REv.
of release so far into the future that the immediate incentive to conform one's conduct to
prison rules is substantially reduced. For example, in the early stages of a 40-year sentence, it
is relatively immaterial whether release comes in 20 years, 20 years and 60 days, or 21 years.
883. Although it is not currently fashionable to do so, some effort should be made to consider
the effects of long sentences on those serving them. In that regard, the following observation
by an inmate of the violence-plagued Texas DOC is instructive:
The full impact of these aggravated sentences cannot be gauged by anyone who
has not witnessed their effects firsthand. Consider, for example, that a man with an
aggravated life sentence must serve 20 years before parole eligibility. And while this
amount of time is considered "light" by some, in view of the seriousness of the
possible offense-most likely armed robbery, murder, or rape-those serving the
sentences don't consider them light.
But it is not the "rightness" of aggravated sentences that is the point, it is the
hopelessness. To get a better grasp of the time involved, recall where you were and
what you were doing on the day that John Kennedy was assassinated; then imagine
that you had spent each ensuing day in prison-never caressing a loved one, never
spending a moment in privacy, and perhaps worst of all, never hoping for a minute
that an earlier freedom might be gained through a change in your attitude and/or
behavior. Thousands of inmates are faced with this dismal view of their futures.
They wake up each morning with the sure knowledge that they will be wading through
the same mudhole twenty years from today. They will hear the same shrill work
whistle, eat the same tasteless meals, and be treated in the same way they are today,
no matter how much they themselves change.
The Texas Observer, Sept. 14, 1984, at 12-13. These comments are not offered as an argument
against ever sentencing anyone to such lengthy periods of incarceration, but they are a potent
argument for imposing such penalties sparingly and with a full realization of their consequences.
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C. Judicial Discretion
The final issue that must be addressed in fashioning a sentencing guideline
system is whether the guideline sentence should be mandatory or merely
advisory. Both Minnesota and Pennsylvania follow the same approach: the
guideline sentence merely sets forth a presumptive disposition from which
the judge may depart. 84 However, the sentencing laws of both states caution
that departures should be relatively rare occurrences."' 5 Moreover, judges
departing from the guideline sentences must give written explanations for
doing so that are consistent with the principles embodied in the state's
sentencing guidelines. 8 6 Finally, all sentences are reviewable on appeal by
either the defendant or the state.8 7
Normally, it would be clear that Illinois should follow this approach as
well. A sentencing guideline system can be designed to deal with the great
majority of cases, but it cannot anticipate every contingency. Consequently,
a system that is sufficiently open-ended to respond to a unique case in a
unique way is preferable to a closed system in which guideline sentences are
mandatory.8 8 A serious problem exists, however, that could make the adop-
tion of an open-ended approach in Illinois imprudent. In return for judicial
flexibility, the Minnesota and Pennsylvania legislatures have required an expla-
nation for the judge's departure from the guideline ranges and a thorough
review of the sentence on appeal. This quid pro quo has been put beyond
the legislative pale in Illinois, however, by the supreme court's decisions in
People v. Davis"9 and People v. Cox. 9 Without any assurance that sentences
deviating from legislative guidelines would be accompanied by appropriate
884. See MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app., § I. 4, II. C (West Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 42, § 9721(b) (Purdon 1982).
885. See MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app., §§ I. 4, I1. D (West Supp. 1984); id. §§ I1. D.01,
11. D.03 comments; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9721(b) (Purdon 1982).
886. See MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 app., § If. D (West Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
42, § 9781 (Purdon 1982) (by implication).
887. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.11 (West Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9781
(Purdon 1982). In Pennsylvania the allowance of sentencing appeals is discretionary with the
appellate court, and may be granted "where it appears that there is a substantial question
that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under [the sentencing guidelines]." Id.
888. For a discussion of cases with unique circumstances necessitating an open-ended sen-
tencing system, see supra note 868. In addition, cases in which leniency has been granted in
return for cooperation in the apprehension or conviction of other criminals also may present
problems under the guidelines. For some suggestions for addressing this problem see Schuwerk,
supra note 2, at 662 n.148. Finally, Pennsylvania has noted that certain white collar crimes
and offenses involving breaches of trust or duty may also frequently call for out-of-guideline
sentences. See 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 303.1(e). Undoubtedly other cases will arise which do
not fit perfectly within the guidelines.
889. 93 111. 2d 155, 162-63, 442 N.E.2d 855, 862-63 (1982) (legislature cannot require courts
to give reasons for imposing sentence); accord, People v. Hicks, 101 II. 2d 366, 375, 462
N.E.2d 473, 481 (1984).
890. 82 Ill. 2d 268, 275-76, 412 N.E.2d 541, 545 (1980) (the legislature may not vary either




explanations89' and subject to careful review on appeal, 92 the General As-
sembly should seriously consider making its guideline sentences mandatory.
Because of the important and highly sensitive nature of this issue, if at all
possible, the supreme court and the legislature should work together infor-
mally to fashion some mutually acceptable approach. Because of Davis and
Cox, such an accomodation would require the supreme court to develop new
approaches to providing reasons for sentences and to reviewing those sen-
tences on appeal. In deciding whether such an effort on its part is desirable,
the court should consider not only the likely improvements a guideline system
would work in bargaining for and imposing sentences, but also the interests
of the judiciary that such an effort would further.
In that respect, a guideline system requiring adequate explanations for and
review of nonconforming sentences would have several advantages for the
judiciary. The present statement of reasons requirement would be unnecessary
if the sentence imposed were within the guideline range.8 93 Thus, a statement
of reasons would not be needed in the vast majority of cases. All that would
be required in the normal case would be a statement of the offender's
criminal history score, whether there was any dispute regarding that score
and, if so, how the court resolved it, and the nature of any scoring conces-
sions made as a result of plea bargaining. 894
Another probable result of adopting a sentencing guideline system would
be to reduce and simplify appeals from sentencing determinations. Defend-
ant-initiated appeals would be reduced because more sharply defined sen-
tencing criteria and narrower sentencing ranges would increase the number
of sentences that are reasonable both in fact and in appearance. Moreover,
the clarity and objectivity of the sentencing guidelines would make abuses
of discretion easier to discern, thus highlighting unduly lenient or excessively
severe sentences. For all of these reasons, if a guideline system is instituted,
the supreme court should promulgate a rule requiring explanations of de-
partures from guideline sentences 95 and amend its rule governing appellate
review of sentences.8 96
891. Determining exactly what constitutes an adequate explanation-as opposed to merely
requiring that there be one-is probably a purely judicial function. The aim of the guidelines
should not be to compel judges to utter particular magic words. As long as a reviewing court
can determine why a judge imposed a particular sentence, and that the reasons for doing so
are consistent with the guidelines, the explanation should be deemed sufficient.
892. Once again, deciding how careful a review is careful enough is primarily a judicial task.
In this area, however, the General Assembly's substantive sentencing requirements necessarily
intrude on judicial prerogatives. As the legislature requires more of sentencing judges in terms
of fairness, consistency, and proportionality in sentencing, the zone of freedom left to the
sentencing judge to exercise personal predilections necessarily decreases. In other words, sen-
tencing becomes more a matter of law and less a matter of discretion. Consequently, no matter
what standard of review is employed on appeal-whether it is the present abuse-of-discretion
test or something else-reversal of sentences on appeal will necessarily be easier under a guideline
system than under present law. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 686-91.
893. Compliance with the guidelines would be self-justifying.
894. Not even these items would be necessary where the court was imposing a sentence that
had been agreed upon by the parties. See Appendix to text, § la(l), at 396.
895. For suggestions in this regard, see Appendix to text, Part II § 1, at 404, 406.
896. Present Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615 needs to be modified to give the state a qualified
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CONCLUSION
The sentencing reform efforts culminating in the Act were well-intentioned
and promised to promote a fairer and more rational system of imposing
sentences. But while those measures have achieved some limited success, they
have fallen far short of their goal. This is due in part to successful efforts
to undermine or invalidate the Act's structural controls on bargaining for,
imposing, and serving sentences.8 97 Judicial failures to perceive the Act's
substantive limitations on judicial sentencing discretion are also partly re-
sponsible for this limited success. But certain unclear or irrational features
of the Act itself have made the implementation of a rational and consistent
sentencing system virtually impossible. These statutory problems are perhaps
the most significant causes of shortcomings in the sentencing process in
Illinois.
Many of the reform proposals put forward in this article and its predecessor
could be accomplished without any change in existing statutory law through
the adoption of sentencing guidelines promulgated by either the Illinois
Supreme Court8 98 or by the CSC. 899 Such initiatives certainly should be
encouraged. There are several reasons, however, why legislative action would
be preferable. First, neither the court nor the CSC has shown any enthusiasm
for such a task. In fact, it seems clear that the supreme court sees its
institutional interests, as well as those of the judiciary as a whole, better
served by the present system.9 Thus, the General Assembly's deferral to
other bodies almost certainly would not result in a solution to the pressing
problems documented above.
Second, a number of the key reforms discussed elsewhere-such as the
alteration of sentencing ranges and the abolition of certain penalties9° -
cannot be accomplished without legislative action. Third, the matters re-
quiring the General Assembly's attention span the entire pattern of sentence
imposition. All aspects of the use of both incarcerative and non-incarcerative
dispositions are in need of fundamental reform.
The final reason for encouraging action by the General Assembly in this
area is not directly concerned with the advantages of a legislative rather than
a judicial solution. Rather, it is the need to stem the steady, and constitu-
tionally inappropriate, erosion of legitimate legislative authority in sentencing
matters as a result of an overly expansive interpretation of the proper scope
right to appeal sentences. For a proposed change in rule 615, see Appendix to text, Part 1i
§ 2, at 406-07.
897. See generally Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 645-57, 665-707, 722-33.
898. See ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 16; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-4.2 (1983).
899. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-2(6) (1983).
900. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 701-02 & n. 427, 713-14 & n. 504-06.
901. See id. at 735-37; supra notes 806-72 and accompanying text; Appendix to text, Part
1, at 396-404; Chart 4, at 405.
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of judicial powers in that sphere. 9 2 The author finds many of the General
Assembly's sentencing initiatives deeply troubling.903 Nonetheless, it is the
General Assembly rather than the judiciary that has the right to establish
substantive sentencing policies. Under the current judicial regime, however,
that right could well be lost if it is not vigorously asserted."'
There appears to be an urgent need for the promulgation and implemen-
tation of a comprehensive sentencing guideline system like the one advocated
in this article. Such a system would be new to Illinois, but it would not
be new to the nation. Minnesota and Pennsylvania have had favorable ex-
periences with similar systems for some time.90 ' Other states are considering
adopting such a system, 9 6 and Congress has just committed the United States
to doing so."' Illinois should draw on this wealth of experience and imple-
ment comparable improvements in its criminal sentencing system.
902. See Schuwerk, supra note 2, at 681-85, 691-94.
903. See supra notes 77-119, 130-63 and accompanying text.
904. In fact, given the supreme court's view of the proper judicial sphere in sentencing
matters, it is at least possible that it would strike down undesired sentencing guidelines
implemented by any body other than the General Assembly as an improper delegation of
legislative authority and hence violative of the separation of powers.
905. Extensive research has been conducted on various sentencing reform activities, including
the Minnesota and Pennsylvania guideline procedures, which has been compiled in a two-
volume work entitled RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (1983). An analysis
of the Minnesota experience has shown that the shift in sentencing policies intended by the
Minnesota guidelines has been carried into effect. I RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: TIlE SEARCH
FOR REFORM 214-17 (1983). There appears to little complaint that the guidelines are either unfair
or unduly confining.
906. Washington is in the process of implementing a guideline sentencing system and various
jurisdictions in a number of other states are experimenting with such an approach. Id. at 135-
39.
907. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. Law No. 98-473, ch. 227, 98
Stat. 1987 (1984).
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APPENDIX
I. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF
PROPOSED SENTENCING GUIDELINES
§ 1. CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE9 .
All sentences imposed in criminal cases must take the history of prior
delinquency or criminal activity of the defendant being sentenced into con-
sideration. That is to be done by calculating a criminal history score for
that defendant in the manner provided in this section.
a. All convictions of felonies or misdemeanors shall be included.
Except as provided elsewhere in this section, the prior convictions





Classification C B A 4 3 2 1 X M
Scoring




(1) No prior crime that has been used to increase the class
of offense for which the offender currently has been con-
victed shall be counted in calculating that offender's criminal
history score; and
(2) A defendant's criminal history score shall not be increased
by more than two points because of misdemeanor convic-
tions.
b. Only prior adjudications of delinquency involving acts commit-
ted on or after the offender's fifteenth birthday shall be included.
Any such acts shall be scored at one-half the weight that would
be given to a prior conviction under section la above if the defen-
dant had been an adult, except that multiple adjudications of delin-
quency arising out of the same transaction or occurrence shall be
aggregated and scored as provided for below in section lc of these
guidelines.
908. Any crime that has been reclassified since the time it was committed should be scored
as it is currently classified. For simplicity, fractions of a point appearing in a defendant's final
criminal history score should be disregarded. Thus, for example, scores of 2-1/4 or 2-3/4 points
each would become two points.
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c. Prior multiple convictions for offenses that arose out of the same
transaction or occurrence or were prosecuted in a single indictment
or information shall be scored as a single conviction of the most
serious offense of which the defendant was convicted, unless at
least one of the defendant's present offenses involves the actual
or attempted infliction of death or serious bodily injury by the
defendant and either:
(1) The defendant has been previously convicted of murder
or attempted murder, in which case the defendant's most
serious such prior conviction shall be given a double weight
for scoring purposes; 9 ' or
(2) The defendant has been sentenced for two or more crimes
within the scope of this subsection c, each of which involved
the defendant's actual or attempted infliction of serious bodily
injury, in which case the defendant's prior criminal episode
shall be scored as two convictions equal to the two most
serious offenses of which the defendant was convicted;
A defendant may be subjected to the provisions of either subsec-
tion c(l) or c(2) above, but not both.
d. In addition to the foregoing convictions and adjudications, a
defendant's criminal history score may be increased by the amounts
provided for in Chart 3 for any offenses that the defendant was
found in probation revocation proceedings to have committed.
§ 2. ADJUSTMENTS TO CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE
After calculating a defendant's criminal history score as provided for in
section 1 of these guidelines, that score is to be adjusted as provided for in
this section.
a. Factors in Aggravation9 10
(1) Serious Harm
(a) The following types of behavior constitute serious harm
within the meaning of this section, but only if (A) the behavior
is not an element or ordinary feature of the offense for which
the defendant currently is being sentenced; 91' (B) the behavior
was committed personally by the defendant, or at the direction
of, or with the active assistance of the defendant; 9 2 and (C)
909. Thus, if a defendant had been previously convicted of both murder and attempted
murder, only the murder conviction would be doubly weighted.
910. As under present law, the prosecution would have the burden of establishing the presence
of any disputed aggravating factor by a preponderance of the evidence.
911. People v. Conover, 84 Il1. 2d 400, 419 N.E.2d 906 (1981), mandates that these types
of behavior not be considered to constitute serious harm.
912. Limiting behavior in these ways is intended to maintain the requirement that the "serious
harm" involved in the offense consist of conduct or behavior that properly may be considered
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the behavior is not appropriately treated as a form of excep-
tionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty
within the purview of section 2a(2) of these guidelines:9"3
(1) committing an offense that threatened the physical safety
of a number of persons other than the actual or intended
victim(s);
(2) committing an offense while possessing a category I
weapon; 91 4
(3) committing an offense involving the discharge of a fire-
arm or the utilization or attempted utilization of any other
category I weapon so as to physically injure anyone; 915
(4) causing serious bodily injury or death;
(5) causing psychological harm to anyone; 916
(6) committing any forcible felony in which the victim is
less that twelve years old, more than sixty years old, or
physically handicapped at the time of the offense 9l7
(7) committing multiple acts of aggravated criminal sexual
assault, criminal sexual assault, or aggravated assault; 918
(8) committing any offense not involving the actual or threat-
ened use of physical force in an aggravated manner;9 9 or
as bearing on the rehabilitative potential of the defendant being sentenced.
913. Aggravated versions of some behavior covered by this section are included as species
of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior as well, and normally are to be given the weights
called for as exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior by § 2a(2)(b) of these guidelines. See
Appendix to text, § 2c(3), at 403-04.
914. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33A-I(b) (1983).
915. This aggravating factor and that in subparagraph (2) would replace the armed violence
statute, id. § 33B, by providing for the enhancement of a defendant's criminal history score
when a category I weapon was possessed or employed in the course of a felony. The present
automatic upgrading of all offenses committed while armed with a category I weapon to a class
X felony would be abolished. In addition, if a defendant caused or attempted to cause serious
bodily injury or death with such a weapon, such conduct would result in additional increase in
the criminal history score under either subparagraph (4) or under various provisions of § 2a(2)
of these guidelines relating to exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior.
916. Psychological harm may be treated as a form of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
under § 2a(2)(a)(2) if "gratuitous and severe psychological harm or abuse" is found in
conjunction with certain offenses.
917. Age or physical handicap of the victim is a basis for imposing extended term sentences
under existing law. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b)(3) (1983). It was considered
but rejected as a basis for a finding of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior. Under the
proposed guidelines, however, age or physical condition of the victim is an appropriate factor
for routinely aggravating offenses to a more limited extent.
918. This guideline endorses the view that repeated assaultive acts should be treated as an
aggravating factor irrespective of the physical or psychological harm caused.
919. This factor would permit enhancement of sentences imposed on such persons as major
drug traffickers, persons who steal exceptionally large amounts of money, or persons who abuse
a particularly vulnerable class of victims.
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(9) committing an unusually large number of offenses, even
if none of the offenses is aggravated in and of itself.
92 0
(b) If the sentencing court finds that a defendant committed
an offense in a manner that caused or threatened serious harm,
it shall increase the defendant's criminal history score by from
one to three points, depending upon the variety and degree of
such behavior that occurred. In addition, the weights to be
given the various forms of serious harm in subsection (a) above
are subject to the following limitations:
(1) Factor (2) shall not be given a weight of more than one
point, and may be disregarded if no other factor in aggra-
vation is present, and it appears to be in the interests of
justice to do So. 92 1
(2) Factor (5) shall not be given a weight of more than one
point unless factors (3), (4), (6), or (7) were present.922
(3) Factor (6) shall not be given a weight of more than one
point unless factors (3), (4), (5), or (7) were present.923
(4) No combination of factors not involving either factor
(3), (4) or (7) shall be given a weight of three points.924
(2) Brutal or Heinous Behavior.
(a)The following types of behavior constitute exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty within
the meaning of this section, 925 but only if (A) the behavior is
not an element or ordinary feature of the offense for which
920. This factor would permit enhancement of offenders whose first conviction of a serious
offense discloses that they had been involved in extensive criminal activity.
921. Although possessing a category I weapon increases the likelihood of violence, in many
cases it seems to be a factor which the court should be free to disregard. This guideline grants
the court that discretion when it appears to be in the interests of justice to do so.
922. The weight limitation placed on causing psychological harm is designed to protect against
a substantial enhancement of the sentence based upon an extreme and unforeseeable reaction
of a particular victim to the defendant's criminal conduct. The limitation would be unavailable
if the defendant took other actions which clearly should have been foreseen as likely to heighten
the trauma of the victim.
923. The weight limitation placed on the age or physical condition of the victim is designed
to limit significant enhancement of a sentence because of such factors, absent physical or
psychological harm to the victim.
924. This weighing provision implements the policy that directs assaults on the physical in-
tegrity of the victim should be dealt with most severely.
925. The list of exceptionally brutal behavior is not intended to be subject to judicial
supplementation. This treatment is analogous to that governing current extended term sentences.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.2(b), 1005-8-2(a) (1983). The list, however, includes
most forms of behavior that heretofore have been found to constitute exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior. Not included within this list is a provision based solely upon the age or
physical condition of the victim and a provision based solely upon causing psychological harm
to the victim.
The age of the victim as a sole factor has been deleted because of the belief that it does not
accurately indicate dangerousness, depravity, or incorrigibility. Many crimes involving children,
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the defendant is currently being sentenced; 926 and (B) the be-
havior was committed personally by the defendant, or at the
direction of, or with the active assistance of the defendant: 927
(1) subjecting anyone to torture or to gratuitous and severe
physical abuse;
(2) subjecting anyone to repeated acts of aggravated criminal
sexual assault, if accompanied by gratuitous and severe psy-
chological harm or abuse;
(3) causing or attempting to cause928 serious bodily injury or
death:
(a) when the victim has not resisted;
(b) when such actions were undertaken in an order to prevent
the detection, apprehension, or prosecution of an of-
fender; 929
(c) when such action was undertaken because of the testi-
mony of the victim or another in a judicial or administrative
proceeding; 930
(d) when such actions were undertaken for compensation;93 1
or
(e) when more than one actual or intended victim was
involved; 9 2 or
(4) engaging in a conspiracy to commit, or soliciting the com-
mission of, any offense described in subparagraphs (1)-(3)
above.
(b) Except as provided in section 2c(3) of these guidelines, if the
sentencing court finds that a defendant who was at least seventeen
elderly, or physically handicapped persons, however, will involve other factors of exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior as defined in this section. In addition, the age of the victim is taken
into consideration as a form of serious harm under § 2a(l), and as such also used to further
increase sentences aggravated by factors listed under § 2a(2). See Appendix to text, § 2a(2)(c),
at 401.
926. For the reasons for this limitation, see supra note 911.
927. For the reason for this limitation, see supra note 913.
928. The "causing or attempting to cause" phraseology is intended to eliminate a finding of
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior merely because a crime was committed in a potentially
more dangerous manner, even though that danger did not come to pass. Instead, offenses
including potentially dangerous behavior are treated as a variety of serious harm. See Appendix
to text, § 2a(1)(a)(l)-(3), at 400.
929. Efforts to prevent the detection, apprehension, or prosecution of either the defendant
or someone else are included within this provision.
930. The testimony referred to in this provision need not have been directed against the
defendant for this factor to apply.
931. This provision is directed toward murders or attempted murders committed either for
hire or to obtain some other monetary benefit resulting from the victim's death, such as life
insurance benefits or an inheritance.
932. The weight given to this factor obviously would vary according to the number of victims
involved, and, in an extreme case such as a mass hostage situation or a terrorist bombing, the
presence of multiple victims could lead to an out-of-guideline sentence.
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years old at the time the crime was committed 933 was convicted
of an offense accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, the defendant's criminal
history score shall be increased by from three to six points, 93 4
depending upon the variety and degree of such behavior that
occurred. 935
(c) If a defendant is found to have caused or threatened serious
harm within the meaning of section 2a(l)(a) of these guidelines
and that behavior is not of a type included within section 2a(2)(a),
any adjustments to the defendant's criminal history score under
section 2a(2)(b) may be further increased in accordance with sec-
tion 2a(l)(b).
(3) Other Factors in Aggravation
(a) The following factors shall be used to increase a defendant's
criminal history score by the amounts indicated:
(1) The offender committed the crime while serving a sentence
of probation, conditional discharge, or periodic imprisonment
(one point for each such occurrence, up to a maximum of two
points);
(2) The offender committed his crime while serving a period
of parole or mandatory supervised release (one point for each
such occurrence, up to a maximum of two points); or
(3) The offender committed the crime while at large on bond,
or while awaiting trial, or pending appeal (one point for each
such occurrence, up to a maximum of two points).
(b) The following factors may be considered as reasons to impose
a lengthier sentence within the guideline range for persons having
the defendant's criminal history score or, when otherwise con-
sistent with section 1005-6-1(a) of the Unified Code of Correc-
tions, 936 to impose an incarcerative rather than a nonincarcerative
sentence: 937
933. The age limitation of the defendant is brought forward from present law. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(b) (1983).
934. The three to six point increase in an offender's criminal history score resulting from
this finding is the equivalent of treating the offender as having an additional prior conviction
for a class I felony (three points), a class X felony (four points), or murder (six points).
935. It is difficult to be more precise in describing how to weigh this type of behavior for
sentencing purposes. Both the degree and variety of abuses can vary over such a broad range
that it is probably not wise to require that multiple factors be present before heavier weights
are available. If more extreme examples of abuses are known to the court, however, it would
be inappropriate to utilize the heavier weights of five or six points.
936. Section 1005-6-1(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-
6-1(a) (1983), governs the availability of probation under the Code. This provision makes it
clear that these guidelines continue the statute's important policy of generally favoring probation.
937. The five factors are identical to those currently codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-5-3.2(a)(4), (5), (6), (7), (9) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (eff. July 1, 1984).
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(1) The defendant, by the duties of his or her office or by his
or her position, was obliged to prevent the particular offense
committed or to bring the offenders committing it to justice;
(2) the defendant held a public office or was a public employee
at the time of the offense, and the offense was related to the
conduct of that office or employment;
(3) the defendant utilized his or her professional reputation or
position in the community to commit the offense, or to afford
him or her an easier means of committing it;
(4) The sentence is necessary to deter others from committing
the same crime; or
(5) The offense took place in a place of worship or on the
grounds of a place of worship, immediately prior to, during,
or immediately following worship services.
b. Nonaggravating Factors
(1) The following factors shall not be used to increase an offend-
er's sentence:
(a) The offender exercised a right secured to the offender by
law;
(b) The judge believes that the offender either committed or
suborned perjury in connection with the offender's trial or
sentencing; or
(c) The judge believes that the defendant lacks remorse for the
crime.
(2) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the sentencing judge is
convinced that the defendant committed perjury or lacks remorse
for the crime, the judge may refrain from reducing the defendant's
sentence by any amounts allowable pursuant to other provisions
of these guidelines.
c. Factors in Mitigation 938
(1) The following factors may be utilized by the court as reasons
to reduce a defendant's criminal history score by either one or
two points, depending upon the variety and degree of factors
found to be present:
(a) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threat-
ened serious physical harm to another;
(b) The defendant did not contemplate that his or her criminal
conduct would cause or threaten serious physical harm to
another;
938. Except for factor (g), the mitigating factors listed in subsection (1) of this section are
identical to those currently codified at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.1(a)(l)-(12) (1983).
As under present law, the defendant would have the burden of establishing the presence of
any disputed factor in mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence.
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(c) The defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(d) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify
the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a
defense;
(e) The defendant's criminal conduct was induced or facilitated
by someone other than the defendant;
(f) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the
victim of his or her criminal conduct for the damage or injury
that the victim sustained;
(g) The defendant has no scoreable history.of prior delinquency
or criminal activity 9 9 or has led a law-abiding life for a sub-
stantial period of time before the commission of the present
crime;
(h) The defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circum-
stances unlikely to recur;
(i) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that
the defendant is unlikely to commit another crime;
(j) The defendant is particularly likely to comply with the terms
of a period of probation;
(k) The imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive
hardship to his or her dependents; or
(1) The imprisonment of the defendant would endanger his or
her medical condition.
(2) If any or all of factors (c), (d), (g), (h), and (i) above have been
utilized to reduce exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior to a
form of serious harm within subsection (3) below, then the fac-
tors may not be utilized to effectuate a further reduction in a
defendant's sentence under subsection (1) above.9""
(3) Conduct within the scope of section 2a(2) may be treated as
a form of serious harm within the meaning of section 2a(l) rather
than as a form of exceptionally brutal of heinous behavior if any
of the circumstances listed below were present94I and the ends of
justice would be served by such treatment: 942
939. The word "scoreable" in this factor signifies that the defendant has a criminal history
score of less than one point. These scores are to be rounded down to zero. See supra note 908.
940. Under this provision a judge is not free to utilize the presence of the specified factors
more than once, so as to give no weight to the fact that a defendant engaged in exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior on the occasion in question. Instead, the judge would give that fact
a weight of from one to three points as a form of serious harm.
941. The five factors are derived from factors in mitigation currently codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.1(a)(3), (4), (7), (8), (9) (1983). All the proposed factors are identical
to the current versions, except that factor (c) has been modified by adding the word "scoreable."
For an explanation of that change, see supra note 939.
942. The "ends of justice" qualifier is designed to clarify that a judge is not required to
treat exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior as serious harm merely because one or more of
these factors is present. The greater the likelihood of their existence, and the more factors that
19851
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(a) The defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(b) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify
the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a
defense;
(c) The defendant has no scoreable history of prior delinquency
or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial
period of time before the commission of the present crime;
(d) The defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circum-
stances unlikely to recur;
(e) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that
he is unlikely to commit another crime.
d. Pleas of Guilty
When the defendant has elected to plead guilty to the offenses for which
he or she is being sentenced, the court may take that fact into con-
sideration by sentencing the defendant as if his or her criminal history
score was either one or two points lower than otherwise called for by
these guidelines. The court should not grant such a reduction, however,
if it believes that the ends of justice would not be served thereby.
§ 3. PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING RANGE
A defendant's presumptive type and length of sentence is determined by
the class of the felony for which the defendant is currently being sentenced
and the defendant's adjusted criminal history score, as seen in the chart on
the following page.
II. PROPOSED SUPREME COURT RULES
§ 1. A NEW RULE REGARDING REASONS FOR IMPOSING SENTENCE
a. In imposing sentence for a felony, the trial judge shall provide
the following information, as appropriate:
(1) Where the sentence being imposed has been agreed to by the
parties, a statement that, based upon the judge's independent
assessment of pertinent facts and circumstances, the sentence con-
forms to Illinois' sentencing guidelines or, if it does not, that it
is otherwise in the interest of justice. Any such non-guideline
sentence is also subject to the provisions of subparagraph b below.
(2) Where the sentence being imposed has not been agreed to by
the parties:
(a) a statement that the sentence conforms to Illinois' sentenc-
ing guidelines, or, if it does not, that it is otherwise in the
interest of justice. Any such non-guideline sentence is also sub-
ject to the provisions of subparagraph b below; and
(b) a recitation of the defendant's criminal history score as
determined by the court, whether there were any disputes
are present, the more willing a judge should be to mitigate the effects of the defendant's
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(b) a recitation of the defendant's criminal history score as
determined by the court, whether there were any disputes
regarding either that score or any adjustments thereto, and,
if so, how the trial judge resolved them and the reasons
therefor.
b. In any case where a trial judge imposes a sentence that the judge
believes departs from Illinois' sentencing guidelines, the judge shall
provide a statement on the record of the particular evidence, in-
formation, or other reasons that led to his or her sentencing
determination.
§ 2. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SUPREME COURT RULE 615
Supreme Court Rule 615 should be modified to allow the reviewing
court to modify the punishment imposed by the trial court, and to
provide the state with a qualified right to appeal sentences.9 43 The
necessary modification would require an amendment to paragraph
615(b)(4) of the present rule as well as the addition of new subpar-
agraphs (c) and (d), as provided below.
RULE 615
(b) Powers of the Reviewing Court. On appeal the reviewing court
may:
(4) modify the punishment imposed by the trial court, as pro-
vided in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this rule;
Appellate Review of Sentence
(c) Right to Appeal.-The defendant or the state may appeal the
legality of any sentence."' In addition, the defendant or the state
may appeal the discretionary aspects of any sentence for a felony
or a misdemeanor to the appellate court, provided, however, that
the state may not appeal any discretionary aspects of a sentence
943. Supreme Court Rule 615(b) currently allows the reviewing court to:
(1) reverse, affirm, or modify the judgement or order from which the appeal is taken;
(2) set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to or
dependent upon the jugement or order from which the appeal is taken;
(3) reduce the degree of the offense of which the appellant was convicted;
(4) reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court; or
(5) order a new trial.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 615(b) (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 615(b) (1983)).
944. The state currently may seek review of illegal sentences by way of mandamus. See
Fitzsimmons v. Norgle, 104 III. 2d 369, 371, 472 N.E.2d 802, 803 (1984); People ex rel. Carey
v. Bentivenga, 83 111. 2d 537, 539, 416 N.E.2d 259, 260 (1981).
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if the state either agreed to the sentence or failed to advise the
trial judge of the aspects of the sentence of which it complains,
or failed to make timely and proper objection thereto.94 5
(d) Determination on Appeal.-The appellate court shall affirm the
sentence imposed by the circuit court unless it finds: 94
(1) The circuit court purported to sentence within the sentenc-
ing guidelines but applied the guidelines erroneously;
(2) The circuit court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines
but the case involves circumstances in which the application
of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or
(3) The circuit court either did not apply the sentencing
guidelines or sentenced outside those guidelines, and the
sentence is unreasonable.
When the appellate court finds it cannot affirm the circuit court's sentence,
if it further finds that all pertinent facts and circumstances necessary to the
determination of a proper sentence have been fully and fairly developed, it
may impose an appropriate sentence itself.9 47 In all other such cases, the
appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand for further proceed-
ings. 948
945. The detailed qualification of the state's right to appeal sentences is designed to prevent
abuse of the defendant's right to appeal and to discourage politicization of judicial sentencing
decisions.
946. This Rule would require affirmance of sentencing decisions unless an error appeared on
the record. Purported errors involving disagreement over a sentencing judge's use of his or her
discretionary authority would require that the judge's position taken below was "clearly
unreasonable." See Appendix to text, Part II § 2(d)(2), at 407.
947. This provision would expand the power of the appellate court by permitting it to impose
a different type of sentence than that imposed by the circuit court. It would, however, offset
that expansion by making the presumptively correct disposition in all cases involving overturned
sentences to be a remand for further proceedings. Only where the necessary factual predicates
for determining a proper sentence have been developed fully would the appellate court be free
to impose a sentence itself.
948. Where the completeness of the record permitted, it also would be useful for the appellate
court to give its view of the appropriate length or type of sentence.
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